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Executive Summary 
How will the introduction and diffusion of autonomous vehicles (AVs) affect U.S. workers? This 
highly fraught question promises soon to loom large in hometowns and policy realms across the 
nation. Given Americans’ current reliance on cars and trucks for most of our transportation, the 
transition to self-driving vehicles will change many lives and livelihoods, likely for the better for 
the vast majority. But it will be costly for some. This study advances the national conversation 
about how to cope with the effect of AVs on workers in three ways: by setting forth a framework 
for discussion, presenting quantitative simulations and qualitative scenarios to help assess key 
impacts, and providing policy recommendations for mitigating negative impacts while also setting 
an agenda for research on policy. We hope that our report will help motivate policymakers and 
stakeholders to take steps now to reduce the likely negative effects of AV on U.S. workers. 
To preview our results, we find that the introduction of autonomous cars and trucks could directly 
eliminate 1.3 to 2.3 million workers’ jobs over the next thirty years, depending on the adoption 
scenario followed. While near-term effects are limited, the maximum impact we simulate (which 
occurs during the 2040s) could raise the overall annual unemployment rate by about 0.1 
percentage points and lower labor force participation by about 0.1 percentage points for a number 
of years, with stronger effects in hard-hit communities or during a recession.  
Using evidence from previous dislocations we find that each laid-off worker would likely lose on 
average about $80,000 in lifetime income due to the disruption, for a total loss of about $180 
billion for U.S. workers. These adjustments take into account the probable age of workers being 
dislocated; on average these workers would have about 16 years of labor force participation left 
in their careers.  
Most of the affected workers will eventually find new jobs or retire. However, this process will 
take time and may lead to wage increases or decreases. We do not provide specific estimates of 
job creation associated with AVs; instead we discuss the three general sources of these new jobs: 
growth in overall transportation, new labor inputs for the AV sector, and increased purchases of 
other goods and services by consumers who spend less on transportation.  
In addition, when driving is no longer a requirement, the duties in many other jobs (such as many 
home health aides, building contractors, visiting nurses, real estate agents and other sales people, 
regional supervisors, automobile and vehicle insurance workers, and taxi dispatchers) will change 
substantially. In total, the jobs whose duties are very likely to change with the adoption of AV 
employed 7.7 million people in 2016. The change in duties could be associated with better or 
worse jobs from the perspective of pay or skills; we explore a range of possibilities. 
Complacency, fatalism, or ignoring these serious consequences would be a mistake. There are 
numerous policy options for assisting workers in the affected occupations. As a country, we need 
to plan now so that the promise of AVs (cheaper and more efficient transportation, dramatic 
reduction in deaths and injuries from accidents, greater mobility for those who can’t drive, 
freedom from tedium for those who can) either does not impose huge costs on those directly 
affected or compensates them for their loss. The economic benefits of AVs, which some have 
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estimated at $800 billion to $1 trillion per year should provide adequate resources for such policy 
intervention.1 With advance planning, the task is manageable; according to our scenarios, 
employment disruptions won’t start in large numbers until after 2030, and will be gradual (about 
100,000 jobs disrupted per year, or 0.1 percent of the work force, at the time of peak impact).  
Our estimates, like all estimates, have limitations. Our simulations for displacement and 
unemployment include adjustments for turnover (workers leaving occupations for reasons other 
than the rise of autonomous vehicles). However, we do not include multiplier effects (the fact that 
when people lose jobs, their spending drops, leading to additional temporary unemployment from 
reduced sales from those jobless workers), a clear source of underestimation. On the other hand, 
if the pace of AV diffusion is slower than our scenarios anticipate (e.g., due to delays in achieving 
fully autonomous capabilities, consumer hesitance about adoption, regulatory constraints, partial 
(vs. full) automation that preserves a role for a human driver) or if employers retain and retrain 
many workers in the eliminated jobs, we may have overestimated.  
 
A. Lessons from the past 
Recognizing that innovation is not new, we begin with seven examples of previous disruptive 
changes and their labor market impacts, each providing lessons for the current situation:  
• The Industrial Revolution in England from 1750-1900 
• Autopilot in aviation from 1912 to now 
• Computer numerical control (CNC) in machine tools, 1960-1990  
• Automation in auto assembly plants 
• Automatic teller machines (ATMs) 
• Trade expansion from 1990-now  
• Self-driving trucks in the Australian strip mining industry, 2000-now  
Together, these cases illustrate compellingly that while technological change leads to large social 
benefits in the long run, some benefits can be long-delayed and the change can result in significant 
uncompensated costs to those displaced and their communities. The direct effects of new 
technology on jobs and skill levels are easier to foresee in the short-term and may be primarily 
negative. The indirect effects are likely to be positive as productivity rises, but may take a long 
time to arrive — the pace is much harder to forecast explicitly. Accordingly, we focus our 
                                                          
1
 See Securing America’s Future Energy, “The Impact of Autonomous Vehicles on Consumers, the Economy and the 
U.S. Labor Force,“ (June 13, 2018) and Robert Atkinson, “The Coming Transportation Revolution,” Milken Institute 
Review. 4th Quarter 2014. https://itif.org/publications/2014/10/17/coming-transportation-revolution. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to estimate benefits from AV adoption. We take no stand on the size of benefits other 
than to reference two credible estimates and note that there is necessarily considerable uncertainty about these 
estimates, as is true for our estimates of costs. A key source of uncertainly concerns AVs’ environmental impacts 
(in particular the impacts on vehicle miles travelled and on land use); policy choices will have a large impact on 
the size of net benefits.  
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simulations on quantitative calculation of jobs lost due to the disruption of the new autonomous 
technology. We address job creation in broader qualitative terms, sketching possible scenarios.  
We predict that the transition from today’s human-driven vehicles to the AV future will be long 
and marked by bursts of startling change in how people and goods are moved around, 
interspersed with times when diffusion slows due to technological complications, public 
resistance, regulatory caution, and efforts to clarify legal responsibility/liability. We know from 
other examples of disruptive change affecting jobs and skills that the length and difficulty of such 
transitions have varied greatly, depending upon the size of the changes in skills needed, 
investment requirements, stakeholder bargaining power, and institutions, even the geography.  
Hence, there are at least three reasons for concern about the impending adoption of AVs.  
1. Losses tend to accumulate before widespread gains, substantially affecting certain 
individuals and geographic and demographic communities more than others.  
2. Many benefits are difficult to predict and they may be very unevenly distributed. In 
particular, recent wage stagnation even in the face of significant productivity gains casts 
doubt on whether the benefits of a technology like AVs would, in fact, be shared, and 
causes worry among those who already feel they are just getting by.2  
3. We cannot rule out the possibility that the advent of AVs and more generally, artificial 
intelligence (AI) technology, will result in a different mix of direct and indirect effects 
than in the past. In particular, AI may pose a more real threat to automating high-skilled 
work and hence adversely affect both jobs and skills at the high-skill (usually high-pay) 
end of the economy.  
 
B. Framework 
We set forth a framework (below) to help trace the labor market impacts of AVs. The framework 
draws on both historical experience and economic theory. It clarifies that a central risk from 
large disruptions stems not from some permanent decline in the number of jobs available in the 
economy, but from the costs imposed on displaced workers and the negative social reaction if 
adjustments to the disruption are too slow or costly. New jobs will be created through three 
effects: people will use more transportation when it becomes less expensive, suppliers of AV-
related goods and services will expand to meet demand, and consumers will increase purchases 
of other goods and services with money left over when transportation becomes safer and 
cheaper. So, the economy will eventually return to full employment after AV-adoption layoffs. 
                                                          
2
 David Autor and Anna Salomons. “Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity Growth, Employment, and the 
Labor Share.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. March 8, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/is-
automation-labor-displacing-productivity-growth-employment-and-the-labor-share/ 
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Thus, if our report only estimated the number of workers likely to be displaced, we would miss the 
heart of the matter. The key questions concern the magnitude of losses to workers, how long the 
adjustments will take, and what we can do to mitigate the costs. The framework points to four 
gaps that make workers’ adjustments slower and costlier. Displaced workers may not have the 
skills needed for the new jobs. They may not live in the same areas where new jobs arise. Lack of 
worker voice, bargaining power, and supportive institutions could mean that workers’ losses are 
unnecessarily exacerbated. Finally, firms may not have the financing or incentives to invest 
because of poor economic conditions or other impediments. The historical cases reviewed 
demonstrate that technology alone does not uniquely determine many outcomes, including the 
quality of the new jobs. Instead, social policy and employer choices to address these gaps make a 
big difference. 
 
C. Assessing impacts 
Informed by the framework, we estimate the number of workers displaced and use that to 
simulate key impacts of AV adoption over the next few decades. First, we focus on how AV-
adoption layoffs might raise unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduce workers’ 
earnings.  
We consider four adoption scenarios developed by Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE): 
• Passenger (light-duty) vehicles with household ownership: Households own most cars and 
light trucks, as is now the case. We call this scenario “Cars-Personal.” 
• Passenger (light-duty) vehicles with fleet ownership: A set of transportation service 
providers own and operate most cars and light trucks. Compared to household ownership, 
fleets imply more centralized maintenance, fewer vehicles per person, and more rapid 
adoption of electric vehicles. We call this scenario “Cars-Fleet.” 
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• Trucking (heavy-duty) with slow adoption: Trucking takes about 30 years adapting to 
driver-assisted autonomous vehicles before it proceeds to fully autonomous trucks that do 
not need drivers. We call this scenario “Trucking-Slow.” 
• Trucking (heavy-duty) with aggressive adoption: Trucking proceeds to full autonomy much 
more quickly and completely than in the slow adoption scenario. We call this scenario 
“Trucking-Fast.” 
We base our simulations on the experiences of workers displaced in the recent past, data on the 
occupations likely affected, and estimates of earnings losses from displacement. We follow 
previous studies in identifying occupations likely to be affected directly and indirectly by AVs, 
building on occupational classifications identified as “driving related” by the Commerce 
Department’s Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) study.3 In consultation with industry 
experts, we set the percentage of workers in each occupation who are at risk of layoff under each 
AV scenario. These include truck and bus drivers, taxi and other personal transport employees, 
and other drivers. In addition, we consider other job losses from the adoption of AVs, such as 
automobile insurance adjusters, auto repair mechanics, police patrol officers, and others. We 
adjust these job losses for projected occupational turnover (workers leaving occupations for 
reasons other than the rise of autonomous vehicles) to produce estimates of displacement. 
From recent U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS) we construct 
the likely path followed by a cohort of displaced workers. We quantify the path as shares of the 
cohort of displaced workers shifting between three possible labor force states (employed, 
unemployed, or out of the labor force) in the years after displacement. Although the DWS asks 
about only three years of experience post displacement, we extend the time covered by making 
assumptions about eventual convergence of the displaced workers to workforce averages. The 
path constructed is consistent with prior studies that find that displaced workers experience above 
average unemployment for a long time and are disproportionately likely to be out of the labor 
force after displacement.  
With this information (post-displacement paths, numbers of workers in occupations affected, and 
the timing of transition phases) we simulate how many unemployed workers and labor force exits 
will be added due to AV adoption over the coming decades, as implied by the four scenarios.  
Importantly, these simulations should be regarded less as highly specific forecasts, but rather as 
rough gauges of the potential size and nature of the disruption to the labor market posed by AV 
adoption. In order to place the effects in the easily-understood context of today’s labor market, 
these simulations abstract from the many expected and unexpected changes in demographic and 
economic conditions that will occur over coming decades. When AV adoption actually takes place, 
its costs and benefits will undoubtedly be affected by conditions prevailing at the time (in 
particular the rate of growth of the overall economy), as well as employers’ and policy choices.  
                                                          
3
 David Beede, Regina Powers, and Cassandra Ingram. Office of the Chief Economist, Economics and Statistics 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. (August 11, 2017). “The Employment Impact of Autonomous 
Vehicles” (ESA Issue Brief # 05-17). 
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/Employment%20Impact%20Autonomous%20Vehicles_0.pdf 
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Based on our simulations, we find the following unemployment impacts as the labor market 
absorbs the loss of 1.3 to 2.3 million jobs (adjusted for projected turnover), depending on the 
adoption scenario:4 
• Job losses from AVs ramp up slowly and do not start adding noticeably (i.e., remain under 
50,000 per year) to the ranks of the unemployed until 2030 or later.  
• The Trucking-Fast scenario causes the most concentrated job losses of the four considered. 
At its peak, the rise in unemployment under this scenario is about four times higher than 
the peak impact of any of the other transition scenarios.  
• Combining the Trucking-Fast adoption with either passenger car AV adoption swells the 
ranks of the unemployed by about 200,000 workers across the U.S. at the peak of impact, 
around 2046, enough to raise the U.S. unemployment rate by about 0.1 percentage points.  
• The additional joblessness affects some demographic and geographic communities even 
more noticeably.  
o Men will lose many more jobs than women.  
o African Americans and people with lower levels of education will be dispropor-
tionately affected.  
o By region, the South and West will have the most workers displaced. Impacts may 
be most severe for the eight inland states that have disproportionate shares of 
Heavy and Tractor Trailer Truck Drivers: North Dakota, Arkansas, Nebraska, Iowa, 
Wyoming, Mississippi, Tennessee, and South Dakota.5 
We also find the following labor force participation and earnings effects: 
• AV adoption will increase the numbers of workers who exit the labor force for a 
considerable time. The number of workers not in the labor force after AV-induced 
displacement is on a par with the rise in unemployment and lasts longer. At peak impact 
(around 2049), it could lower the U.S. labor force participation rate by almost 0.1 
percentage points.  
• The lifetime wealth (present value of earnings) lost by workers will be very high, totaling 
$70,000 to $87,000 per AV-displaced worker and from $104 billion to $189 billion to the 
AV workforce and their families and communities as a whole. 
                                                          
4
 With no adjustment for occupational turnover, the figures are 1.4 to 2.6 million. According to BLS occupational 
turnover projections, turnover for the occupations affected by AV averages 10.5 percent per year for trucks and 
9.9 percent per year for cars. 
5
 See our in-depth case study on truck drivers in Section V.D. for more about the various factors that will affect job 
loss in that occupation. 
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It is important to note that in the context of a recession, all of these impacts would be much more 
severe. However, it is possible that a recession could also slow the diffusion of AVs, hence the 
overall levels of job loss or changed duties, as a partial offset.  
It may be useful to compare our estimates of dislocation from AVs to that caused by the decline 
of manufacturing.6 U.S. manufacturing has lost 6.7 million jobs since its peak in 1978, or about 1.7 
million jobs per decade. We estimate AVs will disrupt 1.3 to 2.3 million jobs over 30 years, which 
is as much as 800,000 jobs per decade—half the size of the manufacturing job loss. The AV impact 
will be further weakened by the larger size of the U.S. labor force in the future, and the disruption 
will be less geographically concentrated than in manufacturing. However, given the large impact 
of manufacturing job loss on U.S. workers, the economy, and political system, a potential new 
disruption about half that size in another industry certainly merits serious attention. 
 
D. Recommendations 
In order to be sure that the country will reap the promised benefits of AVs, it will be important to 
ensure that transition costs and fear of them do not hinder progress. The short- to medium-term 
losses identified by these simulations likely won’t be addressed adequately in the absence of active 
efforts to mitigate costs to those harmed. Anticipating that long-term gains in employment and 
skills may turn up in unexpected parts of the economy is insufficient to address these impacts for 
many reasons—including that those gains are not likely to accrue to those who suffered the losses. 
Indeed, it is imperative to avoid using the vision of a long-term post-adjustment future as an 
excuse not to deal with the dislocations caused in the short term by the adoption of AVs.  
Previous major transformations in the United States have occurred without coordinated 
engagement of stakeholders to mitigate damage to those left behind. Failure to address the costs 
once again risks sidelining part of our national productive capacity and unleashing a full range of 
attendant social ills that accompany extended unemployment, including deteriorating health, 
shorter life spans, and intergenerational impacts on children.7 The uncompensated losses from 
transformations have damaged many lives, families and communities and, thus, helped breed 
resistance to change. With research, advance planning, and conversation, the adoption of AVs 
offers an important opportunity to improve on the past. 
There are many policy options, both existing and proposed, to mitigate losses to workers. The U.S. 
has a workforce development system composed of federal, state, and local partners that 
administer the Unemployment Insurance system, One-Stop centers to aid unemployed workers, 
training grants, community colleges, and other components. Increasing use of program 
evaluations provides evidence that many employment and training programs are effective and can 
help direct resources to their most productive uses. Despite its good work, there are many signs 
that this present system by itself will not be adequate to mitigate the large costs of the adoption 
                                                          
6
 Thanks to Michael Mandel for suggesting this comparison. 
7
 Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
2011 no. 2. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/recessions-and-the-costs-of-job-loss/  
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of AV, including falling coverage and take-up of Unemployment Insurance, declining funding for 
the Employment and Training Administration, and a rising sense of worker insecurity.  
Addressing the costs to workers requires a multipronged approach to augment the existing 
system. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to take a stand on specific policies to pursue, 
we recommend an overall approach that includes the following: 
1. Development of a forum for ongoing engagement by AV employers and stakeholders with 
the U.S. workforce development system in order to minimize disruptions from AV, perhaps 
via the Workforce Information Advisory Council. Such communication would educate 
members of the workforce system about upcoming challenges and opportunities, connect 
affected employers with local workforce system agencies, and help identify the best means 
to monitor labor market impacts of AVs. 
2. Efforts to design new jobs created by AVs to take advantage of the skills that people in the 
disrupted occupations already have. For example, those who used to manually drive trucks 
might have skills well-suited for traffic monitoring, truck maintenance, or remotely piloting 
convoys of trucks (if this latter scenario becomes widespread).  
3. An organized effort to conduct research with the goals of informing mitigation efforts for 
AV and future innovations. Key research topics beyond the scope of the current paper 
include measuring the impact of AVs on commuting times for employees, estimating the 
impact of a driving requirement on occupational wages, the potential of AVs to open more 
jobs to people with disabilities that prevent them from driving, and understanding the 
impact on workers and others of AV-induced changes in land use and vehicle miles 
traveled.  
4. Active support for the development of good data to monitor developments via official 
statistics and private efforts. This includes support for: 
a. Recommendations by the recent Ryan-Murray Commission on Evidence-Based 
Policymaking (CEP) that point the way for the federal government to better harness 
administrative data for workforce development. 
b. Adequate funding for the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide needed data 
including initiatives such as quick-response surveys of employers. 
c. Safe sharing of state Unemployment Insurance worker records for statistical and 
evaluation purposes and enhancing those records to include occupational titles and 
hours worked while retaining strict controls to maintain the confidentiality of 
individuals’ data.  
d. Broadened access to data generated by AVs in the service of important public policy 
goals, e.g. supporting a viable insurance system or learning about safety violations 
and accidents in order to achieve system-wide improvements, again with controls 
to maintain confidentiality of individuals’ data.  
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5. Active, ongoing consideration of directing some of the benefits from AV adoption toward 
support for major policy solutions that incorporate the following features: 
a. Programs that are large enough or scalable to handle multiple large scale 
disruptions, even during an economic downturn  
b. Multiple treatments that can be tailored to workers’ situations, risks, and local 
conditions 
c. Increased ability of ordinary Americans to share in the gains from disruptions that 
help the overall economy 
d. Broad-based rather than applying narrow criteria for determining eligibility  
e. Engaged directly with employers and worker organizations 
f. Able to innovate  
g. Guided by evidence from program evaluations, robust labor market statistics, and 
research  
There is no dearth of broad policy proposals that could meet these criteria, including works 
councils, worker training accounts, wage insurance, public sector employment, universal basic 
income, flexicurity, and place-based policies.  
Going forward, we believe that establishment of a sound mitigation strategy must be recognized 
as an essential component of promoting any disruptive innovation like AVs in the U.S.  
 
I. Lessons from Past Innovations 
In this section, we explore what happened in the past when there were large changes in 
employment and job content. We look in detail at several cases, and also at more general studies 
of the issue. Our seven main cases, in rough chronological order, are: 
• The Industrial Revolution in England from 1750-1900 
• Autopilot in aviation from 1912 to now  
• Computer numerical control (CNC) in machine tools 1960-1990  
• Automation in auto assembly plants, 1980s to now 
• Automatic teller machines (ATM), 1980s to now 
• Trade expansion from 1990 to now 
• Self-driving trucks in the Australian strip mining industry 2000 to now  
All but one of these cases involves a major change in technology. The exception is the impact of 
trade with China, which we include because it is both well-studied and recent. Also, much of the 
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current fear about the potential impact of autonomous vehicles and other forms of automation 
stems from this recent shock, which imposed large uncompensated losses for workers and 
communities.  
Below, we summarize the lessons from these cases and their potential lessons for the case of 
autonomous vehicles. More detail on each case appears in Appendix A.  
A. Summary of labor market impacts from past innovations 
The introduction of almost all technologies has both positive and negative impacts. In general, the 
direct effect of automation is that fewer jobs are needed to make a certain amount of product or 
service. Typically, demand then rises for that product or other products. In the long run, the 
demand effects more than offset the productivity effects, and employment and living standards 
increase. A recent McKinsey report provides several examples of this process.8 For example, in the 
first half of the 20th century, the growth of the auto industry destroyed jobs in the carriage industry 
and railways, but created new jobs in automobile manufacturing and trucking; the number of jobs 
created over this period was more than 10 times the number destroyed, McKinsey estimates.  
Although the new technology almost always creates enough new wealth to leave everyone better 
off, actually distributing this income widely sometimes takes a very long time. For example, the 
Industrial Revolution began in England in the late 18th century. The mechanization of industries 
such as agriculture and weaving led to dramatic increases in output. However, wages stagnated 
for half a century, from about 1790-1840, and workers’ living standards declined. The Enclosure 
Movement removed small farmers’ and grazers’ access to land, enabling agriculture to be 
mechanized on the resulting large holdings; the mechanization also reduced the skills needed for 
farming. Similarly, skilled hand-loom weavers were replaced by unskilled factory workers 
(including children), and the weavers’ wages fell dramatically. Eventually, wages did grow at a rate 
commensurate with (and sometimes exceeding) productivity growth, thus enabling workers to 
share in prosperity. But these changes did not occur automatically. As the McKinsey report notes, 
“The turnaround in the relationship between wages and output came at a time of substantial 
reform of existing structures including the right to unionize, limitations on child labor, the 
introduction of public high schools, urban planning to improve public health, elimination of 
debtors’ prison, and the extension of the right to vote to landless workers.”9 
Technology is not deterministic of any particular outcomes, and examples are abundant of how 
the same technology can be implemented in very different ways with very different consequences, 
certainly for jobs and skills. For example, the U.S. Air Force subsidized development of computer 
numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools with the goal of enabling complex products to be 
                                                          
8
 James Manyika, Susan Lund, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan Woetzel, Parul Batra, Ryan Ko, and Saurabh 
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produced without companies having to depend on skilled labor. The Air Force and defense 
contractors ended up with a highly abstract programming method which initially was quite 
complex, expensive, and fault-prone. They rejected a simpler technology, “record playback,” 
which would have simply recorded the actions of skilled machinists to make a repeatable process. 
The result was a technology that after much tribulation could make more complex parts than even 
the most skilled machinist could make—but which continued to require input of skilled 
technicians. The most effective operation of the technology involves both specialized 
programmers and skilled technicians on the shop floor who can modify programs to take into 
account ever-changing variables such as tool wear.10 The goal of a “lights out factory” (one with 
no workers) remains elusive.  
Automation sometimes leads to de-skilling, and sometimes to upskilling. For example, automation 
in banking in the U.S. in the 1990s had both effects, leading to “job polarization.”11 
Computerization made it easier to divide up the relatively low-level tasks performed by “check 
processors” into four jobs. One of these jobs was done by computers; the other three were 
narrower jobs doing relatively tedious tasks that are hard for computers to do. (One of the jobs 
was removing staples and orienting checks so the computer could scan them; this job was paid 
less than the original check processor job.) In contrast, the more tedious parts of jobs performed 
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by higher-level workers were automated, and these workers took on tasks involving more 
judgment and higher pay. 
In some cases, introduction of the same type of equipment led to upskilling in some cases and 
deskilling in other places, depending upon characteristics of both product and labor markets. Once 
CNC had been adopted, rather than record playback, machinists in some plants gained computer 
programming skills while computers took over the direct determination of “feeds and speeds.” 
More often, however, machinists became less skilled, mostly watching for errors by the automated 
equipment, while firms gave programming and problem-solving duties to engineers.  
Sometimes a new general purpose technological capability follows very different implementation 
trajectories when applied to different tasks. For example, the 1980s saw the beginning of a huge 
campaign to invest in automation at automotive assembly plants as multi-axes, programmable 
robots became available. These robots’ flexible capabilities came at a price that incentivized efforts 
at labor cost displacement.  
Automation in both welding and paint departments did increase substantially due to investment 
in these new robotic capabilities. However, automakers worldwide all failed in their attempts to 
apply these same robots to final assembly tasks, for three reasons:12 1) the capital equipment was 
expensive; 2) the equipment broke down a lot, making production schedules unreliable and 
requiring frequent maintenance; and 3) the equipment, while hypothetically programmable and 
able to handle a high degree of product complexity, was mostly unable to accommodate a high 
level of variety in actual operating conditions. With these barriers to implementation, many 
assembly automation initiatives were unwound.  
The alternate path eventually adopted by virtually all automakers could be called “automation 
assist.” These days, simple, inexpensive robots that can lift heavy parts and hold them in place 
while human workers carry out assembly tasks and quality checks have proved a winning 
combination in terms of lower capital investment, better labor productivity and product quality, 
and fewer workplace injuries. Custom-designed carts to hold tools, parts, and fasteners, 
connected to move in synchrony with the assembly line, are another low-cost “automation assist” 
application that has had the additional benefit of involving line workers, within teams, in their 
design. The lesson is that automation often does not completely eliminate jobs. Many times, 
automation has a partial impact in which tasks are shared between the human and the machine – 
and creative approaches to managing the human-machine interface are often possible in this 
partial automation state. Indeed, when humans work in close proximity to machines, their 
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observations can yield improvement ideas that “give wisdom to the machine”13, which can help 
capital equipment appreciate (rather than depreciate) in value.  
The pace of change has a large impact on the size of the dislocation. Rapid implementation of AV 
could lead to sudden dislocation. This suddenness is typically difficult for individuals, communities, 
and government policies to adjust to and/or ameliorate. In contrast, slow change, interrupted 
diffusion, and/or equifinal paths to implementation could allow for better anticipation and better 
adjustment, smarter policies, less negative framing, and more creative discovery of positive 
scenarios for joint gains.  
For example, the sudden entry of China into the World Trade Organization caused widespread 
dislocation in U.S. manufacturing communities. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song found that one 
quarter of recent U.S. manufacturing job loss could be attributed to this cause.14 The impact was 
not limited to the manufacturing sector; they estimate that the median working-age American lost 
$1,200 in annual income from 2000 to 2007 as a result of China’s entry into the WTO.15  
Future analysts will continue to debate exactly which factors caused which outcomes. This is 
because assigning causality to any particular impact is always difficult and technological 
transformations do not follow a rigid pattern. For example, in the trade example above, 
economists used to think in general that dislocations due to various types of economic change 
were temporary. Recent research is upending this conclusion, as we noted above. A recent 
example, automated mining in Australia, shows that some technologies have immediate benefits 
for many workers. There, AV technology has eliminated long commutes by miners to remote areas 
and dangerous work in dusty and hot conditions, and has led to increased pay for remotely 
directing automated mining machines. However, jobs near the mines supplying food and goods to 
the remote miners (often among the few available in these remote communities) were 
permanently eliminated, to the detriment of many local workers.  
Economic historians also believed that the gains from the Industrial Revolution were so unequally 
distributed that malnutrition (as measured by average heights) rose in the ensuing decades. But 
more recent scholarship casts some doubt on this conclusion, suggesting that sample selection 
biased the results. (For example, much height data comes from recruits to the military; if times 
are better, those interested in joining the military are a less-wealthy stratum of the population 
than before. Thus paradoxically, improved welfare could lead to shorter stature in the army.) Still, 
as we noted above, it does seem clear that wages stagnated during the early years of the Industrial 
Revolution (and fell sharply for many), with disputed indications that average heights fell 
significantly during this period.  
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Forecasters can typically anticipate the direct impacts that automation will have in eliminating 
specific jobs. However, analysts have been very poor at predicting how indirect effects of 
automation will change input costs, thus creating new economic activity and creating new jobs to 
deal with higher demand or new types of goods and services, etc. Yet with benefit of historical 
hindsight we can see that the number of indirect jobs created vis-à-vis a given type of automation 
is virtually always greater than the number of direct jobs lost.16  
Fifty years of experience with automated teller machines (ATMs) testify to the difficulties of 
predicting these indirect effects, particularly during a long transition to ubiquitous application of 
the technology. ATMs were launched in 1967, almost simultaneously (and independently) in the 
U.S., UK, and Sweden. Early diffusion was slowed by operational problems, some created by ATM 
exposure to harsh weather and temperature extremes.17 The pace of diffusion picked up by the 
mid-1980s and the direct effect of eliminating bank teller jobs showed up immediately; a 1996 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) study found a decline of 41,000 bank teller jobs from 1986 to 1996, 
out of an overall employment drop of 70,000 to the level of 1.5 million commercial banking jobs, 
despite an expanding economy.18  
But this pattern reversed beginning in the mid-1990s. According to Bessen,19 the number of full-
time equivalent bank tellers grew from the late-1990s to 2014 even as the number of ATMs 
deployed grew dramatically. How was this possible? Since ATMs allowed banks to operate branch 
offices at lower cost, they chose to open many more branches for easier access and a stronger 
community presence, expanding the number of people served and services offered by banks. Job 
losses from fewer tellers per branch were offset by the larger number of branches, resulting in net 
growth for bank tellers. Furthermore, with the emphasis on cross-selling new financial products 
to bank customers, new types of jobs were created at these branches, requiring customer-facing 
interpersonal skills, product knowledge, and aptitude for sales. In the last few years, with a decline 
in the use of cash, the trend is again reversed, with expectations that some bank branches will 
close. At the same time, the newest ATM feature at some banks is a two-way video connection to 
a bank employee in a call center to handle any non-routine transactions. ATMs as portals for new 
services could spur yet another phase of expected and unexpected consequences for jobs and 
skills. 
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Some implementations of big new technologies have gone relatively smoothly. In the U.S. for 
example, the 1990s computerization of white-collar work affected the jobs of people with college 
degrees; they were able to use computers as a complement to their work, rather than as a 
substitute for it. In other cases, the co-existence of people doing jobs that overlap with what 
technology could do on its own becomes institutionalized, not least because this arrangement 
keeps a responsible (and liable) human being “in the loop.”  
For example, the autopilot function in aviation has a long history, going back to 1914 when 
gyroscope technology was shown capable of keeping a plane’s flight path stable even in the 
absence of an active pilot at the controls. Yet pilots still routinely staff all commercial airline flights. 
The minimum required staffing level for a flight crew has shifted down; it was once three (two 
pilots and a flight engineer) and now only the two pilots are required by FAA regulations. This 
status quo is, by most accounts, securely maintained under the current regulatory regime.20  
Are human pilots headed for elimination? Perhaps, since in a recent survey, airline pilots reported 
spending only 4 to 7 minutes per flight in manual control mode. And NASA is investing heavily in a 
“safe autonomous system operations” project that could potentially remove the on-board co-pilot 
and substitute a remote ground controller who could serve as co-pilot for multiple flights.21  
Yet, even with what autopilot technology is capable of doing, accounts from pilots reveal how 
misleading the “seven minutes of hands-on flying” statement is.22 Pilots always have hands-on 
control during taxiing for takeoff and after landing. Pilots also make the choices among a set of 
operating parameters that go into a given autopilot configuration. Pilots respond to queries and 
directives from air traffic controllers and, of course, take over in the case of extreme weather 
conditions, equipment failures, and other emergencies.  
But perhaps the most important point about the continued presence of pilots in the cockpit is that 
they are there to reassure both passengers and the society at large that a responsible, competent 
professional is in charge and monitoring the technology for their safety. Legal philosophers and 
ethicists, observing this phenomenon, speak of the importance of having a “moral crumple zone” 
for certain activities that are dangerous and occur in public space.23 Just as the crumple zone in an 
automobile provides protection for the occupant in the event of a crash, the presence of a pilot 
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who is responsible for safety provides a kind of moral protection against anxieties that could 
otherwise render the aviation system less effective as a transportation service open to all.  
Thus, it appears unlikely that “planes without pilots” are coming to our airports anytime soon. We 
might find that similar sentiments will preserve a driver role for autonomous trucks, perhaps 
particularly the big tractor-trailers that can pose such a danger in case of accidents in uncontrolled 
environments, even when the technology is hypothetically able to function without any human 
intervention.  
Although in some situations, automation can be implemented without the need for dramatic 
adjustments in jobs or skills, this is by no means the norm – or even the dominant case. And even 
when indirect effects over the long term add more jobs and skills than are lost in the short term, 
limitations in the effectiveness of short-term adjustments can have negative consequences for the 
individuals and communities first affected. Several types of gaps slow adjustment: 
1) The new jobs may be located in different places from existing jobs. In this case displaced 
workers may have to move to find new employment, slowing the process of re-employment. 
An example here would be trade, where manufacturing-intensive communities lost jobs, 
while others gained.24  
2) The new jobs may require different skills from the old jobs. For example, computerized 
machine tools were designed in such a way as to require sophisticated programming skills, 
making it hard for existing machinists to use their skills.  
3) Incentives or access to capital for investments that create new jobs may be lacking. For 
example, if the major adoption of a technology occurs during a recession or in a region with 
low access to capital, the creation of new jobs may be slowed. In contrast, this process may 
occur relatively quickly during a boom time, such as during the rapid diffusion of ATMs from 
the mid-1980s to mid-1990s.  
4) Institutions and regulations that facilitate the sharing of productivity gains may be lacking. 
Examples of these mechanisms include unions and some labor market regulations. Unions 
can work with employers to implement transition plans that reduce the need for layoffs and 
new hires. The automation of welding and stamping in the auto industry was facilitated by 
clauses in UAW contracts that required retraining and reassignment when jobs were 
eliminated due to new technology. The union recognized that the viability of the “Annual 
Improvement Factor” (an annual wage increase received by all members) in fact depended 
on the introduction of new technology.25 In contrast, where workers do not have the power 
to enforce an efficient agreement, they may try to protect their right to perform the duties of 
their individual job, preventing efficient reallocation of resources. For example, some states’ 
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occupational license requirements impose barriers that slow occupational switching but do 
not appear to contribute much to the quality or safety of the service provided.26 Other 
regulations can improve transitions, such as requiring early warnings for mass layoffs to allow 
workers more time to search or retrain while on the job to shorten or avoid unemployment 
spells.27 
B. Implications of past changes for likely labor market impacts of AVs 
Taken together, our review of historical cases suggests that technological change in the long run 
leads to large social benefits, but that in some cases these benefits are long-delayed and/or 
impose significant costs to those displaced.28 The length and difficulty of the adjustments varied 
greatly, depending upon the size of the changes in skills needed, the geography, investment, 
bargaining power, and institutions.  
For example, the pace and pattern of diffusion of AVs will likely be affected by many factors, 
including the capability of the technology itself (e.g., extreme weather conditions are still 
challenging for most AV hardware to handle), customer receptiveness (e.g., how much customers 
are ready to trust a driverless vehicle, particularly where there is no potential for human backup), 
regulatory and legal requirements (e.g., at what level of safety will regulators allow (or demand) a 
rapid move to a fully-AV transportation network? who is liable when AVs cause accidents?), and 
economics (e.g., what level of density of demand is needed to make fleets of AV cars economically 
viable, particularly in suburban and rural areas; what cross-subsidies might be needed to insure 
universal access to new modes of transportation?). An additional factor is the interaction of AV 
diffusion with efforts to regulate carbon that might lead to significant increases or decreases in 
vehicle miles travelled. At any given rate of diffusion, there will be immediate direct effects and 
longer-term, difficult-to-predict indirect effects; there is no scenario in which negative direct 
effects can be completely avoided.  
Still, when viewed in retrospect and across the entire economy, it is clear that automation has not 
shrunk the total number of jobs and has delivered a higher standard of living. This is such a positive 
scenario that one might ask “why worry?” 
So, why worry?  
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First, the direct losses that occur right away can impose substantial costs on certain individuals 
and communities. In particular, for the reasons listed above, re-employment may be delayed 
substantially. Indeed, recent declines in U.S. business expansions and startups suggest that the 
capacity of the U.S. economy to respond quickly to shocks has diminished.29 
Second, the broader indirect impacts may be very unevenly distributed and increasingly so. While 
the U.S. has historically seen wages rise in tandem with productivity, institutions for achieving this 
have broken down since the 1980s, as shown in Figure I-1 on the next page. As a result, despite 
significant U.S. productivity gains, the bottom 90 percent of American adults have not seen any 
income gains since 1999, even when government payments are included.30 The President’s 
Council of Economic Advisors provides more evidence, reviews possible causes, and advances the 
idea that employer bargaining power (also called monopsony power) has been growing in the 
U.S.31 This real wage stagnation, which has persisted since the mid-1970s in the face of significant 
productivity gains, casts doubt on whether the promise of a technology like AVs would in fact be 
shared, and causes worry among those who already feel they are just getting by.  
Third, we cannot rule out the possibility that the technology behind the current wave of 
automation—artificial intelligence (AI)—will have a different mix of direct and indirect effects than 
in the automation scares of the past. In particular, due to a capacity for “machine learning” via 
mimicking what humans do in their jobs (rather than programmers having to figure out how to 
reduce those human activities to programmable rules), AI may pose a more real threat to high-
skilled workers and hence adversely affect both jobs and skills at the high-skill (usually high-pay) 
end of the economy. Future technologies may differ from past technologies in important ways 
that could render what we know about past patterns to be worth little. Many heralding the 
importance of artificial intelligence (AI) are making exactly the claim that “this time it’s different.” 
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Others disagree, expecting that consequences of the current automation scare will not differ 
substantially from the patterns of past waves of technological disruption.32 
FIGURE I-1: Disconnect Between Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Compensation, 1948-2014 
 
Source: Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishel. “Understanding the Historic Divergence Between Productivity and a 
Typical Worker’s Pay: Why It Matters and Why It’s Real.” Economic Policy Institute. September 2, 2015. 
https://www.epi.org/publication/understanding-the-historic-divergence-between-productivity-and-a-typical-
workers-pay-why-it-matters-and-why-its-real/ 
Since people’s experience with previous innovation is likely to strongly inform their attitude to 
future changes, we ignore these worries at our peril. All three of these concerns have the potential 
to fuel local and national resistance to innovation, via adverse policy or shop-floor disruptions. If 
so, they could slow productivity growth, reduce international competitiveness and retard 
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improvements in our standard of living. Proponents of innovation need to take these risks 
seriously.  
 
II. Framework for Labor Market Impacts 
This section sets forth a framework that allows us to consider comprehensively the labor market 
impacts of AV. First, we describe how an ideal, well-functioning labor market works and how the 
adoption of autonomous vehicles would affect such an ideal market. Then, we discuss the impact 
of key ways in which the actual U.S. labor market differs from the ideal.  
 
A. How an ideal labor market would adapt to AVs 
Economists often use simple models as baselines from which they can systematically examine 
factors that alter outcomes from the ideal. That is, an understanding how the ideal market works 
during a transition provides us with a clarifying starting point for assessing an actual event. Figure 
II-1 presents a diagram of this ideal system.  
 
FIGURE II-1: Impact of Adoption of AVs on the Labor Market—Ideal (Frictionless) Adjustment 
Process 
 
Source: Authors, inspired by Joss Fong, “Why the rise of the robots won’t mean the end of work,” Vox, November 
13, 2017. https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/11/13/16635360/automation-robot-jobs-unemployment-debate. 
In a nutshell, adopting productivity-boosting AV in a model competitive economy with a perfect 
labor market can be beneficial for all parties. Here’s how that works, starting with the employers. 
At the beginning, all employers are making the same, normal profits. When the first employers 
adopt AV, the cost of making their goods or services falls, which enables them to earn higher 
profits and to lower their prices to grab market share. Seeing that, other employers adopt AV in 
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order to stay competitive. The ones that don’t adopt AV close down because they see better uses 
for their investments elsewhere. When the dust settles, a new lower price level for AV-enabled 
goods and services prevails. And the total amount of those goods and services produced (now 
using AV) will rise in accordance with how price-sensitive the customers are. The increase in 
production can range from substantial (if the customers are very price-sensitive—think about bank 
customers using ATMs much more than they did tellers) to zero (if customers’ demand is 
unresponsive to prices). The early adopting firms make abnormally high profits briefly, until their 
competition catches up. Then all revert to making normal profits at the new AV-enabled lower 
prices and higher productivity.  
How do workers fare in this perfect world? They start off with wages that reflect their productivity 
without AV, and everyone who wants to work is fully employed, except for those who are in brief 
transitions between jobs: full employment. As employers adopt AV, two related things happen: (1) 
job churning rises temporarily; and (2) firms’ skill needs change permanently.  
Job churning rises as some firms grow or shrink while others are born or close. As firms adopt AV, 
they need fewer workers in some occupations, such as truck drivers. Meanwhile, workers are 
attracted to higher productivity firms (with AV or in other sectors) that pay higher wages and are 
expanding. At the same time, firms without AV lose market share and thus lay off workers as they 
shrink or close. The unemployment rate rises temporarily while the churn is higher.  
As new skills are needed to adapt to AV, employers or external parties can use savings they have 
garnered from lower transportation prices to attract and train workers accordingly. Some of the 
reallocation and retraining takes place within firms. Employers adjust worker training to fit 
redesigned jobs and to move workers from jobs being cut to new vacant slots. In other cases, laid-
off workers are unemployed while they search for new jobs. To ensure that no one loses from AV 
adoption, a tax or surcharge paid by the beneficiaries of lower transportation prices funds 
retraining or other benefits for laid-off workers. Eventually, the economy adjusts back to full 
employment with employment churning returning to its normal level.  
Where do the new jobs for all the displaced workers come from? There are three sources.  
1. More transportation services. As firms implement AV, mobility will become more 
affordable, so use of personal mobility (including by the young, disabled, and poor) will 
rise, perhaps a lot. Similarly, as road transport costs fall, more goods carried by trucks or 
delivery vans will be consumed. So, transportation services and trucking companies will 
expand their output and add jobs to handle the new volume. Firms will need to expand 
and hire workers to meet this new demand, as banks did with tellers after the 
introduction of ATMs. 
2. More AV support jobs: AV will expand employment in jobs that support AV in 
transportation services firms and elsewhere, such as AI specialists and programmers. In 
addition, some new products and services will be enabled by AV, such as expanded in-
automobile entertainment systems or Wi-Fi-enabled applications that occupants who are 
no longer driving can utilize, which will lead to new jobs.  
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3. More spending on other goods and services. When consumers see cheaper and safer 
transportation, some will have more income remaining to use for non-transportation 
expenditures. Capital will be invested in the firms that produce these goods and services, 
so more workers will be hired to produce, distribute, and sell these additional goods and 
services, whether in health, education, computer games, home repairs, vacations, or 
toys. Indeed, this final source of demand closes the loop and leads to full employment in 
the long run.  
With flexible wages, these new jobs, in aggregate, will absorb all the workers displaced by AV 
because their expansion is funded by the savings from the productivity gains from AV. These 
workers’ wages will not necessarily be higher than before. However, the efficiency gains from 
introducing AV make it possible to compensate these workers and leave everyone better off than 
they were before.  
In the next section, we draw on our historical cases to add two real-world complications to this 
story and present the framework that guides our estimation. 
 
B. Real-world complications 
Above, we showed how the economy could return to full employment with everyone better off 
after some jobs are permanently eliminated by AVs. Two key real-world complications have 
frustrated the achievement of this happy scenario in the past: a) barriers to moving resources 
(such as people and equipment) to the new opportunities, and b) lack of institutions or 
mechanisms to enable or force the winners from the new technology to compensate the losers.  
Figure II-2 illustrates a framework that incorporates the potential for adjustment shown in Figure 
II-1 and the two real-world complications we just introduced. Figure II-2 captures the fact that four 
types of gaps make workers’ adjustments from the old jobs to the new ones more difficult: 
1) Geography: New jobs may be located in different places from existing jobs (as occurred 
during the industrial revolution and trade expansion).  
2) Skills: New jobs may require different skills from the old jobs (as occurred in the 
automation of auto assembly plants). 
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3) Worker voice: Institutions and regulations that surface workers’ perspectives and 
facilitate the sharing of productivity gains may be lacking (as during the recent trade 
expansion in the U.S.).33  
4) Investment: Incentives or access to capital for investments to create new jobs may be too 
low (such as transitions during a recession and the impact on local indigenous workers 
near Australian mines). 
 
FIGURE II-2: Impact of Adoption of AVs on the Labor Market—Realistic Adjustment Process 
 
Source: Authors, inspired by Joss Fong, “Why the rise of the robots won’t mean the end of work,” Vox, November 
13, 2017. https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/11/13/16635360/automation-robot-jobs-unemployment-debate. 
The larger these gaps are, the longer laid off workers will spend unemployed while they search or 
prepare for their next job. And if many workers lose their jobs, unemployment rises substantially 
                                                          
33 The broad concept of worker voice covers any format (including, but not limited to, formal unionization) that can 
channel workers’ perspectives to influence outcomes and provide some measure of bargaining power. Such 
institutions tend to raise productivity as well as lead to more equitable distribution of returns. The seminal work 
on the importance of stakeholder voice appears in Albert O. Hirshfeld’s “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States,” Harvard University Press, 1972. For recent research on the rationale 
and options for restoring a voice for U.S. workers see Thomas Kochan, William Kimball, Duanyi Yang, and Erin L. 
Kelly, “Worker Voice in America: A Current Assessment and Exploration of Options,” Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, draft, January 17, 2018 http://iwer.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/worker-voice-paper-
1_16_18_tablesintext12pt.pdf. Another relevant study is Jeremy Avins, Megan Larcom, Jenny Weissbourd, “New 
forms of worker voice in the 21st century,” Harvard Kennedy School of Government and MIT Sloan School of 
Management, January 2018. http://iwer.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/New-Forms-of-Worker-Voice-
IWER.pdf. 
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for a long time and displaced workers’ new jobs pay far less than they received before. Particularly 
large gaps raise the possibility that low wages for many are not just a transition problem, but also 
a persistent feature of new economic arrangements.  
Thus, in Figure II-2, AV adoption causes lost jobs and incomes because unemployment durations 
are longer and/or uncompensated. This impact is shown in red. The three general sources of job 
increases (shown in green) remain: more transportation will be used, requiring some new jobs, 
new companies and jobs will spring up to provide AV services and new products enabled by AV 
(for example new forms of in-car entertainment); and consumers will have more money to spend 
on other things with the money and time they are saving on transportation. And, as we have seen 
in the past, the “green” new jobs usually eventually come to balance the “red” job losses. 
However, the dotted green lines show that connecting the displaced workers to the new jobs 
quickly (or ever) is not guaranteed.  
As before, the model also shows how consumers benefit as AV lowers the price of transportation, 
allowing them to travel more and buy other things with their AV-enabled savings. In essence, the 
benefits of the transition will go to the AV-adopting companies and to consumers overall, while 
the costs are borne most severely by the displaced workers.  
Figure II-2 shows that, in order for everyone to be at least as well off as before, there must be 
mechanisms for job placement, retraining, or other benefits for the displaced workers. With these 
mechanisms we can achieve the outcome illustrated in Figure II-1. Without such mechanisms, the 
rise in unemployment can be prolonged and earnings-decreases more likely. So, workers at high 
risk of displacement (along with those who support and represent them) have a strong reason to 
resist or slow the transition. Furthermore, even workers who are not displaced may have reason 
to resist if changes in their duties that increase productivity are not reflected in their wages or 
they fear future displacement. Policy options for these issues are discussed in Section V.  
The framework also invites investigation of other topics related to the adoption of AVs, many of 
which are discussed in Section IV.  
• Future research will be needed on likely benefits of AVs to workers and employers. These 
benefits include lowering the risk of occupational injury or deaths (a crucial feature of 
working conditions) and reduced time spent actively driving, which should allow workers 
more time for non-driving duties, raising the productivity of any worker whose job now 
requires driving.  
• New jobs will also be created, as noted above. Even though much is unknown about the 
timing, price effects, and consumer response, the three categories of new jobs provide a 
route for conjecture about what form these new jobs may take.  
 
C. Adoption scenarios 
To understand the magnitude of the labor market challenges posed by the transition to AVs, we 
construct quantitative simulations of job loss. These simulations use four high-level AV adoption 
scenarios developed by Securing Americans’ Future Energy (SAFE) to help ground projections 
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within the context of technological development and deployment. The scenarios also inform our 
qualitative treatment of job creation.  
Labor market and policy dynamics make it useful to look separately at “light-duty” and “heavy-
duty” vehicle sectors. Light-duty vehicles are mostly cars. They weigh less than 10,000 pounds and 
primarily serve personal mobility needs, moving people from place to place. Heavy-duty vehicles 
are mostly trucks and buses. They weigh over 10,000 pounds and are primarily used for the 
movement of goods as well as for mass transit. 
SAFE has developed two scenarios for each sector to explore different technology development 
and deployment trajectories. For the purposes of this study, we treat the car and truck sectors as 
fully independent of each other. The scenarios are illustrated in Figures II-3 and II-4. They can each 
be considered individually or combined into four car-truck combinations.  
The light-duty sector (car) scenarios are pictured in Figure II-3. These two scenarios differ primarily 
in how AV ownership evolves, not the timescale on which technology develops. In both the 
“shared” (fleet) ownership and the “household” (personal) ownership light-duty scenarios, most 
AVs are initially shared, with initial deployment around 2020 and an inflection point into rapid 
adoption around 2030. The scenarios diverge at that point.  
 
FIGURE II-3: Cars (Light-Duty Vehicles) Adoption Scenarios 
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Source: Securing America’s Future Energy 
Early stage deployment may be in restricted areas, although not only, or even primarily on limited 
access routes. For example, Waymo is planning to deploy in a defined area within Chandler, 
Arizona, but will likely be able to travel between any point A and point B within that defined area. 
As significant deployment occurs, we assume that most routes will be capable of supporting 
automation. But 100 percent deployment will require that the technology is fully developed and 
diffused. 
• Cars-Personal: describes an AV adoption timeline for passenger (light-duty) vehicles with 
household ownership. Households own most cars and light trucks, as is now the case. Fleet 
ownership plateaus at about 10 percent of the market and households buy AVs for their 
household usage at the rate of current vehicle sales today.  
• Cars-Fleet: describes an AV adoption timeline for passenger (light-duty) vehicles with fleet 
ownership. A set of transportation service providers own and operate most cars and light 
trucks. Compared to household ownership, fleets imply more centralized maintenance, 
fewer vehicles per person and more rapid adoption of electric vehicles. Household 
ownership of AVs grows to an appreciable fraction of the market, but fleet ownership 
comprises a strong majority (about 80 percent).  
The heavy-duty sector (truck) scenarios are pictured in Figure II-4. These two scenarios incorporate 
the influence of the age of rolling stock and are primarily differentiated by the timeline for 
technology adoption. Thus, the difference between the two timelines reflects factors such as 
speed of technology development, policy support, or societal acceptance. To broadly illustrate 
technology development, we divide technological development into three stages.  
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• Phase I is a composite of Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS—equivalent to 
Level1/2 automation), platooning (trucks move in a convoy all controlled by the lead 
truck), and early applications of Level 3 automation (where vehicle control transfers back 
and forth between automated system and human driver). These technologies may make 
a trucker’s drive safer and more comfortable, but it does not change the reality that a 
driver’s attention must be accessible at all times, not so different from today.  
• Phase II represents a stage in which the driver can be removed from the truck for some 
subset of trips or parts of trips on some restricted set of routes (advanced Level 3 or early 
Level 4 automation).  
• Phase III represents the stage when the driver is not required for most trips on most, if 
not nearly all, routes (advanced Level 4 or early Level 5 automation).34 
The two scenarios represent two different timelines for progressing through these phases.  
• Trucking-Slow: describes a baseline AV adoption timeline where trucking takes about 30 
years adapting to driver-assisted AV before it proceeds to fully autonomous trucks that 
do not need drivers. It sees Phase I technology becoming mainstream in the 2020s, Phase 
II in the 2030s, and Phase III technology becoming available in the 2040s.  
• Trucking-Fast: describes an aggressive AV adoption timeline where trucking AV 
technologies gain adoption on a more accelerated timeline, perhaps as much as a decade 
in advance of the “Slow” scenario. In particular, full adoption of Phase III technology is 
predicted to be nearly complete by 2050.  
                                                          
34
 The levels of automation referred to here and throughout our report are drawn from the framework established 
by the international Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Stanford Center for Internet and Society, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/12/sae-levels-driving-automation (reproduced as Table IV-2).  
 31 
FIGURE II-4: Trucking (Heavy-Duty Vehicles) Adoption Scenarios 
 
 
Source: Securing America’s Future Energy 
These four scenarios drive the displacement timelines in our simulations. For example, in the year 
when adoption of a phase is half complete, we simulate that half of the layoffs associated with full 
adoption of the phase will have occurred. This approach is somewhat crude in that we do not apply 
differential phasing for the various occupations. That is, we abstract from the fact that some 
occupational job losses may occur early in adoption (perhaps auto repair mechanics), while others 
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may be concentrated later on (perhaps some of the drivers). We start our simulations in 2017 and 
end in 2050. 
 
D. Occupations at risk 
We base our simulations on workforce status paths drawn from the experiences of displaced 
workers, data on the occupations likely affected, turnover projections, and estimates of earnings 
losses from displacement.  
i. Which jobs may be eliminated by AVs? 
We follow previous studies in identifying occupations likely to be affected by AV, building on 
occupational classifications identified as "driving related" by the Commerce ESA study.35 We break 
all occupations into four impact groups. Table II-1 describes the categories and provides examples 
of the occupations in these groups, which are: 
1. Primary drivers: Jobs whose primary responsibility is driving on roads, such as drivers of 
trucks, taxi cabs, and buses  
2. Other on-the road drivers: Jobs associated with personal driving in which the primary 
responsibility is not driving, such as traffic and highway police officers, parking lot 
attendants, and driving instructors 
3. Duties changed: Jobs that require skills now (such as driving) that will change with the 
advent of AV, including incidental drivers such as home health aides, building 
contractors, visiting nurses, real estate agents and other sales people, regional 
supervisors, automobile and vehicle insurance workers, and taxi dispatchers 
4. Unaffected: Jobs not listed above, such as teachers 
Our analysis (like the Commerce ESA study) relies on the Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) system.36 This system is used across the federal statistical system and is updated regularly. 
Yet, no classification system will be perfect for all uses in a dynamic economy. An in-depth 
discussion of the number of truck driver jobs that may be eliminated by AV within the next dozen 
years and its relation to SOC codes can be found in Gittleman and Monaco.37  
                                                          
35
 David Beede, Regina Powers, and Cassandra Ingram. Office of the Chief Economist, Economics and Statistics 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. (August 11, 2017). “The Employment Impact of Autonomous 
Vehicles” ESA Issue Brief # 05-17. 
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/Employment%20Impact%20Autonomous%20Vehicles_0.pdf 
36
 For descriptions of the affected occupations see https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm.  
37 Murray Gittleman and Kristen Monaco. “Truck Driving Jobs: Are They Headed for Rapid Elimination?” Bureau of 
Labor Statistics unpublished paper, October 2017.  
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TABLE II-1: AV Impact Analysis Occupational Classifications 
Classification 
category 
Definition 
How identified Examples of 
occupations 
1. Primary drivers  • Light duty drivers: Workers in 
occupations whose primary 
responsibility is driving cars, 
vans, and small trucks on the 
road  
 
• Heavy duty drivers: Workers 
in occupations whose primary 
responsibility is to drive 
heavy duty vehicles on the 
road 
Following 
Commerce ESA 
2017 
Drivers of 
trucks, buses, 
taxis, and 
ambulances 
2. Other on-the-job 
driving 
occupations  
• Workers in occupations 
where driving is often 
required, but whose primary 
responsibility is not driving 
and whose role may be 
eliminated by AV  
Following 
Commerce ESA 
2017 
Security guards, 
police, patrol 
officers, auto 
mechanics, 
parking lot 
attendants  
3. Duties changed 
— Incidental 
drivers 
• Workers in occupations 
whose primary responsibility 
is not driving but currently 
must drive in order to reach 
clients or job sites. 
Following 
Commerce ESA 
2017 
Home health 
aides, real 
estate agents, 
visiting nurses, 
salespeople, 
building 
inspectors  
4. Unaffected 
occupations 
• Workers whose occupational 
responsibilities will be largely 
unaffected by AV 
All occupations 
not in 
categories 1-3 
above.  
 
Source: David Beede, Regina Powers, and Cassandra Ingram. “The Employment Impact of Autonomous Vehicles.” 
Office of the Chief Economist, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. ESA Issue Brief 
#05-17. August 11, 2017 
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/Employment%20Impact%20Autonomous%20Vehicles_0.pdf 
 
ii. How many jobs are at risk? 
For the simulations we focus on the first two groups of occupations. As shown in Table II-2, these 
two sets of occupations account for more than 6 million U.S. jobs—over 4 percent of U.S. nonfarm 
payroll jobs. 
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TABLE II-2: Job Loss Calibrations for AV Simulations 
                                                          
38
 Assumes wider penetration under fast scenario. 
39
 Assumes wider penetration under fast scenario. 
40
 Assumes wider penetration under fast scenario. 
Occupation 
Employ-
ment Level 
in 
thousands, 
2016  
Share of jobs eliminated under full 
implementation of scenario 
Number of jobs eliminated under  
full implementation of scenario 
Trucking-
Fast 
Trucking
-Slow 
Cars–
Fleet 
Cars–Personal 
Trucking-
Fast 
Trucking-
Slow 
Cars–Fleet 
Cars–
Personal 
Primary Driver Occupations 
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer 
Truck Drivers38 
1,532 0.65 0.6 0 0 996 919   
Light Truck or Delivery 
Services Drivers39 
781 0.55 0.45 0 0 430 351   
Bus Drivers, School or 
Special Client 
212 0.5 0.5 0 0 106 106   
Driver/Sales Workers 383 0 0 0.2 0.2   77 77 
Taxi Drivers and 
Chauffeurs 
300 0 0 0.7 0.2   210 60 
Bus Drivers, Transit and 
Intercity40 
75 0.75 0.7 0 0 56 53   
Ambulance Drivers and 
Attendants, Except 
Emergency Medical 
Technicians 
10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 1 1 1 1 
Primary Driver Total 
(percent of total jobs) 
3,293     
1,588 
(48%) 
1,430 
(43%) 
287 
(9%) 
137 
(4%) 
Other On-The-Job Driver Occupations 
Security Guards 646 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 16 16 16 16 
Police and Sheriff's Patrol 
Officers 
673 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 34 27 34 34 
 35 
Notes: 1. For Phase II of Truck scenarios we use 0.1*full implementation job losses. 2. For combined AV scenarios (such as the “Trucking-Fast” Scenario combined 
with the Cars-Fleet scenario) the shares displaced are added together. Sources: Occupational employment: Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment 
Survey 2015. Share of jobs eliminated based on consultation with industry experts. 
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 Assumes more electric vehicles in fleets. 
Automotive Service 
Technicians and 
Mechanics 
711 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 71 71 356 356 
Postal Service Mail 
Carriers 
271 0 0 0.2 0.2   54 54 
Parking Lot Attendants 48 0 0 0.5 0.5   24 24 
Automotive Body and 
Related Repairers 
116 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.5 6 6 58 58 
Refuse and Recyclable 
Material Collectors 
64 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 32 32   
Automotive and 
Watercraft Service 
Attendants41 
57 0 0 0.6 0.4   34 23 
First-Line Supervisors of 
Police and Detectives 
103 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 5 5 5 5 
Couriers and Messengers 143 0 0 0.02 0.02   28 28 
Automotive Glass 
Installers and Repairers 
15 0 0 0.25 0.25   4 4 
Insurance Appraisers, 
Auto Damage 
14 
0.3 0.2 
0.25 0.25 4 3 4 4 
Electronic Equipment 
Installers and Repairers, 
Motor Vehicles 
7 0 0 0.5 0.5   4 4 
Travel Guides 1 0 0 0.5 0.5   1 1 
Total, Other On-The-Job 
Driver Occupations 
(percent of total jobs) 
2,869     
167 
(6%) 
159 
(6%) 
620 
(22%) 
608 
(21%) 
Grand Total 
(percent of total jobs) 
6,162     
1,756 
(28%) 
1,589 
(26%) 
907 
(15%) 
745 
(12%) 
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Of course, AV will not eliminate the need for every position in these jobs. Columns 3-6 of Table II-
2 show our estimates of the share of positions in each occupation that will be eliminated under 
each AV scenario. Although admittedly speculative, these shares reflect our understanding of what 
industry experts at SAFE expect will happen. Over time, such estimates will certainly require 
refinement. When we multiply these shares by the employment levels in each occupation, we get 
the number of potential layoffs by occupation associated with the four scenarios.  
The trucking AV transition affects occupations with greater employment, mostly primary truck 
drivers, and a large share (26-28 percent) of the jobs in those occupations. AV technology in 
passenger vehicles has a more diffuse impact, affecting many jobs where the primary activity is 
not driving, with a smaller share (12-15 percent) of the positions in those occupations. Although 
we do not account for it in our simulations, these percentages may be large enough to cause 
considerable job insecurity even in those workers who are not ultimately laid off.  
How many jobs are at risk, according to the adoption scenarios? Figure II-5 shows the total 
number of jobs eliminated from 2018 through 2051, calculated by multiplying the shares 
affected in Table II-2 by the number of workers in each occupation. All told, the Trucking-Fast 
scenario alone involves job reductions of almost 1.8 million workers, while Cars-Personal causes 
about 0.7 million reductions. Combining scenarios yields a range from 2.6 million reductions for 
Trucking-Fast plus Cars-Fleet to 1.4 million for Trucking-Slow plus Cars-Personal, out of an overall 
U.S. labor force of about 159 million workers in 2016. This represents an impact on 1.6 percent 
to 0.9 percent of the labor force. Clearly, the adoption path matters considerably. In addition, as 
we will see below, other factors will also make a difference.  
FIGURE II-5: Total Number of Workers Displaced by AV Adoption Scenario, 2018 - 2051, in Thousands 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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III. Job Loss and Displacement Effects 
Informed by the framework in Section II, we now simulate key labor market impacts of the 
adoption of AV over the next few decades. First, we discuss turnover and then we focus on results, 
specifically how AV-adoption layoffs might raise unemployment, lower labor force participation, 
and reduce workers’ earnings.  
Importantly, we offer these simulations not as definitive forecasts, but as gauges of the potential 
size and nature of the disruption to the labor market posed by the adoption of AV as if they were 
taking place today. In particular, we do not adjust counts of workers affected in future decades by 
business cycle effects or demographic trends, including population growth. This approach allows 
us and the reader to interpret simulation outcomes in the context that we understand best, 
today’s world. In so doing, this perspective abstracts from all manner of economic and 
demographic evolution that would be taken into account in a forecasting exercise. When adoption 
of AVs actually takes place, its costs and benefits will undoubtedly be affected by conditions 
prevailing at the time as well as employers’ and policy choices.  
 
A. Job loss and occupational turnover 
The number of workers displaced from an occupation is not the same as the number of jobs 
eliminated. That is, we cannot assume that employers will lay off workers one-for-one with each 
job that is eliminated. To the extent that employers opt to retain and reassign workers to similar 
or better positions or workers leave the occupation for other reasons, the number of layoffs could 
be smaller. This point calls attention to a key aspect of our simulations: we must somehow make 
the conceptual leap from the anticipated employment reduction in various occupations to 
projecting how many workers will be displaced. That is, we want to use changes in employment 
“stocks” to construct displacement “flows.” To make this leap in a reasonable way, we must 
consider that workers do leave occupations regularly and that employers have means other than 
layoffs to reduce employment in declining occupations.  
Occupational turnover occurs when workers leave an occupation. For example, a worker may 
retire, become disabled, take a job in another occupation, go back to school, be promoted, take 
on family responsibilities, be fired for cause, or pass away. An occupation’s annual turnover 
reflects the rate at which jobs in the occupation would decline if no exiting workers were replaced. 
Factors that influence occupational turnover include the average age of the workforce, injury 
rates, whether it is an entry-level job, and if experience in that job applies to other occupations.  
To cut its workforce by 10 drivers after adopting AVs, an employer could lay off 10 drivers. If it 
could anticipate that some would leave soon for other reasons, it might lay off only eight or nine. 
It might also look to fill vacancies that it has in other jobs by offering reassignment and training to 
its excess drivers. For example, the employer might train some workers in sales, programming, 
traffic coordination, maintenance, or roadway repair jobs. Or, it might redesign its driving jobs into 
hybrid occupations with changed duties: less driving and more coordination, sales, or 
maintenance.  
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Should we account for turnover, and if so, in what way? Drivers are reputed to have particularly 
high rates of job churn, so it may be that the fluid nature of these occupations will naturally reduce 
the disruption caused by AV adoption.  
From one perspective, there is no need to explicitly account for turnover because vacancies reflect 
the normal degree of churn in the particular occupational environment. High turnover occupations 
occur when workers move frequently out of the occupation or the labor market.42 From this point 
of view, not filling a vacancy is like removing a seat during a game of musical chairs. Although no 
one sits in the chair at the moment, removing it forces someone out of the game. When many 
open positions in an occupation are eliminated, people between jobs in that occupation are caught 
out as are those who sought training with the expectation that there would be jobs in that field. 
From this perspective, the estimated disruption is not reduced by the normal amount of churning 
in the labor market.  
An alternative, more conservative view emphasizes the voluntary nature of some turnover and 
assumes that most potential entrants are not heavily invested in taking a job in a declining 
occupation. In that case, to the extent that an employer can rely on vacancies rather than layoffs 
to make needed reductions, some disruption is avoided.43  
To make this adjustment we need estimates of occupational turnover. Fortunately, as part of its 
Employment Projections program, the BLS produces 10-year projections of turnover-related 
vacancy rates by occupation. The latest turnover statistics are BLS Occupational Openings and 
Separations projected for 2016-2026.44 These are estimates of turnover caused by workers exiting 
the labor force, due to retirement or other reasons, and separations caused by workers 
transferring to different occupations. They take into account occupational factors including past 
patterns, age, and education. By construction, the estimates do not count workers who change 
jobs but remain in the same occupation, nor do they include expected net job growth.  
To provide a reasonable simulation of displacement that incorporates turnover, we reduce the 
anticipated job reductions by their annual occupational turnover rates. That is, since Heavy Truck 
and Tractor Trailer Drivers have an annual turnover rate of 10.5 percent, then eliminating 10,000 
jobs in a particular year would result in 8,950 truckers laid off (that is, [1-0.105]*10,000). By doing 
this we implicitly assume that 10.5 percent of the job reductions affect spots held by workers who 
were leaving the occupation anyway, so they are not displaced.  
                                                          
42
 Steve Viscelli. The Big Rig: Trucking and the Decline of the American Dream. University of California Press. 2016. 
https://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520278127. 
43
 The assumption that potential entrants are not heavily invested in entry to these occupations is least tenable 
when those workers have few alternative options, for example because they live in an economically depressed 
area or a one-industry town.  
44
 BLS projects occupational turnover using two different models, one for labor force exits and another for 
occupational transfers. Both models use a regression analysis of historical data to identify the characteristics of a 
worker, such as age and educational attainment, which make them likely to separate from their occupation. These 
patterns from historical data are then applied to the current distribution of employment for each occupation to 
project future separations. These are described in https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_separations.htm  
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We present occupational turnover rates for the AV-affected occupations in Table III-1, along with 
the ranges for the total number of jobs eliminated across all four combined scenarios. More 
explanation is provided in Appendix B.  
TABLE III-1: Occupational Turnover Projections for AV-Affected Occupations, 2016-2026 
Sources: Occupational employment: Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2016. Occupational turnover: BLS 
Occupational Projections 2016-2026. Jobs eliminated: See Table II-2. 
 
Occupation 
Jobs eliminated in 
AV scenarios, 
range in 
thousands 
Annual occupational 
turnover as a percent 
of employment 
Primary Driver Occupations 
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers 919-996 10.5% 
Light Truck or Delivery Services Drivers 351-430 10.5% 
Bus Drivers, School or Special Client 106 11.9% 
Driver/Sales Workers 77 10.5% 
Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs 60-210 10.0% 
Bus Drivers, Transit and Intercity 53-56 11.9% 
Ambulance Drivers and Attendants, Except Emergency Medical 
Technicians 
1 14.2% 
Other On-The-Job Driver Occupations 
Security Guards 16 13.0% 
Police and Sheriff's Patrol Officers 27-34 6.3% 
Automotive Service Technicians and Mechanics 71-356 9.2% 
Postal Service Mail Carriers 0-54 6.7% 
Parking Lot Attendants 0-24 14.7% 
Automotive Body and Related Repairers 6-58 9.4% 
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors 0-32 11.8% 
Automotive and Watercraft Service Attendants 0-34 16.3% 
First-Line Supervisors of Police and Detectives 5 5.9% 
Couriers and Messengers 0-28 9.0% 
Automotive Glass Installers and Repairers 0-4 9.5% 
Insurance Appraisers, Auto Damage 3-4 8.1% 
Electronic Equipment Installers and Repairers, Motor Vehicles 0-4 9.6% 
Travel Guides 0-1 17.1% 
All US Occupations 10.9% 
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Turnover projections for the affected occupations vary from a minimum of 6.7 percent for First-
Line Supervisors of Police and Detectives to a maximum of 17.1 percent for Travel Guides. Among 
the primary driver occupations, the rates are mostly similar to the U.S. average of 10.9 percent, 
ranging from 10.0 percent for Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs to 14.2 percent for Ambulance Drivers 
and Attendants, Except Emergency Medical Technicians. 
The projections for truck drivers will surely surprise readers who understand these occupations’ 
turnover to be extremely high. For example, the American Trucking Associations (ATA) reports 95 
percent turnover for truck drivers in the third quarter of 2017.45 Some part of the discrepancy is 
likely due to differences between sectors of the trucking industry. Turnover tends to be much 
higher in the less-than-truckload (LT) sector, which often has poor compensation and working 
conditions. By contrast, turnover is much lower in the full truckload (FT) sector, where 
compensation and working conditions are better. Many employers of truck drivers in the FT sector 
are not primarily trucking companies, so they may not be included in the ATA survey. See Section 
V.D. for more discussion of the differences in trucking sectors.  
Another key part of the discrepancy stems from omitting between-employer job changes from 
occupational turnover estimates. This is appropriate for our goal of gauging the number of workers 
displaced overall. Although high job-hopping may lower the number of pink slips that employers 
need to issue, it does not reduce the number of workers that must find new livelihoods when jobs 
in their occupation are eliminated. 
Our overall approach takes account of the frictions in the labor market noted in our framework. 
Workers cannot move seamlessly to take vacancies at any other employer anywhere else in the 
country. If the labor market had no frictions, the correct adjustment for turnover would be much 
higher. We could, for example, estimate all the vacancies in the industry and calculate 
displacements as occurring only if the number of job reductions exceeds the number of vacancies 
in the entire occupation. This polar approach is certainly too strong. Workers who lose jobs with 
particular employers must then search for new work. To not count them as displaced just because 
there is some opening in their occupation somewhere else in the country is clearly incorrect.  
Thus, we adjust for turnover only on the number of jobs eliminated. This reduces the measured 
displacement arising from a job elimination by the occupation-specific probability that the worker 
would have left the occupation during that year anyway.  
While this approach adjusts for a normal number of occupational reassignments, it does not factor 
in the potential for more reassignments and retraining by employers in order to avoid AV-related 
layoffs. To develop a reasonable estimate of the potential labor market disruption of AV adoption, 
we intentionally do not assume that employers will take more intensive efforts to reassign workers 
to other positions than they have in the past, for two reasons. First, much of the attraction of AV 
is in the potential for reduced labor costs. This suggests that many employers will want to reduce 
the size of their workforce. Second, reassigning and retraining workers is an important mitigation 
step that employers could take, with or without some assistance. Yet it would run counter to the 
                                                          
45
 American Trucking Associations. “Large Truckload Driver Turnover Rate Rose in Third Quarter.” Press Release. 
December 7, 2017. http://www.trucking.org/article/Large-Truckload-Driver-Turnover-Rate-Rose-in-Third-Quarter 
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spirit of this exercise to essentially assume away some major part of the problem from the 
beginning. We believe that employers could play an important role of this sort, but we cannot 
assume they will.  
Note two other features of our approach to turnover. First, the turnover estimate that we use is 
static, projected for the decade of 2016-2026. Consistent with the rest of our approach, we do not 
take into account expected demographic and other changes beyond this close horizon. Second, 
since the adjustments do not vary as a share of job destruction, we do not incorporate how slower 
job destruction could help workers and employers adjust. That is, we abstract from employers’ 
and workers’ greater ease of adjustment to slow-moving changes. When job destruction happens 
at a slower pace, information has more time to be shared and absorbed.46 In addition, workers 
and employers have more options for adjustment, including longer training programs and more 
experimentation. This is a limitation of our approach.  
 
B. How will displacement affect workers? 
As the framework in Section II shows, an estimate of the number of workers displaced does not 
get to the heart of how disruptive a transition will be for the labor market. For that we must 
simulate what happens to workers after they are laid off. To recognize the current gaps that slow 
transitions in the U.S., we use actual experiences (wage changes and labor market status paths) of 
displaced workers to simulate the impact of AVs.  
From recent BLS Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS) we construct the likely path followed by a cohort 
of displaced workers using an approach described in detail in Appendix B.47 We express the path 
in terms of shifting shares of the cohort of displaced workers in the three possible labor force 
states (employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force) during the years after displacement. 
Figure III-1 illustrates the path we derive from our analysis of the whole DWS sample. Just before 
displacement (we call this “Year -1”), all the workers are employed (shown in green), while none 
are unemployed (in red) or out of the labor force (in yellow). At the moment they are laid off, none 
are employed: some leave the labor force and the rest are unemployed. So, for the year containing 
the layoff (Year 0) as a whole, they are all employed part of the time, then unemployed, and then 
pursue some combination of looking for work, starting another job, and leaving the workforce. As 
a group, they vastly increase their unemployment and out-of-labor-force shares. Their layoffs add 
to the number of unemployed in the economy because they moved as a group out of jobs to 
unemployment. By Year 2 after the layoff, many more have a new job. Yet their unemployment 
rate is still markedly above the rate for the economy as a whole. In each year that follows, their 
unemployment rate converges closer to a new normal state.  
                                                          
46
 In particular, when there are fewer jobs in an occupation, young people tend to avoid going into that occupation. 
When a field changes slowly, there is adequate time for young workers to learn about the poor prospects for that 
occupation and to plan accordingly. 
47 According to the BLS: “Displaced workers are defined as persons 20 years of age and older who lost or left jobs 
because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or 
shift was abolished.” https://www.bls.gov/news.release/disp.nr0.htm  
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FIGURE III-1: Average Labor Market Status of Workers by Year After Displacement 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Although the DWS asks about only three years of experience post displacement, we extend the 
time covered by making assumptions about eventual convergence of the displaced workers to 
workforce averages, as detailed in Appendix B. The path constructed is consistent with prior 
studies which find that displaced workers experience above average unemployment for a long 
time and are disproportionately likely to be out of the labor force after displacement.48  
With this information (post-displacement paths, numbers of workers in occupations affected, and 
the timing of transition phases) we simulate how many unemployed workers and labor force exits 
will be added to the labor market due to the adoption of AV over the coming decades, for each of 
the four scenarios.  
In each year, we measure how much this cohort adds to the pool of unemployed. That is, we 
subtract how many would have been unemployed without the displacement, which we call the 
baseline amount of unemployment. In Years 0 and 1, we count all the unemployed displaced 
                                                          
48
 See Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2011 no. 2. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/recessions-and-the-costs-of-job-loss/ and the 
references within.  
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workers as AV-induced additions to unemployed because they underwent this sudden change. But 
eventually, we cannot expect the cohort’s unemployment rate to go much below the prevailing 
unemployment rate. So, the baseline for comparison is an unusual sort of baseline; it must 
converge over time to the average rate for workers in the rest of the economy. At the beginning 
their unemployment baseline is zero because they were all employed. By Year 6, though, their 
baseline compares them to the average rate of unemployment. We adopt a linear path for the 
baseline between these two endpoints. 
Figure III-2 shows the pattern for unemployment post layoff. This is the contribution that one 
displacement makes (on average) to the number of employed during the years after the layoff. 
For example, in Year 1, the peak year, a displacement of 100 workers raises the number of 
unemployed by about 38 people.49 We sum these additions to unemployment for each year for 
each worker affected by our scenarios to simulate the impact of AV displacement on 
unemployment. 
FIGURE III-2: Extra Unemployment among Displaced Workers Compared to Average Workers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note that we do not explicitly model job growth in this approach. Rather, we infer growth from 
the way that the economy has reabsorbed displaced workers in the past as tracked in the DWS. If 
no barriers to re-employment were present, the red areas in Figures III-1 and III-2 would be very 
                                                          
49
 The remainder in Year 1 are employed (48), out of the labor force (13), or would have been unemployed anyway 
(1)—which is what the baseline captures. See Table B-1 for these numbers. 
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small, reflecting little increase in unemployment after layoffs. During a recession or in a very 
stagnant economy, the areas would be very much larger. 
For labor force participation, the exercise is similar, but the horizon is much longer because the 
behavioral reaction is different. As can be seen in Figure III-1, many more displaced workers seek 
new work than opt to exit the labor force. Yet, the share of workers that exit does not decline 
rapidly subsequently, in contrast to unemployment. Indeed, except for the youngest workers in 
the DWS, in no case does labor force participation recoup its decline. For younger workers, this is 
likely due to temporary exits to get more education or training. Neither does participation fall 
noticeably over time (as you might expect for discouraged job seekers), except for the oldest 
workers. Taken together, this suggests that the overall propensity to spend time out of the labor 
force takes a long-lived bump up after displacement.  
This does not mean that the particular people who leave the labor force at the time of layoff stay 
out permanently. There can be a lot of cycling in and out within a steady rate. But it certainly 
means that on average, displacement weakens workers’ attachment to working.  
Figure III-3 shows how this weaker attachment plays out. Like Figure III-2 for unemployment, this 
one shows that the share of displaced workers that exit the labor force is above what one would 
expect if they had not been displaced. The figure says that in each of Years 1, 2, and 3 after 100 
workers are displaced, the workforce will have 13 fewer participants. The impact then declines 
over time as the cohort ages. The effect ends at sixteen years because that is the expected years 
of work life remaining for the average displaced worker in the DWS. The figure also shows that the 
participation effect is much stronger for women. This might be expected as they generally earn 
lower wages and may be more likely to take on family responsibilities. For more detail on the 
construction of these estimates, see Appendix B.  
FIGURE III-3: Share of Displaced Workers Out of the Labor Force as a Result of Displacement 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Years after displacement
All Women Men
 45 
C. Displacement, unemployment, labor force participation and lost earnings simulations 
In this section we simulate the impact of AV-related layoffs under the four adoption scenarios. 
Importantly, these simulations should not be used as definitive forecasts, but as gauges of the 
potential size and nature of the disruption to the labor market posed by the AV transitions. In 
order to place the effects in the easily-understood context of today’s labor market, these 
simulations abstract from many expected and unexpected changes in demographic and economic 
conditions over coming decades. When AV transition actually takes place, its costs and benefits 
will undoubtedly be affected by conditions prevailing at the time (in particular the rate of growth 
of the overall economy), as well as employers’ and policy choices.  
i. Effects of AVs on displacement 
The top panel of Figure III-4 shows the implied pattern of job displacement for each of the 
scenarios separately. Job losses from AVs ramp up slowly and do not reach over 50,000 per year 
for any scenario until 2031 at the earliest. Most striking is the difference between fast and slow 
adoption of AVs by trucking, even though the total number of jobs lost under the two trucking 
scenarios is not so different. Aggressive adoption could cause annual displacements of about 
200,000 workers around 2045. By contrast, under the slow trucking scenario, peak annual layoffs 
are half as high and occur in 2049 and 2050.  
Adopting AV for cars causes earlier and fewer job losses than we see in trucking. The two car 
scenarios start out similarly, but fleet ownership causes more displacement than personal 
ownership from 2039 onward. The reason is that fewer cars are needed and fleets are more likely 
to adopt electric vehicles which will reduce employment of Automotive and Watercraft Service 
Attendants, who do oil change and brake job maintenance, etc.  
Of course, AV is likely to be adopted by both cars and trucks, so the second panel of Figure III-4 
shows the four possible combined scenarios. These make it clear that the biggest source of 
variation in outcomes is fast versus slow adoption of AV for trucks. The Trucking-Fast scenario 
causes the most concentrated job losses of the four considered. To reiterate, from a labor market 
perspective, the most challenging combination would be combining aggressive truck adoption 
with a fleet approach to car AVs.  
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FIGURE III-4: Displacements from AV Adoption  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
ii. Effect of AV displacements on unemployment 
Figure III-5 translates these job losses into unemployment effects. Compared to the layoff pattern 
in the previous figure, unemployment effects are clearly more persistent. At its peak, the rise in 
unemployment under the Trucking-Fast scenario is about four times higher than the peak impact 
of any of the other transition scenarios. The peaks are little different in height from the layoff 
peaks, but the elevations last longer. The easiest way to see this is to compare the trucker 
unemployment in 2050 to layoffs that year. Lingering unemployment from previous years means 
that although layoffs decline to 22,000 in 2050, there are over 60,000 truckers unemployed.  
Combining the Truck-Fast transition with either passenger car AV transition swells the ranks of the 
unemployed by over 200,000 workers across the U.S. at the peak of impact, around 2045.  
Is this effect large enough to raise the unemployment rate? Yes, but modestly. Figure III-6 
translates the number of unemployed into the impact on the unemployment rate. For simplicity, 
we display only the high and low estimates, which correspond to the Trucking-Fast/Cars-Fleet and 
Trucking-Slow/Cars-Personal scenario combinations respectively. The shaded area on the figure 
shows the range between high and low estimates in each year. Relative to a baseline of full 
employment, the advent of AVs is projected to increase the unemployment rate to a small degree 
in the 2030s and more strongly in the late 2040s, with a peak, temporary addition to annual 
unemployment rates of 0.06–0.13 percentage points at peak impact.  
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It may be useful to compare our estimates of dislocation from AVs to that caused by the decline 
of manufacturing.50 U.S. manufacturing has lost 6.7 million jobs since its peak in 1978, or about 
1.7 million jobs per decade. We estimate AVs will disrupt 1.3 to 2.3 million jobs over 30 years, 
which is as much as 800,000 jobs per decade—about half the size of the manufacturing job loss. 
The AV impact will be further weakened by the larger size of the U.S. labor force in the future, and 
the disruption will be less geographically concentrated than in manufacturing. However, given the 
large impact of manufacturing job loss on U.S. workers, the economy, and political system, a 
potential new disruption about half that size in another industry certainly merits serious attention. 
FIGURE III-5: Marginal Impacts of AV Displacements on Unemployment 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Thanks to Michael Mandel for suggesting this comparison. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
FIGURE III-6: Estimation Range of Marginal Contribution of AV Displacements to Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: “Low” refers to the combination of Trucking-Slow and Cars-Personal scenarios. “High” refers to the 
combination of the Trucking-Fast and Cars-Fleet scenarios. 
iii. Effect of AV displacements on labor force participation 
Our simulations also suggest that the adoption of AVs will increase the number of workers who 
leave the labor force, as shown in Figure III-7. The persistence of participation effects is shown in 
the smoothness of these lines and their general upward trend. The Trucking-Fast plus Cars-Fleet 
scenarios could shrink U.S. labor force participation by over 160,000, which is close to lowering 
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
 U
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
 (
in
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
Marginal Impact of AV Displacements on Unemployment,
by  Combined Adoption Scenarios
Trucking-Fast + Cars-Fleet Trucking-Fast + Cars-Personal
Trucking-Slow + Cars-Fleet Trucking-Slow + Cars-Personal
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
1
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
3
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
5
2
0
2
6
2
0
2
7
2
0
2
8
2
0
2
9
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
1
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
3
2
0
3
4
2
0
3
5
2
0
3
6
2
0
3
7
2
0
3
8
2
0
3
9
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
1
2
0
4
2
2
0
4
3
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
5
2
0
4
6
2
0
4
7
2
0
4
8
2
0
4
9
2
0
5
0P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 p
o
in
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 
u
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
Estimation Range of Marginal Contribution of AV 
Displacements to Unemployment Rate
Projection Range AV Unemployment -  Low AV Unemployment - High
 50 
the U.S. labor force participation rate by 0.1 percentage points. Thus, the number of workers not 
in the labor force after AV-induced displacement is on a par with the rise in unemployment and 
lasts longer. 
FIGURE III-7: Marginal Impacts of AV Displacements on Workers Not in the Labor Force 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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iv. Demographic and regional effects from AV adoption 
Some demographic groups will be more strongly affected than others. Figure III-8 breaks down 
the job losses for each scenario by sex, age, education, and race. Not surprisingly, workers at risk 
of lay-off by AV will be mostly men. Over half of them are over 45. (The Other age group consists 
mostly of people over 54.) Very few have a college degree, although many have some college. 
Most are white. These are the people whom the adoption of AV will push toward more 
unemployment and lower labor force participation. 
 52 
FIGURE III-8: Characteristics of AV-Displaced Workers 
  
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure III-9 breaks down total worker displacement by region. In all four scenarios, the South 
sustains the most displacements. The Midwest and West have similar number of displaced 
workers, while the Northeast has the lowest number. Adoption of AV in trucking has a more 
regionally disparate impact than AV adoption in cars, likely because the south in particular is a net 
supplier of long-haul trucking services to the rest of the country. By contrast, professional drivers 
of cars are more locally based.  
FIGURE III-9: Total Displacements from AV Adoption by Region 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In addition, we can look at the extent to which particular states specialize in providing workers in 
the occupations most affected by AV. This approach helps point to geographic areas that might 
suffer most lost jobs and to workers who might sustain the largest losses. The standard measure 
of geographic employment concentration is called a location quotient. Applied to occupations in 
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states, it is defined as an occupation’s share of jobs in a state divided by that occupation’s share 
of jobs in the U.S. as a whole. A value of one means that the share matches that of the nation. For 
example, Wyoming has a location quotient equal to 1.89 for Drivers/Sales Workers. This means 
that Wyoming has 1.89 times as many Drivers/Sales Workers as it would if it matched the overall 
U.S. share—or 89 percent “extra” Drivers/Sales Workers. Thus, it is likely to take a bigger hit from 
the elimination of those jobs than other states.  
Table III-2 lists all states with 50 percent or more “extra” primary driving jobs—that is cases of 
state occupation location quotients of 1.50 and higher. (Table B-4 presents a full list of the location 
quotients.)  
TABLE III-2: Analysis of State Occupation Location Quotients (LQs) for Primary Driving Occupations 
 
Heavy 
and 
Tractor-
Trailer 
Truck 
Drivers 
Light 
Truck or 
Delivery 
Services 
Drivers 
Bus Drivers, 
School or 
Special Client 
Driver/ 
Sales 
Workers 
Taxi 
Drivers and 
Chauffeurs 
Bus 
Drivers, 
Transit 
and 
Intercity 
Ambulance 
Drivers and 
Attendants, 
Except 
Emergency 
Medical 
Technicians 
Standard 
deviation of 
state LQs 
0.475 0.158 0.336 0.268 0.901 0.500 1.313 
Total US em-
ployment, in 
thousands** 
1,532 781 212 383 300 75 10 
Jobs eliminated 
in AV scenarios, 
range in 000s** 
919-996 351-430 106 77 60-210 53-56 1 
States with 
Location 
Quotients of 1.5 
or greater 
ND-2.36  WV-2.11 WY-1.89 NV-6.88 HI-3.00 ND-7.37 
AR-2.30  CT-1.68  MA-2.13 NY-1.90 ME-3.73 
NE-2.29  MN-1.52  CT-1.71 MD-1.88 SC-3.57 
IA-2.02  NY-1.51  VT-1.67 NV-1.67 PA-3.23 
WY-1.85  PA-1.50  HI-1.57  WV-2.83 
MS-1.66      AL-2.04 
TN-1.65      NM-1.75 
SD-1.53      NY-1.72 
      GA-1.71 
      NJ-1.59 
*Occupation LQs measure whether a state specializes in providing a certain type of labor. They are defined as the 
ratio of an occupation’s share of jobs in a state to the occupation’s share of jobs in the U.S. as a whole. LQs greater 
than one signify that the state has a higher concentration of jobs in that occupation than the U.S. as whole. LQs less 
than one indicate that the state has a lower share than in the U.S. An LQ of two indicates that the state has double 
the share of jobs in that occupation as the country as a whole. The standard deviation of LQs for an occupation is 
lower if that occupation has a consistent share of jobs in most states. See Table B-4 for full state detail. 
**See Table II-2 for sources.  
Source: Authors calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Survey 2016. 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm  
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Of particular interest are Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers because this occupation is likely 
to lose the most jobs, as indicated in Table III-2. Eight states show strong concentration in these 
jobs, from North Dakota in the lead at 2.36 to South Dakota with 1.53. Not surprisingly, inland 
states with low population density are the most likely to take the brunt of layoffs in this 
occupation: North Dakota, Arkansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wyoming, Mississippi, Tennessee, and South 
Dakota.  
In stark contrast, the occupation poised for the next highest losses, Light Truck or Delivery Services 
Drivers, has no state location quotients of 1.5 or higher. Since this occupation is much more locally 
based, all areas tend to have similar shares of workers in it.  
This contrast shows that occupations vary in their degree of regional concentration. All else equal, 
job eliminations in more regionally concentrated occupations are likely to pose more challenges 
for workers since more workers with similar skills in their labor markets will be out of work at the 
same time and the whole local economy is more likely to suffer. To measure how regionally 
concentrated occupations are, we can take the standard deviation of location quotients across all 
states—shown in the top row of Table III-2. All else equal, a lower standard deviation indicates 
that job losses in an occupation will have less disparate regional impacts. Indeed, Light Truck or 
Delivery Services Drivers’ standard deviation of 0.158 is the lowest in this group, followed by 
Driver/Sales Workers. 
Interestingly, Ambulance Drivers show the highest evidence of concentration, which may reflect 
different ways that this work is organized in states, partly for regulatory reasons. Since AV-related 
job losses in this occupation are expected to be small, this anomaly is not likely to distort our 
analysis very much.  
Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs are the second most regionally concentrated, particularly in Nevada, 
which has almost seven times the normal share in this occupation. In all, five states may be 
particularly vulnerable, particularly if fleets are adopted, with at least 50 percent “extra” workers 
in this occupation. Those five states are Nevada, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Hawaii.  
While the location quotients for Heavy Truck drivers are not extreme, the size of the job losses in 
this occupation suggests that the eight states named above (North Dakota, Arkansas, Nebraska, 
Iowa, Wyoming, Mississippi, Tennessee, and South Dakota), which have the highest concentration 
of Heavy Trucking jobs, are likely to be the most vulnerable to AV-related displacement. 
Nevertheless, the transition to AV has the potential to cause problems in some other states and 
occupations also.  
v. Earnings losses from AV displacement 
To simulate the earnings losses associated with displacement, we turn to estimates provided by 
Davis and von Wachter.51 They calculate average lifetime wealth losses as a multiple of previous 
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 Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
2011 no. 2. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/recessions-and-the-costs-of-job-loss/. 
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earnings. As described in Appendix B, we use American Community Survey earnings averages for 
the AV affected occupations to simulate losses, as shown in Figure III-10.  
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FIGURE III-10: Average and Total Lifetime Earnings Loss at Displaced Jobs, by Scenarios and Combined Scenarios 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The two upper panels show that AV-adoption layoffs would cost workers an average of over 
$80,000 apiece in lifetime wealth, with higher amounts in trucking and less for cars, largely as a 
consequence of their current occupational salaries. Note that these estimates are subject to a 
number of key caveats that could have strong effects—such as whether the workers laid off have 
more or less tenure than average, work full-time or not, or are laid off during a recession. Workers 
displaced during a recession would sustain losses that average about $120,000. Whatever the 
actual circumstances, we see laid off workers would lose a substantial amount of wealth. These 
are earnings that families and communities would not recover even after re-employment.  
Taking these losses together, we see combined losses of over $180 billion that would be sustained 
by U.S. workers as a consequence of AV adoption under the Trucking–Fast scenarios and over $100 
billion for the Trucking–Slow scenarios. Again, workers’ losses would be dramatically higher if they 
take place during recession years, potentially over $250 billion. It should be noted, however, that 
this total cost pales in comparison to the annual $800 billion to $1 trillion in benefits estimated by 
SAFE and Atkinson.52 The comparison supports the idea that AV adoption is likely to be a net 
benefit to the country and that there are potential resources available to mitigate costs.  
vi. Workers with changed duties 
Finally, the duties of workers in many other occupations are likely to change with the adoption of 
AV. According to the BLS Occupational Requirements Survey, 30 percent of workers are required 
to do some driving on their jobs.53 Figure III-11 shows what the percentage of workers that are 
required to drive cars or other vehicles in selected occupations. When that driving is no longer a 
requirement, many jobs will change substantially. And others that don’t drive now may still see 
changes in duties. 
For example, removing from many occupations the requirement to be able to drive will benefit 
workers whose disabilities now prevent them from driving. For others, time now spent driving may 
be available for productivity-enhancing activities such as writing, completing paperwork, or 
making sales calls. In addition, jobs related to roadway accidents or personal ownership of cars 
will be strongly affected. Another large category are current drivers who will continue in their 
occupation with much more assistance from technology derived from the development of 
autonomous vehicles, as is the case with airline pilots and auto assembly line workers. 
The ESA noted jobs that were most likely to have their duties change.54 In total, these jobs 
employed 7.7 million people in 2016. Figure III-12 shows the characteristics of the workers in 
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 See Securing America’s Future Energy, “The Impact of Autonomous Vehicles on Consumers, the Economy and the 
U.S. Labor Force, “ (June 13, 2018) and Robert Atkinson, “The Coming Transportation Revolution,” Milken Institute 
Review. 4th Quarter 2014. https://itif.org/publications/2014/10/17/coming-transportation-revolution.  
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 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “30 Percent of Civilian Jobs Require Some Driving.” The Economics Daily, June 27, 2017. 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/30-percent-of-civilian-jobs-require-some driving-in-2016.htm 
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 David Beede, Regina Powers, and Cassandra Ingram. Office of the Chief Economist, Economics and Statistics 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. August 11, 2017. “The Employment Impact of Autonomous 
Vehicles” ESA Issue Brief # 05-17. 
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/Employment%20Impact%20Autonomous%20Vehicles_0.pdf 
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these jobs. The largest occupation in this group is Personal Care Aides, many of whom now drive 
to work with a variety of dispersed clients and also take them on errands. Compared to the 
displaced workers, the workers with changed duties are more female, more educated, and 
younger. 
FIGURE III-11: Percentage of Civilian Jobs that Require Driving, in Selected Occupations, 2016 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/30-percent-of-civilian-jobs-require-some-
driving-in-2016.htm 
 
FIGURE III-12: Characteristics of People in Occupations Whose Duties Will Change with AV Adoption 
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Source: Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2016 and authors’ calculations. 
 
IV. Job Creation, Impact on Well-Being, and Pace of Change 
In line with past experience and our framework (from Section III), our simulations assume that 
enough new jobs will arise to restore the economy to full employment. However, this assumed 
job creation does not argue for a passive approach to job losses from AV adoption. Not all jobs are 
equal and the path to a new job may be short and smooth or long and uncertain. The historical 
examples reviewed in Section II show that technology alone will not determine which new jobs 
are created and how painlessly displaced workers are slotted into them.  
Here we discuss what we can know about the job creation that will replace the jobs eliminated by 
AV adoption. We begin by focusing on the job creation implied by our analysis framework and 
consider a baseline case as well as two contrasting job creation variants. We also review some 
broader implications for wellbeing from AV adoption. Then we discuss a number of major 
uncertainties and how they could affect our simulations. Finally, we discuss the case of truck 
drivers in depth to illustrate how different the futures could be and the uncertainties involved. 
 
A. Job creation 
The outcomes described in our simulations assume no other major changes or disruptions to the 
U.S. labor market. That is, our simulations project that the experience of workers displaced by AV 
adoption will be similar to the recent path for a typical laid-off worker in the U.S. We assume that 
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even with no major policy changes that employers will still create enough new jobs reasonably 
quickly to employ the workers that need to be reabsorbed. In that sense, despite the losses noted 
above, we describe a relatively rosy outcome.  
How many new jobs will be created? Figure IV-1 illustrates the process of replacing the jobs 
changed by AV deployment under the high and low displacement scenario combinations. The 
upper line in each pair is the projected cumulative number of workers who will be displaced due 
to AV adoption and adjusted for retirements. Even as the AV-related displacement occurs, 
previously displaced workers will continue to take jobs; this quantity is represented by the lower 
line in each pair. This shows the additional labor market churn caused by the transition to AVs. 
FIGURE IV-1: Job Displacement and Re-Employment 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: “Low” refers to the combination of Trucking-Slow and Cars-Personal scenarios. “High” refers to the 
combination of the Trucking-Fast and Cars-Fleet scenarios. 
If displaced workers all landed new jobs immediately, then the number of jobs created would be 
the same as the number of jobs eliminated in each year. However, we have seen that after they 
are displaced, some workers will be unemployed for a time or exit the workforce. Their paths to 
re-employment are slowed by the four frictions (geography, skills, worker voice, and investment), 
as discussed in the framework (Figure II-2). Thus, job creation lags job destruction, which opens a 
temporary gap between job destruction and job creation and lowers employment for a time. The 
job gaps for the high and low deployment scenario combinations are represented by the two 
shaded areas in Figure IV-1.  
Our simulations suggest that displacement rates will be fairly modest until about 2040. After that, 
the gap between displacement and re-employment widens as more workers are displaced 
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annually, so that a larger number of workers experience a time lag before they land new positions. 
The gap will peak at 380,000 in 2047 for the high scenario combination and 170,000 in 2051 for 
the low scenario combination.55 After those years, the gap begins to dwindle as AV-related worker 
displacement tapers off and an increasing number of workers find new jobs. Sometime after 2051, 
all jobs eliminated by AV deployment will be replaced with new jobs that will be filled with workers.  
The number of new jobs created implied by the high and low simulations (shown in the high and 
low job re-employment lines of Figure IV-1) is substantial—a range between 0.7 to 1.7 million new 
jobs created by 2051. Of course, many workers displaced by AV will not take newly created jobs; 
they will be hired into pre-existing jobs. Other workers, often young people just entering the 
workforce, will take the new jobs. Regardless of who fills which job, our simulations (as informed 
by past experience and economic theory) suggest substantial job creation in the wake of AV 
adoption. There are at least two contrasting alternatives to the churn paths laid out above: 
employers may not create good new jobs so quickly or consumers could expand their use of 
transportation enough so that few workers will be displaced. How would those job creation 
variants differ from the baseline outcome?  
First, why might employers lag in job creation? Our framework (Figure II-2) lists four reasons why 
job creation may be delayed and income losses may mount: 
1) Geography: New jobs may arise in different places from where existing jobs are lost. For 
example, many long-haul truck drivers live in rural areas. Job growth in rural areas has 
been slower than for the rest of the U.S. If many of the displaced workers are not mobile 
and live in areas where job growth is slow, adjustment would be more prolonged.  
2) Skills: New jobs may require different skills from the old jobs. Very different 
requirements (for example, between new occupations in hospitals and driving), 
challenges for mid- or late-career workers in acquiring new skills, and high costs for 
training could slow their adjustment.  
3) Worker voice: Institutions and regulations that surface workers’ voices to facilitate the 
sharing of productivity gains and preserve the value of employees’ human capital may be 
lacking. When displaced workers have no voice in allocating productivity gains or in 
reorganizing work, insufficient resources may be directed toward retraining or other 
assistance they need to smooth their adjustment. Workers can have a voice through 
unionization, employer practices, and the political system. Without this voice, wages are 
more likely to remain depressed as the laid-off workers crowd into and compete for the 
few jobs available for workers like them. In addition, the new jobs created will be less 
likely to be “good jobs,” that offer high wages, stability, a chance for advancement, etc.  
4) Investment: Incentives or access to capital for investments to create new jobs may be 
too low. An economy in recession, a lack of local investment capital, information gaps, or 
overly restrictive policies or regulations could all hinder employers from expanding 
employment.  
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 Note: The scenarios do not extend past 2051, so it is possible that the gap would grow after that date. 
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The larger these gaps are and the more they compound each other for particular workers, the 
longer their unemployment spells will be while they search or prepare for their next job. And if 
many workers lose their jobs, unemployment will rise substantially for a long time, and displaced 
workers’ new jobs will likely pay far less than they received before. Search times might double, 
and time out of the labor force would be far higher. Indeed, as noted above, Davis and von 
Wachter56 found that income losses to workers displaced during recessions were two to three 
times higher than losses to those who lost their jobs during economic expansions. These higher 
losses could occur in locally depressed economies even when the rest of the nation was expanding. 
So, under this variant, all the negative outcomes are substantially higher.  
Second, in contrast with the first scenario of slow job creation, lower transportation prices could 
spur dramatically higher spending on transportation. If so, after AV adoption, more people may 
move further away from each other and their workplaces. The ability to travel further from home, 
at lower cost and without a commute that requires a driver’s attention, could open new job 
possibilities to some workers. Under these conditions, many fewer transportation workers would 
lose jobs, but urban sprawl, congestion, energy use, and environmental costs could rise rapidly, 
reducing the overall social benefits from AVs. We examine this issue further below when we 
discuss some wellbeing impacts of AV adoption.  
The three sorts of jobs created by AVs are those outlined in our framework: additional 
transportation jobs, AV-supplying jobs, and jobs from expanding non-transportation consumption. 
As these two alternative outcomes suggest, the number of jobs in each category and their speed 
of creation matters a lot for achieving the rosy outcome.  
i. New transportation jobs 
To the extent that autonomous vehicles reduce the cost of transportation, people will demand 
more transportation. Even if AVs achieve high levels of autonomy (levels 4 or 5), humans will still 
be necessary for the operation of the transportation system. For example, people will be involved 
in dispatching fleets of vehicles, repairing them on the road (it probably will be a long time before 
it is practical to have a robot change a tire next to a busy highway), etc. There are also some tasks 
that are currently bundled with driving, such as delivery of a package to the customer’s door, 
helping a frail, disabled or very young customer and her luggage to get into/out of a vehicle, and 
other types of customer service. As the cost of transportation falls, the quantity demanded of 
these non-driving tasks (those now bundled with driving jobs) will likely increase, thus partially 
(though not fully) offsetting the reduced demand for driving tasks.57  
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For example, discussing a small experiment designed to gauge new demand for transportation in 
an AV-enabled world, Harb et al. say:58  
We found an 83 percent overall increase in VMT [Vehicle Miles Travelled]. The 
number of long trips and trips after 6 p.m. increased by 91 percent and 88 percent 
respectively. Retirees were the cohort with the largest increase in these two trip 
types (175 percent and 246 percent respectively). 21 percent of the increase in 
VMT was a result of “zero-occupancy” vehicles, where subjects sent their chauffeur 
[simulating an autonomous vehicle] on errands. 
More generally, previous studies suggest that people’s use of transportation is quite responsive 
to price. One review of the literature summarizes the findings as follows:59 
Although there is a large literature on elasticities of VKT or fuel demand with 
respect to fuel prices, estimates for light duty VKT elasticities with respect to 
generalized travel costs per kilometer are few. FHWA (2005) suggests a long-run 
elasticity of 1.0 to 2.0, while Graham and Glaister (2002) recommends 2.3. For 
heavy vehicles, freight demand elasticities with respect to total costs range from 
0.5 to 1.75 (Cambridge Systematics, 2009; Graham and Glaister, 2004; Winebrake 
et al., 2012), with a choice of 0.97 to 1.0 as a central value by HDR/ICF (2008) and 
Cambridge Systematics (2009).  
ii. New AV-related jobs 
Here we attempt to anticipate what jobs will be created directly from the expanded adoption of 
AVs, both cars and trucks, and by both individuals and businesses (fleets). We start with 
manufacturing-related employment, for which we have a more solid basis for projection, and then 
move to services where our thoughts are more speculative given the well-known difficulty in 
predicting the indirect job creation tied to new technologies.  
AV-Related Manufacturing 
AVs will need to be manufactured and so far, every indication is that automakers (current and 
possibly new entrants, following the model of Tesla) will do that job. The tech companies (including 
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Waymo, Uber/Lyft, and Apple) are backing away from saying they will do manufacturing 
themselves, and the contract manufacturing capacity for the automotive sector has been shrinking 
rather than expanding in recent years. Automakers are also working hard to make sure they retain 
their system integrator role for future vehicles, anticipating the full range of technological 
advances.  
Most of the technologies that permit AVs to function autonomously are layered onto existing 
vehicle technologies. Cameras, sensors, regular radar, and lidar (laser-powered radar) are the 
hardware components most likely to be added to existing vehicle designs. To support the vastly 
greater information processing demands of AVs, many advanced chips and microprocessors, 
incorporated into integrated control units (ICU), will be added, along with storage capacity and 
backup ICUs for redundancy protection needed to deal with the extreme operating conditions in 
automobiles and trucks.  
Another area of expansion will be the information and communications technologies (ICT), both 
hardware and software, needed for within-the-vehicle hard-wired networks plus outside-the-
vehicle protocols related to Wi-Fi that will support vehicle telematics60 (and provide business 
services) and very likely both vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-cloud or vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2C/V2I) communication. While some standards for near-range wireless 
communication already exist, including the DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) 
standard already backed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), most 
observers believe that the full implementation of wireless communication needed for the 
combination of AV and “connected car” services (what some call “CAV”) will await the 
implementation of the 5G standard in telecommunications.61 Once properly outfitted, vehicles will 
become both transmitters and receivers of signals in an expansive 5G network; Wi-Fi performance 
on the road may be at its best in a traffic jam!  
What about the fundamental structural design and materials for an AV? How might those differ 
from today’s vehicles? Here it is important to discuss current regulatory developments at the 
federal level that promise to exempt a certain number of AV test vehicles—per manufacturer, per 
year – from the FMVSS (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards). FMVSS are developed and 
enforced by NHTSA, based on the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, and are 
divided into three categories: crash avoidance, crashworthiness, and post-crash survivability. 
Automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs—the large automakers) are responsible for 
validating that vehicles meet FMVSS; U.S. law (going back to McPherson vs. Buick in 1916) also 
holds OEMs responsible for legal liability and for undertaking recalls, even where a safety problem 
can be linked to a component made by a specific supplier, because of their system integration 
role.  
If the current bill to regulate AVs passes both houses of Congress (it is currently stalled at the 
Senate), AVs used for testing purposes in all states will not have to meet FMVSS as long as their 
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manufacturers self-certify them as “safe.” However, this is unlikely to bring changes in the basic 
materials or structural design of these test vehicles. Steel (with some aluminum) construction with 
many crumple zones to protect occupants, along with safety technologies like air bags, are likely 
to be the default characteristics of any vehicle operating during the long transition to system-wide 
(i.e. 100 percent) implementation of AVs. Once system-wide implementation is achieved, it is 
possible that AVs (assuming that their safety record in avoiding accidents, deaths, and injuries is 
as impressive as its proponents claim) could be made of lighter-weight materials that wouldn’t 
need to be designed to protect occupants as in current vehicles. However, that is very far off; in 
our scenarios, that would be reached well after 2060, if at all. Our expectation is that as long as 
there is any mix of AVs and conventional vehicles still operating, societal expectations will continue 
to support safety standards at the level of current FMVSS.  
This is important because if future AVs were built with radically different structural designs 
involving much less steel and occupant protection, manufacturing requirements would be much 
simpler—and the associated manufacturing employment would also be much less. If for the 
foreseeable future, AVs both need to meet current FMVSS and are adding lots of new 
technologies, the overall manufacturing task will become greater/more complex rather than less, 
which will preserve manufacturing employment at OEMs and suppliers at current levels (assuming 
a balancing of greater work content with productivity improvements).  
Where the new technological components are manufactured will obviously affect U.S. 
employment levels; automotive supply chains are already extraordinarily international and are 
characterized by contradictory locational dynamics, with labor-intensive components flowing to 
low-labor cost locations but with heavy, high value-added, and/or key customized components 
tending to be manufactured relatively close to final assembly plants in order to keep inventories 
lean/low and feedback loops quick for quality assurance.  
A separate factor often considered in evaluating future manufacturing requirements is the 
prevalence of electric vehicles (EVs) in the future. EVs generally are simpler and have a more 
modular product architecture than conventional cars, and electric motors and other drive train 
components are simpler to build than internal combustion engines (ICE). Thus if EV sales increase 
greatly, labor requirements in automotive assembly plants may drop; since EVs have fewer moving 
parts than ICEVs (estimates start at 25 percent fewer and go up from there, depending on the level 
of granularity in counting components), less assembly labor is needed.  
In terms of technological interdependence, there is no necessary requirement for AVs to be EVs—
or vice-versa. Thus, there is no reason to assume that fast diffusion of AVs will reduce 
manufacturing complexity or labor hours if those AVs have ICEs—or hybrid gasoline-electric 
drivetrains, which are also time-consuming to manufacture. However, AVs and EVs could be 
bundled together for many reasons, including regulatory mandates, consumer preference, and 
the fact that both AVs and EVs need much more electrical system capacity than exists at present. 
In the short term, cities allowing AV testing might require that the test vehicles be EVs as well in 
order to achieve environmental policy goals. For now, based on current EV diffusion patterns (i.e. 
impressive growth but from a very low baseline and hence with very low impact on overall sales), 
we do not anticipate much reduction in manufacturing employment requirements because we do 
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not expect a tight coupling between EV and AV designs. That is, we expect the number of vehicles 
with EV/AV coupled designs to remain relatively low for a long while. 
In summary, we anticipate that the manufacturing requirements associated with designing and 
building an AV will be equal or higher than for current vehicles through the entire period of 
transition when AVs and traditional vehicles are on the road; only full system implementation (100 
percent AVs) would allow a dramatic shift in FMVSS and hence in vehicle structural designs and 
manufacturing requirements. If the new ICT technologies needed for AVs, from lidar to advanced 
chips and ICUs, are not manufactured in the U.S., the employment gain related to greater use of 
these new technologies would not help to offset U.S. job losses from AVs—even if retraining were 
available to help displaced workers move into these manufacturing jobs.  
One possible development that could keep these ICT-related jobs in the U.S. (and other developed 
economies) is the likelihood that AVs will require sophisticated hardware/software integration and 
associated customization requirements. For example, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan called 
the world’s attention to the fact that a single factory of semiconductor firm Renesas made 60 
percent of a particular customized electronic chip/ICU needed by virtually every vehicle built in 
the U.S., Europe, Japan, and Korea. This dependence arose because Renesas had a rare/scarce 
ability to design both the chips (hardware) and the associated applications (software) along with 
customization to each OEM’s requirements. For AVs, lidar is a crucial technology that is often 
described as inevitably following a path to being a commodity, readily available in a standardized 
design at a low cost. This is certainly what one would predict based on the most common trajectory 
of ICT digital products. But perhaps competitive advantage in lidar (and hence in the overall AV 
system) will emerge for the firms most able to pull together the best-performing combination of 
operating system, 3-D mapping data, and hardware/software configuration for lidar, cameras, 
sensors. Waymo—the AV subsidiary of Google’s Alphabet—appears to hold a leading position in 
integration and customization skills that are not yet in evidence at other firms, e.g. Uber.62 In 
general, high skill jobs in digital technologies are likely to grow with AVs—along with demand for 
prospective employees with engineering degrees in artificial intelligence, vision systems, and 
advanced data analytics. These are likely to be highly sought-after jobs for young people 
embarking on careers involving these new technologies rather than jobs for which older workers 
from manufacturing could be retrained.  
AV-Related Services 
As noted above, forecasting job creation in services related to AVs is much more difficult than for 
manufacturing. We know very little now about what will be needed (or required by regulation) to 
operate AVs, particularly in fleet applications such as ride-sharing. Furthermore, there is a huge 
range of possible services that could appeal to the occupant of an AV who has a long commute 
and no need to pay attention to driving or parking, yet little basis for forecasting which will be 
                                                          
62
 This comparative assessment is speculative but can be inferred in the aftermath of the recent fatality in which an 
Uber vehicle operating in autonomous mode (albeit with a test driver behind the wheel) killed a pedestrian with a 
bicycle near Phoenix. The signs of a less-than-adequate hardware configuration (one rather than six lidar units) 
and lower test driver coverage (one rather than two) at Uber stand in contrast to the confident assertion of 
Waymo’s CEO that the Phoenix accident would not have occurred with their AV system (i.e. integrated 
hardware/software/mapping). 
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most technologically feasible, most appealing to consumers, and most profitable for service 
providers. What we offer here is thus, of necessity, quite speculative.  
One persistent prediction about AVs is that the first applications are likely to be in fleets rather 
than individual ownership. Indeed, fleet management capabilities are likely to be both necessary 
and highly valued by both the automotive OEMs building AVs and the tech companies providing 
AV operating systems. AVs will be an expensive durable asset for which return on investment will 
depend on smart management for high utilization (although it will be easy to surpass the current 
level of usage of privately-owned automobiles, which sit unused 95 percent of the time). Also 
necessary will be smart capital investment choices about timing, financing, and volume purchases, 
smart maintenance choices to minimize AV depreciation and maintain a high operating ratio, and 
smart replacement and end-of-life management of the asset. Neither automakers nor tech 
companies have much expertise in these areas; more likely candidates are rental car companies 
(Hertz, Avis, etc.); truck leasing companies (Ryder, Penske, etc.); car-sharing companies (Zipcar, 
already owned by Avis; car2go); and vendors who retrofit and guarantee pre-owned vehicles 
(CarMax, CarVision, TrueCar). Waymo has already contracted with Avis and CarMax to maintain 
their fleet of Chrysler Pacifica minivans in their AV tests around the U.S. These companies would 
enjoy a substantial surge in demand for their services with growth in AV fleets and their 
employment requirements would grow accordingly for jobs in asset acquisition and financing; 
utilization management; maintenance and replacement; and user support services.  
Another prediction is that Level 4 AVs (no driver, no controls by which a human could operate the 
vehicle) will, in many situations, need support from a traffic specialist or operator in a remote 
location. The air travel analog is air traffic control centers. Remote drone operation, for military or 
commercial purposes, is a newer example. Another analog are today’s traffic engineers and 
technicians, who study and design traffic flow patterns. Consider the case when employers can 
replace drivers (who focus on a single vehicle’s operation) with remote operators (who can 
hypothetically monitor many vehicles at once). At that point, the labor cost savings are potentially 
huge, as are the implied job losses, all depending on the ratio of remote operators to vehicles. 
Three “known unknowns” are whether policymakers or companies will set remote operation or 
traffic management guidelines, what criteria they will use for setting guidelines, and whether the 
ratio of operator to vehicles will be low (e.g., 1/50) or high (1/8).  
Let’s consider a scenario about trucking that raises the question of where remote operator 
activities might be situated. In one possibility, driverless trucks with Vehicle-to-Cloud 
communication will connect with a remote operation center that covers multiple states and 
oversees all trucks‘ cross-country travel on interstate highways. Such a center would presumably 
have a relatively high operator-to-vehicle ratio, of, say, 1 to 30.  
But imagine instead a platooning situation in which a convoy of 4-6 trucks is traveling together in 
tight configuration to gain aerodynamic benefits. At present, platooning can occur but only with a 
driver present in each truck. The technology is likely to advance so that some trucks in a convoy 
could operate with no driver. But perhaps the remote operator role would be played by the truck 
driver in the lead vehicle of the convoy who would monitor all convoy vehicles plus environmental 
conditions while possibly performing other tasks such as communicating with delivery destinations 
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or working out schedule complexities. In this case, the ratio of operator to vehicle would likely be 
closer to 1 to 5.  
The employment and skill consequences of these two scenarios could be quite different. The 
analog to an air traffic control center would involve a relatively small number of very high skill jobs 
not readily available to a truck driver whose job was displaced by AVs. In contrast, the lead driver 
in a platoon who monitors all other vehicles in the convoy would have a more multi-faceted role 
involving a range of skills, and current truck drivers facing elimination of their driving 
responsibilities could probably be trained for this role relatively easily and cheaply.  
Divergent scenarios can also be imagined for many other service offerings. Remote call centers 
that wait for AV occupants to call for help of some kind would have very different jobs, in both skill 
levels and employment levels, than centers that offer customized “concierge”-type services with 
proactive offers made to AV occupants based on data previously collected about their preferences 
and needs. Convenience-related services, in which AVs would bring occupants to destinations to 
accomplish errands, e.g. picking up groceries on the way home from work, are likely to generate 
extra jobs at the grocery stores, just as Instacart now provides for people ordering groceries for 
home delivery. In this situation, the AV provides the delivery functionality by bringing the 
consumer to the store and the grocery store staffer would need to prepare the order and bring it 
out to the AV at a precisely-coordinated time and place.  
Some of the most futuristic visions for AV occupants involve a variety of health-related services. 
The seat for an AV occupant (particularly in a privately-owned AV) could contain a range of sensors 
to check a variety of health indicators, e.g. blood pressure, blood sugar levels, external air quality 
vis-à-vis pollutants and allergens, and to provide health-related guidance about what/where to eat 
lunch, exercise possibilities, etc. Communicating these data in real time to the individual’s doctor 
or medical support team could be hugely helpful in preventative approaches to health care that 
are highly customized and more representative of daily health conditions than any number of 
doctor’s office visits could accomplish.  
A final category of AV services would be discretionary choices by occupants of how to spend the 
time freed up by not having to drive. These could include a variety of services supporting work 
activities (videoconferencing, data analysis, any computing or communications applications 
currently used in offices); personal growth activities (on-line courses; language instruction; travel 
information); entertainment/relaxation (watching movies, TV, meditation, enjoying an in-seat 
massage or aromatherapy session), and of course sleep. (If sex-related applications are often the 
first to dominate new technology applications, e.g. Internet porn, we can only imagine what could 
be possible in AVs in which seats are flexible and shades can be drawn.) It is nearly impossible to 
predict the pattern of adoption of such services. Furthermore, the skill/employment impact will 
be heavily dependent on whether those services simply substitute for consumption now occurring 
at non-driving times or represent some additional consumption.  
iii. New jobs producing other goods and services 
The remainder of the new jobs arise as consumers gain useful time while travelling, save money 
from lower transportation costs, and can earn more through access to safer, convenient travel. 
With these benefits, AVs will allow consumers to buy more non-transportation goods and services. 
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For example, a family that earned more or spent less on their cars or taxi service might eat out 
more often, see doctors more often, buy more clothes, or renovate their home. The best guess is 
that those consumers would mostly expand consumption in the same directions as they are 
already trending. So, to understand what these jobs might look like, we turn to ten-year 
occupational Employment Projections produced biannually by the BLS and assume that the 
distribution of additional new jobs from this source will look much like those the economy is set 
to generate anyway.63 BLS summarizes the projected new jobs as follows:  
About 9 out of 10 new jobs are projected to be added in the service-providing 
sector from 2016 to 2026…Employment in the health care and social assistance 
sector is projected to add…about one-third of all new jobs... 
Healthcare support occupations and healthcare practitioners and technical 
occupations are projected to be among the fastest growing occupational groups 
during the 2016–26 projections decade. These two occupational groups—which 
account for 13 of the 30 fastest growing occupations from 2016 to 2026—are 
projected to contribute about one-fifth of all new jobs by 2026. Factors such as the 
aging baby-boom population, longer life expectancies, and growing rates of chronic 
conditions will drive continued demand for healthcare services. Several other 
occupational groups are projected to experience faster than average employment 
growth, including personal care and service occupations, community and social 
service occupations, and computer and mathematical occupations. 
…Of the 30 fastest growing detailed occupations, 18 typically require some level of 
postsecondary education for entry. 
iv. How new jobs would compare to eliminated jobs 
Ongoing concerns about widening inequality and job polarization raise concerns about whether 
the new jobs will further contribute to widening gaps. The fear is that automation like AV can take 
over the more challenging work of low-skilled workers and fuel demand for highly skilled labor. 
This would leave low-skilled workers crowded into jobs that pay little and have few opportunities 
for advancement. For example, former truck drivers could find themselves left only with jobs 
loading and unloading trucks or serving fast food.  
This need not be the case. Mandel64 found that the recent growth of ecommerce has led to a net 
upgrading of jobs for high school graduates. The jobs in shrinking occupations (such as retail sales 
clerks) pay less and have worse working conditions than the fast-growing, automation-assisted 
ecommerce jobs in fulfillment centers.  
                                                          
63
 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Employment Projections: 2016-26 Summary”. 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.nr0.htm.  
64
 Michael Mandel. “How Ecommerce Creates Jobs and Reduces Income Inequality.” Progressive Policy Institute. 
September 2017. http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/PPI_ECommerceInequality-
final.pdf  
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In the case of AVs, the previous discussions show a wide variety of jobs that will likely arise to 
absorb AV-displaced workers. How will these new jobs stack up compared to those eliminated by 
AVs? As examples, Table IV-1 compares 2017 annual wages and highest state location quotients 
for the three occupations that we expect to lose the most jobs from AV adoption with examples 
of those where jobs are likely to be created. The comparisons show that the new jobs may occur 
at many levels of education and pay. They are not currently concentrated in states so different 
from those that employ the current drivers. Yet, former drivers would need retraining and more 
education in order to assume the better-paid positions, such as repair mechanics and traffic 
technicians, nurses, and ICT jobs. Without that retraining, their options are likely to be limited to 
the lowest-paid of the new jobs, such as personal care aides or food service and preparation.  
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TABLE IV-1: Examples of Occupations Where Jobs Will be Created, Compared to Occupations with Largest AV-Displacement  
Median 
annual 
wage, 
2017 
Typical entry-
level 
education 
States with highest occupational concentration  
(location quotient) 
AV-reduced occupations (top three occupations) 
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck 
Drivers 
$42,480 
Postsecondary 
nondegree 
award 
Nebraska 
(2.23) 
Arkansas 
(2.22) 
North Dakota 
(2.15) 
Iowa (2.02) Wyoming 
(1.8) 
Light Truck or Delivery Services 
Drivers 
$31,450 
High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
Montana 
(1.31) 
Maryland  
(1.3) 
Louisiana 
(1.28) 
Rhode 
Island 
(1.25) 
Illinois  
(1.25) 
Bus Drivers, School or Special 
Client 
$31,060 
High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
West 
Virginia 
(1.71) 
Connecticut 
(1.68) 
Pennsylvania 
(1.54) 
Minnesota 
(1.51) 
New York 
(1.51) 
New transportation jobs (beyond mitigating losses above)* 
Aides for older, young or 
disabled riders (Personal Care 
Aides who help with 
transportation) 
$23,100 
High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
California 
(2.18) 
New Mexico 
(2.16) 
Minnesota 
(1.78) 
Maine 
(1.68) 
Wisconsin 
(1.52) 
Expediters/Roadway Automotive 
Repair Mechanics (Automotive 
Service Technicians and 
Mechanics for roadway service) 
$39,550 
Postsecondary 
nondegree 
award 
Maine 
(1.48) 
Montana 
(1.42) 
West Virginia 
(1.32) 
New 
Hampshire 
(1.30) 
Missouri 
(1.27) 
Package Deliverers (Light Truck or 
Delivery Services Drivers for the 
last mile) 
$31,450 
High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
Montana 
(1.31) 
Maryland  
(1.3) 
Louisiana 
(1.28) 
Rhode 
Island 
(1.25) 
Illinois  
(1.25) 
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New AV-related jobs* 
Traffic Engineers (Civil Engineers 
specializing in roadway traffic) 
$84,770 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
California 
(1.23) 
Texas (1.08) Florida (0.92) New York 
(0.83) 
Pennsylva-
nia  
(0.99) 
Traffic Technicians $45,670 
Associate’s 
degree** 
Tennessee 
(4.22) 
New York 
(3.82) 
Wyoming 
(2.68) 
New 
Mexico 
(2.30) 
Georgia 
(1.98) 
Computer Programmers $82,240 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
Alabama 
(2.22) 
Washington 
(1.9) 
Connecticut 
(1.83) 
New 
Jersey 
(1.57) 
Utah (1.54) 
Network and Computer Systems 
Administrators 
$81,100 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
Maryland 
(2.2) 
Virginia (1.96) Vermont  
(1.85) 
Colorado 
(1.58) 
Rhode 
Island 
(1.57) 
All sectors job creation (top three occupations) 
Personal Care Aides $23,100 
High school 
diploma or 
equivalent 
California 
(2.18) 
New Mexico 
(2.16) 
Minnesota 
(1.78) 
Maine 
(1.68) 
Wisconsin 
(1.52) 
Combined Food Preparation and 
Serving Workers, Including Fast 
Food 
$22,730 
No formal 
educational 
credential 
Louisiana 
(3.27) 
Alaska  
(2.5) 
Hawaii  
(2.2) 
Maine 
(2.17) 
Nevada 
(1.36) 
Registered Nurses $70,000 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
South 
Dakota 
(1.47) 
West Virginia 
(1.45) 
Delaware 
(1.29) 
Missouri 
(1.27) 
Mississippi 
(1.26) 
*Wages and location quotients listed for these emerging occupations are those for the occupation listed as similar to the emerging occupation. Actual wages 
and geographic distribution may deviate from those for the current occupation. 
**Refers to the broader category of Civil Engineering Technicians.  
Sources: BLS Wages and LQs, https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm, Typical Entry-Level Education: https://www.bls.gov/ooh/, All sectors job creation 
(top three occupations): https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_104.htm  
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B. Well-being implications 
i. Crashes and accidents 
One major intended benefit of AV adoption is improved safety: lower injuries and fatalities from 
roadway accidents. In 2016, 37,461 lives were lost in the U.S. due to crashes and accidents.65 For 
the labor market, the potential advantages include longer work lives, less absenteeism, fewer 
disabled workers, less traffic congestion, and lower workers compensation insurance premiums.  
There is great potential for improvement. In 2016, 1,839 people lost their lives while on-the-job 
due to motorized land vehicles, as either pedestrians or occupants.66 These accounted for 35 
percent of all occupational fatalities that year—and 5 percent of all crash and accident fatalities. 
Employers reported an additional 44,350 incidents involving motorized land vehicles that were 
severe enough to result in days away from work, with more than half (23,320) keeping workers 
out for 11 work days or more.67 Some now have permanent disabilities.  
While these counts are the best available for on-the-job accidents, they do not include all the 
labor-market affecting incidents that AV may be able to prevent. First, the injuries data are known 
to be incomplete for a number of reasons, including systematic under-reporting of work-related 
injuries and illnesses by employers.68 In addition, by design, injuries are included only if they result 
in days away from work, which omits the large and rising number of incidents that are serious 
enough to cause restricted duties or job transfers.69 Furthermore, workers are also killed, disabled, 
or otherwise have their productivity hindered by the many incidents that occur off the job.  
To take all these considerations into account, we turn to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, which periodically produces comprehensive estimates of the economic costs of all 
roadway accidents. Their latest report states: 70  
In 2010 the total economic cost of motor vehicle crashes in the United States was 
$242 billion. This represents the present value of lifetime economic costs for 32,999 
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 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration. “2016 Quick Facts.” https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-
releases/usdot-releases-2016-fatal-traffic-crash-data  
66 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2016,” Economic News Release, 
December 19, 2017. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t02.htm  
67
 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Employer-Reported Workplace Injury and Illnesses, 2016,” Economic News Release, 
November 9, 2017. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/osh.nr0.htm  
68
 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Research on the Completeness of the Injury and Illness Counts from the Survey of 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses,” July 20, 2017. https://www.bls.gov/iif/undercount.htm 
69
 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Occupational Injuries and Illnesses: a pilot study of job-transfer or work-restriction 
cases, 2011–2013,” Report 1056. https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/job-transfer-or-work-restriction/archive/a-
pilot-study-of-job-transfer-or-work-restriction-cases-2011-2013.pdf 
70
 Lawrence Blincoe, Ted R. Miller, Eduard Zaloshnja, and Bruce A. Lawrence. “The economic and societal impact of 
motor vehicle crashes,” 2010. (Revised) (Report No. DOT HS 812 013). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration. May 2015. https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013 
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fatalities, 3.9 million non-fatal injuries, and 24 million damaged vehicles. These 
figures include both police-reported and unreported crashes.  
When quality-of-life valuations are considered, the total value of societal harm 
from motor vehicle crashes in 2010 was $836 billion.  
…The cost components include productivity losses, property damage, medical 
costs, rehabilitation costs, congestion costs, legal and court costs, emergency 
services such as medical, police, and fire services, insurance administration costs, 
and the costs to employers. Values for more intangible consequences such as 
physical pain or lost quality-of-life are also examined in estimates of comprehensive 
costs, which include both economic cost components and quality-of-life valuations. 
Three essential factors in this estimate have risen from 2010 to 2016: prices, vehicle miles 
travelled, and crashes per vehicle miles traveled. Prices rose by about 11 percent. The increase in 
miles traveled combined with higher crashes raised the number of injuries and fatalities by about 
14 percent.71 Combining these two effects yields a rough estimate of the comprehensive costs of 
motor vehicle crashes in 2016 of $1.05 trillion.  
AV adoption is expected to shrink these costs dramatically by preventing most of the 94 percent 
of roadway accidents that are now caused by drivers.72 How much overall accidents will decline is 
unclear for three reasons. 
1. For the foreseeable future, humans will continue to do some driving. Even in 2051, both 
of our trucking scenarios allow for 5 percent non-AV enabled trucks. In Trucking-Slow, most 
AV trucks (57 percent) still have drivers responsible for some driving (that is Level 3). Even 
in Trucking-Fast, 2 percent of AV trucks will not reach Level 4, so they will have drivers. So, 
in our scenarios, at least 7 to 57 percent of trucks will still have people driving some part 
(but not all) of the time in 2051. The two car scenarios assume 100 percent penetration of 
AV enabled vehicles by 2051, but experts agree that full (Level 4) autonomy will be adopted 
later in cars than in trucks.  
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 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration. “Quick Facts 2016” and “Quick Facts 2011”. 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/#/PublicationList/38 Since they were not yet available, we estimate the number 
of injuries for 2016 by extrapolating the number of injuries per 10 million vehicle miles travelled (VMT) in 2016 to 
81 and multiplying that by the 2016 VMT. From 2010 to 2016, the number of fatalities rose by 13.5 percent and 
the number of injuries rose by 14.8 percent. We combine those to estimate that total costs rose by 14 percent 
due to increased crashes.  
72 Santokh Singh. “Critical reasons for crashes investigated in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey.” 
Traffic Safety Facts Crash•Stats. Report No. DOT HS 812 115. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. (February 2015). https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812451 
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2. No technology is perfect, so widespread reliance on AV is likely to increase vehicle-caused 
accidents, which currently account for only 2 percent of crashes.73 This will partly offset 
the reduction in driver-error crashes, but as yet there are no estimates how large this offset 
will be.74 With ample testing and safeguards, the AV-caused accident rate should be low in 
the long run. Yet, some failures will occur, particularly early in adoption. For example, the 
potential for system failures in congested areas likely raises the chance of large-scale multi-
vehicle accidents, however rare. It is unclear what level of safety improvement will be 
required before widespread adoption and what can be achieved by 2051.  
3. Travelling more would also offset some of the reduction in accidents. To the extent that 
lower transportation costs raises vehicular miles travelled, the number of accidents will 
not fall in proportion with the decline in the accident rate.  
So, by how much will annual costs of motor vehicle crashes be reduced by 2051? Probably 
substantially, but less than 94 percent. To be conservative, if crashes were reduced by 50 percent, 
AV adoption would save about 18,000 lives (900 on-the-job), 2.3 million injuries, and $500 million 
in costs per year. This would clearly benefit employers and their employees substantially. The 
benefits will be back-weighted, starting small and rising with adoption, accruing in each year. Many 
benefits will accrue to workers in terms of longer work lives, fewer disabilities, less pain and 
suffering, and less traffic congestion. Employers will also benefit from less absenteeism, lower 
Workers Compensation costs, fewer disability accommodations and reassignments, and more.  
ii. Environment 
The labor market will also be affected by AV’s impact on the environment, including emissions, 
energy use, and urban density. If AV adoption produces lower emissions, reduced energy usage, 
and less urban sprawl, then it can make workers healthier, face lower costs and raise their 
productivity, with potential benefits for their earnings and overall wellbeing.  
At present, though, whether AV adoption has net environmental benefits remains unclear. AVs 
are likely to reduce significantly the environmental impact of each mile driven (see below). 
However, the decline in the costs of transportation (in both dollars and attention) is likely to lead 
to a significant increase in miles driven. Reduced transportation costs may well have additional 
negative follow-on effects, by encouraging urban sprawl, larger houses, more distant vacation 
homes, etc. There is a key role for policy to ensure that users of all types of transport take into 
account the true costs (including congestion and environmental costs) of transportation. 
Below, we examine these impacts in more detail.  
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Reduced Emissions 
AVs can be programmed to drive more efficiently than humans, avoiding jackrabbit starts and 
costly detours. To the extent that safety improves, many costly adaptions to the foibles of human 
drivers can be eliminated.75 Cars can follow each other more closely, increasing their carrying 
capacity of roadways and achieving aerodynamic benefits. Reduced need for human driving 
equipment (e.g., steering wheels) and crash protection in a full AV deployment scenario would 
reduce vehicle weight significantly, having a large impact on fuel economy.76 Various features of 
AVs could lead to substantial benefits, as Brown et al. estimated:77  
• Platooning: 3 percent to 25 percent reduction in energy consumption 
• Eco-driving: Up to 25 percent reduction in energy consumption 
• Enhanced vehicle performance: 5 percent to 23 percent reduction in fuel consumption 
• Improved crash avoidance: Up to 25 percent reduction in fuel consumption 
However, limited actual experience with AVs leaves these estimates subject to much uncertainty. 
In another study, the most optimistic scenario projected a 40 percent decrease in total road 
transport energy, and the most pessimistic scenario estimated a 105 percent increase in overall 
road transport energy use.78  
Increases in Miles Traveled 
We noted above that AVs are likely to reduce transportation costs, thus increasing the demand 
for transportation. That is, while AVs reduce emissions per mile travelled, they are likely to 
increase the number of miles travelled.79  
Miles travelled per person might also rise, since self-driving technology frees 
passengers to use travel time for work or sleep. And just as new highways prompt 
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a rise in transport-intensive business, driverless vehicles could generate lots of new 
road-using activity. Where now a worker might pop into the coffee shop before 
going to work, for example, a latte might soon be delivered in a driverless vehicle. 
As we note below, a study by Harb et al. finds this increase in vehicle miles travelled might be very 
large (more than 80 percent, in their estimate).80 This “rebound effect” of increased demand for 
transportation is good news for employment but may well be bad news for the environment if 
policy does not incorporate the spillover costs of transportation (something mostly not included 
currently). The Economist suggests that might be possible:  
People seem not to object to paying by the mile when they are being driven—by 
taxis and services like Uber and Lyft—and the driverless programs now being tested 
by Waymo and GM follow this model. If a driverless world is one in which people 
generally buy rides rather than cars, then not only might fewer unnecessary 
journeys be made, but also political resistance to road-pricing could ease, and 
congestion with it.  
On the other hand, reduced congestion and AVs’ possibly greater ability to avoid accidents might 
increase the potential for greater highway speeds;81 if so, there might be pressure to increase 
speed limits, which would lower fuel economy.  
Changes in land use 
Some argue that AV adoption will raise urban density because AVs can be packed together more 
tightly and shared vehicles need less urban space for parking. On the other hand, density might 
fall quite a lot, since travel time would personally tax the user much less since they could eat, read, 
sleep, etc. while they travelled and, perhaps, travel at much higher speeds. So people might 
choose to build large houses that consume more energy (and produce more greenhouse gases) in 
distant ex-urban areas if these costs are not properly internalized via a carbon tax or other means.  
We have seen this scenario play out before: the development of the interstate highway system 
facilitated tremendous growth in economic activity occurring over larger distances but also led 
to a great deal of flight from cities, with deeply negative implications for the environment, 
income distribution, race relations, etc.82 Thus, while AV has clear potential benefits for workers 
through its impact on the environment, it is far from certain how this will play out.  
                                                          
80
 Mustapha Harb, Yu Xiao, Giovanni Circella, Patricia L. Mokhtarian, and Joan L. Walker. “Projecting Travelers into a 
World of Self-Driving Vehicles: Estimating Travel Behavior Implications Via a Naturalistic Experiment.” Working 
paper. November 15, 2017. Presented at the Transportation Research Board 97th Annual Meeting (January, 
2018). http://www.joanwalker.com/uploads/3/6/9/5/3695513/harb_et_al_chauffeur_-
_nov_2017_working_paper.pdf 
81
 Austin Brown, Jeffrey Gonder, and Brittany Repac. “An Analysis of Possible Energy Impacts of Automated 
Vehicles,” pp. 137-153 in Road Vehicle Automation. Gereon Meyer and Sven Beiker, editors. Springer International 
Publishing. 2014. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-05990-7_13 
82
 See for example, Myron Orfield. Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability. Brookings. 1997. 
https://www.brookings.edu/book/metropolitics/  
 79 
iii. Productivity 
Two key factors for workers’ overall wellbeing are their individual productivity and that of the 
nation as a whole. Compensation and national wealth depend on both. AV has large potential 
benefits for both. Calculating the impact of AVs on productivity, and hence on GDP, faces many 
sources of uncertainty so the points made here are tentative of necessity. 
Many potential benefits from AV derive from relieving people of the burden of driving while they 
travel. According to the AAA American Driving Survey, Americans spend about 293 hours per year 
driving.83 The report says:  
On average, drivers reported making 2.2 driving trips per day, spending 50.6 
minutes on the road and driving 31.5 miles. Projecting these results to all drivers 
nationwide, U.S. drivers made an estimated total of 186 billion driving trips, spent 
70 billion hours driving and drove 2.62 trillion miles in 2016. 
This is about 5 percent of Americans’ waking time (assuming 7 hours of sleep). Assuming that the 
large amount of time now spent driving is not productive (especially in increasing GDP), AVs offer 
the possibility that some of this time would be converted to productive uses as people become 
riders.  
AVs will soon, if not immediately, have Wi-Fi connections to the Internet. In order to support a 
system of AVs, Wi-Fi infrastructure will be extended and strengthened so that AV occupancy will 
be a reliable source of a fast Wi-Fi connection. Moreover, this is likely to be a free Wi-Fi connection. 
While it is conceivable that AV fleets could charge occupants for Wi-Fi, as airlines now do, this is 
unlikely since the actual incremental cost of providing access is near zero and free Wi-Fi is 
becoming increasingly common, e.g. in hotels, convention centers, and any place where people 
have discretionary time for communicating, shopping, etc. To the extent that access to AVs, either 
private or in fleets, is widespread – with public policy that is attentive to avoiding discrimination 
in such access on either income or locational grounds—AVs may provide an opportunity for 
reducing the so-called “digital divide,” much like a public library. (Conversely if access to AVs is 
affected by racial or economic class discrimination, this will perpetuate stratified access to the 
Internet.)  
Just as Internet use at work for personal purposes has cut into productivity, there is no guarantee 
that more ubiquitous Internet access during commuting—a time period now regarded as 
“personal time”—will be used for GDP-enhancing productivity-boosting tasks. However, by giving 
individuals more flexibility in when and where they accomplish both work and personal tasks 
requiring an Internet connection, productivity as well as personal welfare is likely to be enhanced. 
Consistent with the popular idea of AVs as a potential “office on wheels,” the interior of a typical 
privately-owned AV could be equipped relatively easily with the technological tools needed for 
work tasks, including video and audio functionality for conferencing, easy-to-read screens and 
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keyboards, etc. This scenario would be far more productivity-friendly than, for example, working 
on one’s mobile phone while on the bus or subway.  
Ride-sharing provided by AV fleets offers other opportunities for either productivity or welfare-
advancing changes. The economics of ride-sharing presume much lower cost for all occupants in 
return for a somewhat longer ride controlled by the routing algorithms of the ride-share provider. 
During that longer time period, one is joined by an unpredictable mix of other riders. (It is 
interesting to speculate on whether individuals with predictable routes and schedules would end 
up being assigned to the same ride-share AV day after day. Might some ride-share providers offer 
customers the opportunity to express such “AV-mate” preferences for a small price premium?) 
Any given set of riders might be homogeneous on certain dimensions, i.e., income and lifestyle 
preferences based on all living in the same micro-neighborhood, yet heterogeneous on other 
dimensions, i.e., people using ride-share for last-miles commuting to the same work location, 
having arrived at the ride-share departure point by varied transportation options, could hold a 
wide array of different jobs in terms of organizational position, skill set, salary/wages. If ride-
sharing norms evolve to encourage verbal communication, AVs might provide opportunity for 
interaction among citizens that now rarely happens. (Even when buses and subways offer such 
opportunities, they are mass modes of transportation, often with crowding and background noise 
that discourages interpersonal interaction.) Conversely, if AVs are great places to get Wi-Fi access, 
they could simply be places where individuals are in close physical proximity but otherwise 
separate due to immersion in their digital devices, as now happens in many coffee shops with free 
Wi-Fi. Interpersonal interaction can, of course, have either networking or knowledge-transfer 
benefits that could ultimately contribute to productivity enhancement or could be consumed as 
personal experience, for better or worse. 
The main benefits of AV-based fleet services over current car- or ride-sharing arrangements are 
likely to be low cost, ubiquity, flexibility in scheduling, and flexibility in routing. In contrast, car-
pooling arrangements among employees at the same workplace who work the same schedule 
have proven difficult to sustain given inflexibility and/or costliness (in terms of inconvenience or 
time spent waiting) on one or all of these dimensions.  
These benefits are likely to be magnified as they help non-transportation sectors become more 
productive also. Traditional productivity analysis considers the impact of productivity gains in 
different sectors of the economy. For example, we know from Domar and Hulten that the first-
order aggregate effect of productivity gains in a sector equal the ratio of that sector’s gross output 
to value added (i.e., its Domar weight).84 Among major sectors (NAICS 2-digit, from the BEA 
industry accounts), transportation and warehousing have the third-largest gross output/value 
added ratio (1.9 in 2016; manufacturing is the highest at 2.6, and agriculture and forestry, etc. is 
second at 2.4). That means AV productivity gains will really “punch above their weight” in terms 
of aggregate impact. Of course, the employment implications of these knock-on productivity 
effects will depend on factor substitution and demand elasticities. 
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The many channels described above, combined, suggest a broad potential for raising productivity 
and wellbeing of workers. And, when it makes transportation more productive, it has large ripple 
effects across other sectors of the economy. Thus, the potential of AVs to make the proverbial 
“pie” larger suggests that there are resources that can be tapped to ease transitions for displaced 
workers and their communities.  
 
C. The pace of change: accelerators and brakes 
In order to produce the simulations, we make some strong assumptions that are subject to large 
degrees of uncertainty. These could speed or slow the pace of AV adoption or of subsequent job 
creation and impact safety, environment, and productivity outcomes. These include: 
• Speed of adoption: As can be seen from the comparison of the two trucking scenarios, a 
rapid shift to AV, as compared to a slow pace, may cause more total disruption with fewer 
effective policy remedies. We believe it is important to keep separate the longer-term 
trends affecting mobility of people and goods from the shorter-term fits and starts that 
will accompany a period of transition. A long-term trend that favorably portends the many 
benefits we see from AVs is not necessarily threatened by factors that throw up short-
term barriers or delays in implementation. Indeed, as we argue, a slower pace of change 
allows for better planned (and funded) mitigation strategies and more adjustment 
through attrition. Hence, a slower pace means less dislocation vis-à-vis jobs, earnings, 
labor force participation, and skills.  
• Types of technology adopted: If Level 4 automation (no steering wheel or other controls 
for a human driver) prevails, the impact on driving jobs will be higher than if Level 2 or 3 
automation (in which a human remains responsible for some driving tasks) dominate. 
Some firms, led by Waymo (now owned by Google’s Alphabet), have announced that they 
see Level 3 autonomy as an infeasible engineering solution; Waymo abandoned Level 3 
testing after seeing videos of its engineers falling asleep while monitoring a vehicle set to 
full autonomy.85 Waymo saw the difficulty in safely handing control of the vehicle back 
and forth between algorithms and the human driver: individuals who grow habituated to 
autonomous controls will need a lot of time to shift their attention to a suddenly-urgent 
driving situation, apprehend what is going on, and make the right driving choices. Level 3 
automation does require a human driver and would therefore have less impact on 
employment in driving jobs. Level 4 automation is more technically difficult to achieve 
across all driving situations and thus might be implemented more slowly.  
• Modes of personal mobility adopted: Widespread individual ownership of AVs will have 
different consequences than fleets of AVs offering ride-hailing services to individuals who 
no longer own vehicles. This difference is partially anticipated in the two different 
scenarios for passenger vehicles (“Cars-Personal” vs. “Cars-Fleet”). Which of these modes 
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will dominate will depend on many things, including 1) urban vs. rural/suburban location 
(since fleets will make economic sense first in cities); 2) the cost of purchasing and 
maintaining an individually-owned AV relative to conventional vehicle prices and 
ownership costs; 3) the ubiquity and convenience of ride-hailing options versus an 
underutilized-but-always available vehicle provided by personal ownership;86 and 4) the 
cost (in money and time) of ride-hailing services based on either one customer per ride 
(more expensive and could boost congestion, increase, fuel use and pollution, and 
lengthen rides) or multiple customers pooled per ride (cheaper but possibly avoided by 
those who place a high premium on their time given the potential delay of multiple drop-
offs).  
• Price sensitivity of demand for package delivery and distribution mode adopted: Uber 
researchers predict a very strong increase in demand for package delivery in response to 
declining transportation costs. They also predict slow adoption of AVs for local trucking. 
So, they offer a simulation that delivers an increase in the number of truck drivers after 
AV adoption, with most truck drivers working strictly locally. The quality of those jobs 
would also depend crucially on whether the workers are paid as contractors (per mile, 
which returns a low hourly rate without benefits) or as employees (per hour with benefits).  
• Public sentiment for a “human in the loop” as a “moral crumple zone”87: The availability 
of a technological capability does not, in and of itself, mean that it will be implemented. 
The autopilot example for commercial aviation reveals the power of a societal expectation 
of having a pilot present for responsibility and liability, regardless of the extent to which 
automation could replace the pilot’s direct tasks of flying the aircraft. We could find that 
a similar sentiment will affect the progress of autonomous technology in large trucking 
applications. Platooning in commercial trucking, in which hardware/software integration 
and cloud-based monitoring allows a group of trucks to travel with minimal spacing among 
them, has major aerodynamic benefits with fuel savings sufficient to justify the capital 
investment needed to outfit trucks. While platooning could potentially replace drivers 
altogether, it could also coexist with Level 3 automation to support a continued driver 
role, albeit with the driver able to do a variety of other job-related tasks related to logistics, 
future planning, and reporting on current activities. Both the public and regulators will 
likely decide on the “moral crumple zone” policy of mandating that driver role even if it 
could hypothetically be eliminated.  
• Phase of the business cycle: Laid off workers are jobless for longer and suffer more wage 
loss during recessions than during booms with the difference in earnings losses 
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documented by Davis and von Wachter88 providing strong evidence. Recessions could also 
slow the adjustment to AV adoption. The economic history literature about the pace of 
technical change during recessions suggests it can be surprisingly high. Old capital often 
gets junked when firms go out of business. The surviving firms, when they expand, will 
typically buy the newest technology for an aggregate jump up in the overall level of 
technical capabilities. If the pace of these capital investments in AV is higher than the 
creation of other new jobs, which is likely if the new technologies are labor-saving, we 
could see an upward trend towards AV adoption during (and immediately after) a 
recession accompanied by a lingering dearth of job creation and skill retraining during that 
time.  
• Environmental and other policies: Public policy will affect how AV is implemented and 
how the rest of the economy reacts. The levers at the disposal of policymakers, many of 
which we mention throughout this paper, include the level of gasoline taxes, congestion 
pricing, regulations imposed on AV operations, zoning restrictions, and safety and testing 
requirements for AV systems.  
• Individuals’ responses to new mobility options. The new transportation options made 
possible by AVs will affect behavior beyond the ones previously mentioned, such as 
package delivery and car versus fleet ownership. For example, a University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute study89 predicts a drop in the number of vehicles owned 
per U.S. household from 2.1 (now) to 1.2 (a reduction of 43 percent) based on having an 
AV with ‘return to home’ capability, i.e., the AV takes a breadwinner to work and returns 
home to be available for other household members until a similarly ‘driverless’ day-end 
trip for the pick-up. However, if you combine this AV functionality with its impact on where 
people choose to live, the scenario could play out quite differently. Knowing that their 
commute can be automated, people could choose to live further away from their 
workplace in order to live in their “dream home” or “dream neighborhood.” Imagine that 
the round trip in an AV to drop off the bread-winner would take 90 minutes to 3 hours; 
double that to pick the person up. (Note that this would also generate more congestion, 
miles traveled, fuel consumed, and pollution generated.) The amount of time that the AV 
would be back at home, available to others, would be relatively short and the AV might be 
unavailable at exactly the times (e.g. after school activities for kids) when it is needed on 
the home front. The family might decide that a second vehicle is still needed, preserving 
the two-car household mean. Similarly, Harb et al. found that people offered chauffeur 
services similar to what AVs could provide raised their vehicle miles travelled (VMT) by an 
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average of 83 percent, with night-time, elderly, riderless and long-distance travel 
particularly increasing.90  
 
D. Truck drivers–a thin-slice, near-term, systemic perspective 
Thus far in this report, we have relied on scenarios for AV adoption in both cars and trucks that 
only show significant impact from 2030 to 2051. Furthermore, we have attempted to look broadly 
at the impact of AV technologies on all occupations that involve driving tasks, examining job loss, 
job creation and skill change. This reflects the charter we took on. However, we also think there is 
much to be learned by considering the near-term changes in specific occupations that AV 
technologies could bring. 
In this section, we focus narrowly on the occupation of Heavy and Tractor Trailer Truck Drivers and 
the prospects for job loss and job change over the next 12 years. This covers the time up to 2030, 
when our scenarios predict an acceleration of adoption. We call this a thin-slice, near-term 
systemic perspective for three reasons.  
• It is thin-slice because we focus on the particular subset of drivers who deliver goods and 
must have a special commercial driving license, weeks of training, and potentially months 
of driving experience in order to be fully capable of doing the job. Other delivery drivers 
primarily operate vans or cars that do not require special training or licenses to drive.  
• It is near-term in order to easily illuminate the dynamics of change and range of uncertainty 
about which technological options and business models will come to dominate by looking 
at the present and the near-term future.  
• It is systemic so that we can combine lessons from past technological change, prospects 
for direct job loss, opportunities for job creation or job content change, and a survey of the 
choices available to the stakeholders (firms, policy makers, and workers) all into an 
integrated analysis.  
We do not claim that the situation of truck drivers will generalize to all other driving-related jobs. 
Truck driving as an occupation has a complex history and has undergone considerable change in 
the past 40-50 years. Its current status and future path are likely to be quite different from those 
of taxi or bus drivers; salespeople or visiting nurses who drive to get to customers; or the exploding 
number of employees and contractors devoted to last-mile (or last-block) deliveries to customers’ 
homes or workplaces. Instead of generalities, we hope to convey both the complexity and the 
nuance of the intertwined changes in technology, firm strategy, regulatory environment, and 
behavior of the users of mobility services now looming large in the U.S. and many other economies 
around the world.  
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i. Why truck drivers? 
The impact of AV technology on truck driving jobs has seized public attention—or at least the 
imagination of journalists and commentators who often focus on this particular occupation. The 
job of truck driver already has an outsized image in American culture, representing a certain 
combination of autonomy, skill, work that is free of restrictions (physical and social) but also 
solitary and far from home, and an independent thinker admired for practical wisdom. For many 
years, it was also likely to be a highly-paid, secure, and often unionized job. The current attributes, 
though, are quite different, featuring marginal and variable pay, uncertain schedules, and with 
little union coverage. Nonetheless, the nostalgic image still helps to attract newcomers to the 
occupation—and even to the far more precarious route of becoming an independent owner-
operator.91  
Our goal is less to provide a definitive forecast (were that even possible) than to convey a sense 
of the range of possibilities. The symbolism is powerful. The cowboy-like, frontier-pushing truck 
drivers of yore are to be displaced by automation, leaving no one at the wheel (and perhaps no 
steering wheel at all). The sense of loss will be felt by far more than the drivers themselves—
although they will feel the consequences most acutely. And these job losses could exacerbate 
concerns among the individuals and communities already disadvantaged by contemporary trends 
in trade, economic development, and technology, with important implications for both politics 
and policy.  
ii. Lessons from past technological disruptions 
First, we offer a reminder that the mere existence of a feasible technological capability, adequately 
demonstrated and economically attractive to key players, is no guarantee that it will be 
implemented or that its use will diffuse broadly throughout the economy. We have already seen 
demonstrations of autonomous truck technology and we will see many more in the next several 
years. A successful demonstration is potentially effective in catching attention in order to educate 
the public, attract investors, reassure regulators, and send signals to both capital and labor 
markets. It is also, almost certainly, carefully constructed not just for learning but also for success 
in influencing various constituencies. Only broader usage—either testing on a much wider scale, 
as we are starting to see for self-driving cars, or active implementation of a specific business 
application—will provide the experience base that will shape longer-range diffusion patterns.  
Second, we reiterate that no deterministic outcomes are the inevitable outcome of implementing 
a particular technology. The fact that autonomous technology can successfully perform all the 
driving tasks of a truck driver does not necessarily mean that all truck driver jobs will be eliminated. 
Truck drivers do more than drive; their non-driving tasks might be infeasible or too expensive to 
automate. AV trucks may need monitoring in ways that will require humans with truck driving 
experience to do the monitoring. Society—via governmental laws and regulations—has decided 
to insist on the presence of two airline pilots in all commercial flights, regardless of how much 
autopilot technology might be able to perform their piloting tasks. Following a similar “moral 
crumple zone” logic, society might require the presence of a responsible human to oversee the 
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operation of heavy-duty trucks which, like automobiles, are fast-moving objects operating in public 
space that can injure, kill, and destroy property. Business decisions on how to divide up different 
elements of the transportation services provided by trucks may create new segments of the 
industry and hence different types of truck driver jobs (i.e., different jobs in which there is a new 
mix of driving and non-driving tasks for which humans are better suited or more economical than 
automation). Regulations can also shape the space in which those business decisions are made. 
The future for autonomous trucks—like all technological futures—will be chosen rather than 
preordained. 
iii. How much direct job loss? 
Addressing this question requires a multi-part analysis of the following:  
• How many truck drivers are there?  
• What are the job requirements of truck drivers?  
• How many truck driver tasks are likely to be affected by AV technology?  
• Where does AV technology replace vs. simply change the job of truck drivers? 
How many truck drivers are there? 
In the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), truck drivers are included in a category called 
“driver/sales workers and truck drivers.” Of the three occupational subcodes within this category, 
only one matches the truck driving work that requires a commercial driver’s license: Heavy and 
Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers. While all driving jobs are potentially affected by AV technology, here 
we focus on this subcode (SOC 53-5032), for which U.S. payroll employment in 2016 was 1.5 
million, according to the American Community Survey (ACS). The average annual salary for these 
truck drivers in 2016 in the ACS was $44,000. This count includes self-employed owner-operators, 
a group that has been growing in recent years.  
What are the job requirements of truck drivers? 
Occupational requirements are defined by the amount of education or training required to gain 
access to the job and then the cognitive and physical demands of the tasks involved in the job. 
There are no specific educational requirements for truck driving and most drivers span a range 
from no degree to a high school diploma. Specific vocational preparation for truck drivers, based 
on the Occupational Requirements Survey (ORS), varies but Gittleman and Monaco report that the 
largest proportion of drivers fall in the “1-4 years” category, which included training, certificate 
and licenses, and past experience. They summarize other data on truck driver task requirements 
as being “…at the lower end of educational and cognitive requirements but on the high end of 
strength requirements, compared to all workers.”92 These tasks included both structured and 
unstructured contacts with individuals beyond regular working relationships (e.g. when making 
deliveries) and a mix of decision-making requirements from selecting among set options to 
assessing uncertain situations.  
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How many truck driver tasks are likely to be affected by AV technology? 
After analyzing ORS task lists, Gittleman and Monaco identify the following non-driving tasks: 
freight-handling, customer service, safety compliance, paperwork, and operating non-truck 
equipment.93 While the lower-skill end of this range of tasks is potentially easier to automate, the 
key point here is that truck drivers do much more than drive and the AV technology only 
automates the driving tasks. Viscelli reports one estimate from a single trucking firm (JB Hunt) that 
its drivers spend roughly 50 percent of their work time driving.94 Whether automation of the other 
tasks done by truck drivers is technologically feasible and economically attractive is a separate 
matter entirely.  
Where does AV technology replace vs. simply change the duties of truck drivers? 
While the common first reaction to the idea of AV technology is to imagine full replacement of 
drivers, the reality is that there is a range of automation available for driving tasks. In the multi-
level categorization established by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)95 (see Table IV-2), 
Levels 1-3 still require a human driver. Levels 1-2 automation provides automated assist to humans 
who retain full driving responsibility. Level 3 automation envisions a transfer of driving 
responsibility back and forth between humans and AV technologies. Note that Level 3 automation 
could reduce the time spent on driving tasks but could still require one human driver per truck. 
(See below for coverage of platooning technologies, which could alter this equation). Level 4 is “no 
driver” but within a set of designated operating conditions that could include “geofencing” 
(operating only in geographies that are physically separate from other driving situations).  
In summary, increased use of Levels 1-2 automation will likely not affect truck driver employment 
at all, although it could make certain driving tasks easier, safer, or less physically demanding. Level 
3 automation will still require human drivers, in some number, with all necessary driving skills for 
those occasions when control is passed back to them. Only Level 4 automation fits the scenario of 
full displacement of humans from truck driving jobs. The most common (and likely to be first 
implemented) Level 4 scenario involves primarily highway miles interspersed with local travel to 
pick-up and delivery stations (often warehouses or distribution centers close to highway exits).  
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TABLE IV-2: Summary of Levels of Driving Automation for On-Road Vehicles 
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iv. Indirect effects of AV trucking technologies on job creation and new job content 
As above, addressing this question requires a multi-part analysis:  
• What technologies (including AV technology) are being applied to truck driving? 
• Which sectors that utilize truck drivers will adopt AV technology first and most fully?  
• How will the pace of adoption affect the current truck driver population? 
What technologies (including AV technology) are being applied to truck driving? 
Viscelli offers a detailed survey of different technologies that incorporate some degree of 
automation affecting truck driving, which we summarize briefly here.96  
Adaptive cruise-control platooning uses currently available technology (a combination of hardware 
and software plus cloud-based connection to an external service provider) to place trucks very 
close to each other during highway operations. This has primarily aerodynamic benefits that save 
fuel, which (along with labor) is the highest input cost factor for trucking. Both the lead and trailing 
trucks gain fuel-savings, with greater savings for the trailing truck. While two-truck platooning is 
already being implemented by companies such as Peloton, this approach could hypothetically be 
extended to larger convoys. The approach pioneered by Peloton allows platooning between trucks 
of different ownership, as long as they are equipped with the appropriate hardware/software 
package. Peloton oversees the platoon pairings, allows driver overrides when conditions require, 
and divides the total fuel savings between the truck owners. Early reports from drivers are that 
being in a platoon requires close attention (lane positioning, at present, is still the responsibility of 
each driver) but is overall less tiring than being fully responsible for driving. In this regard, 
platooning is essentially sophisticated Level 1 automation. 
Driver in the sleeper (aka autopilot) is at least a Level 3 (and possibly Level 4) automation concept 
that envisions the driver and AV algorithms trading driving responsibility over time. Level 3, as 
defined, foresees a technological solution that allows the driver to engage in other tasks. 
Eventually, these tasks might extend to sleeping in the sleeper, so that the driver could meet the 
requirements of Hours of Service (HOS) regulations while on the road. In this situation, the human 
driver would still be available for all non-driving tasks, could maintain control in any difficult driving 
situation, and potentially would be the one to choose when to switch to autopilot mode. Capacity 
utilization of the truck increases in this scenario, causing some to see this option as particularly 
attractive to owner-operators. The reality of truck routes, many of which are shorter than 500 
miles, indicates that this scenario is better suited to short driver breaks, i.e. possibly for naps but 
not for the longer periods of time needed for restful sleep. There is also a presumption that periods 
designated for sleep would have few to no incidents requiring driver intervention, since the 
challenge of waking a sleeping driver in time to comprehend the driving situation and take control 
in a reasonable amount of time is considerable. Indeed, Google/Waymo’s assessment that such 
Level 3 situations were “engineering infeasible” to automate is the reason for its strategic decision 
to focus exclusively on Level 4 automation in its passenger AVs. 
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Exit-to-exit autonomous is a Level 4 automation approach that relies on AV control in the semi-
geofenced conditions of interstate highway driving and then re-engages a human for all driving 
after exiting. This would require locations at interstate exits for these exchanges to take place; 
whether these would be provided by individual trucking companies, industry associations, or 
government (federal, state, or city) is unclear. This scenario is appealing to various actors for 
multiple reasons. AV trucks could be optimized for highway operation while vehicles for local 
deliveries could be smaller and optimized to the environment (whether dense city streets or 
sparse rural areas) in which final stage miles occur. Delivery scheduling and its variability would be 
concentrated in the non-AV local stage, making exit-to-exit scheduling simpler and more 
predictable. Jobs for human drivers would be more local, with drivers able to live at home and 
work normal-length shifts. In all likelihood, truck driver jobs would be fewer if this approach were 
widely implemented. But the jobs that remained could be more attractive in terms of working 
hours and conditions (i.e. able to be home) while being possibly less attractive in terms of pay and 
task demands (i.e. larger supply of local delivery drivers reducing wages, many short-distance 
deliveries with schedule pressure more stressful).  
Drone operation after exit-to-exit autonomous is an extension of this concept in which a human 
operator with driving skills would guide the truck remotely after exiting the highway, from an 
operations center, to the point of final delivery. Starsky Technologies is the best-known company 
advocating this approach. This would employ fewer actual drivers but would potentially offer new 
jobs to experienced drivers in the remote operating centers. It is worth noting that: first, the AV 
requirements for the final miles to delivery are much more demanding; second, delivery vehicles 
other than heavy-duty tractor-trailers are better suited to those locations; and third, over time, 
training of remote operators who don’t have much actual driving experience (beyond training or 
use of simulators) would be a challenge.  
Both of these exit-to-exit autonomous scenarios at Level 4 automation, even in full 
implementation, do not fully eliminate truck driving jobs but do reduce the number of jobs and 
shift the skill requirements in ways that might not make them attractive or attainable to the truck 
drivers who would be displaced.  
Human-drone platooning envisions a convoy of platooning trucks in which many are fully 
autonomous but the lead truck has a human driver who is responsible for monitoring and 
overseeing the convoy’s overall behavior. This is an intersection of driver-assist platooning, which 
has no employment impact, and exit-to-exit autonomous, which has the largest potential 
employment impact. This might well require a staging area for assembling the multi-truck convoy 
in the best configuration. It is also a concept better suited to a single company’s fleet of trucks, 
which would gain from convoy optimization, but would be more difficult to manage if the 
composition of trucks in the convoy was constantly shifting, in numbers, ownership, and/or 
vehicle/load type. The lead driver jobs would undoubtedly have higher skill requirements and 
might offer an appealing career path for drivers who had developed considerable experience with 
level 2 platooning automation. At present, it is less clear whether this model is sufficiently 
appealing as a business model to attract much investment, as it either requires high scale within a 
single fleet or a difficult set of coordination tasks for a third-party service provider.  
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Which sectors using truck drivers will adopt AV technology first and most fully? 
A full typology of different types of trucking and how technologically feasible and economically 
attractive AV technology will be for each type is beyond the scope of this brief survey. Viscelli 
summarizes his analysis of this issue as follows: “The strongest case for adoption is in the dry and 
refrigerated truckload segments… It is unlikely that other segments will be easily transformed to 
adopt…” where the latter includes local deliveries, intermodal trips, and flatbed trucking.97 Viscelli 
highlights the possible exception of port-originated hauling where large firms with fleets of trucks 
set up for exit-to-exit autonomous operation could compete to deliver freight that now travels 
primarily by rail. For our purposes, the key point here is that even the optimistic technology-based 
scenarios above only apply to certain segments of trucking, albeit the ones that are both most 
visible and most fully embody the archetypical truck driving job.  
How will the pace of adoption affect the current truck driver population?  
Beyond the current automation-based worries about job elimination, the most urgent issue 
highlighted about truck drivers at present is the current severe labor shortage. A February 2018 
article ventures the opinion that: 98 
…for a variety of reasons, it is truck drivers that represent the most worrisome 
constraint on U.S. economic growth at the moment. The trucking industry is unique 
because it's the lifeblood of moving goods around the country, representing 70 
percent of the nation’s freight volume by weight. Without enough trucks and 
drivers on the road, some combination of things is going to happen: Shipments will 
be delayed, and producers will have to pay higher prices to get goods to market.  
Unlike other sectors that routinely complain of labor shortages, like construction (which added 
200,000 jobs in 2017), trucking employment, based on BLS statistics, is unchanged since mid-2015. 
Public earnings announcements from companies that depend heavily on truck deliveries (e.g. 
Hershey, Clorox, Sysco) and are reporting substantial reductions in adjusted gross margins have 
led to sharp reductions in their share prices. The American Trucking Associations, representing 
trucking companies, says that the industry needs over 50,000 more drivers to meet rising demand, 
citing a study by DAT Solutions that just one truck-with-driver is available for every 12 loads 
needing to be shipped in early 2018, the lowest since 2005. 99  
Among the factors affecting the labor shortage, according to industry observers: aging of drivers, 
whose average age is now 55; limited success in recruiting women drivers given the away-from-
home demands of the job and difficulties encountered in such a male-dominated profession; 
negative perceptions of the demands of the job that now overshadow its past appeal; new 
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regulations mandating compliance with HOS requirements, using electronic logging devices, 
potentially reducing illegal driver overwork; and, as in so many jobs, stagnant wages. Furthermore, 
some see younger workers that might have considered truck driving in the past as likely to be 
discouraged by the anticipated job loss from automation. Other observers see high turnover 
among the younger workers recruited to truck driving training programs as the real problem, 
seeing a large gap between what recruits are promised in terms of pay and autonomy and the 
reality of the jobs they find, which often include many unpaid hours waiting to make deliveries in 
addition to the stress from being away from home, and the experience of being closely monitored 
while driving.100 Indeed, one characteristic of a market where a set of employers have strong 
bargaining power (called a monopsony) is the persistence of stagnant wages accompanied by labor 
shortages. With increasing evidence of companies finally offering pay increases and signing 
bonuses, the immediate shortfall may decline but many of these factors are unlikely to change 
quickly. 
Summary  
The key implications of this mini case study of the near-term prospects for heavy-duty truck driving 
jobs for our broader analysis include: 
• Truck driver jobs have already undergone a huge transition from good jobs to bad jobs 
over the past 40 years, for reasons that have nothing to do with automation. 
• The current situation, with the combination of high turnover, stagnant wages, and labor 
shortages characteristic of a monopsony, is addressable either with better pay and working 
conditions or with larger investments in automation. We think the latter is more likely but 
the former would have more short-term potential for increasing the overall capacity of the 
trucking sector. 
• AV options at Levels 1-2 automation supplement what human drivers do—or only partially 
replace them (Level 3). Hence the direct employment consequences of these technological 
features will be much less than a broad-brush assessment would indicate. 
• Level 4 automation, which does eliminate drivers, is likely to be implemented in only some 
segments of heavy-duty trucking in the near term, further reducing the set of affected 
drivers. Gittleman and Monaco identify 310,000 drivers as the most likely to be affected 
by these AV technology plans.101 
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• The new business models linked to Level 4 automation will require reorganization that 
includes a new approach to local deliveries in order to maximize the potential for 
eliminating jobs for the long-haul exit-to-exit interstate driving tasks.  
• Implementation delays, such as technological difficulties to lower-than-expected 
economic gains (or higher-than-expected costs) and regulatory barriers, will further slow 
the employment impact.  
• Given a current shortage in drivers and a high average age, the diffusion of job-displacing 
forms of AV technologies in trucking may result in many fewer layoffs/job eliminations than 
the most negative scenarios indicate. Viscelli sees job loss reaching a maximum of 200,000 
drivers over the next 10-15 years, less than 10 percent of the current total.102 
• Job creation possibilities are evident in the future AV scenarios, particularly from drone-
type operation of trucks from remote centers and for lead drivers in a convoy of 
autonomous trucks. Furthermore, reduction from automation in the required hours of 
driving may change the mix of what a driver does. Without corresponding automation of 
the many non-driving tasks included in this occupation, much less full job displacement is 
likely. 
Overall, for the truck driving jobs we consider here—which match what most people think of first 
for this occupation—the direct job loss and displacement consequences may be quite limited over 
the period up to 2030, where the AV diffusion rates in the technology scenarios in this broader 
report really ramp up.  
However, truck driving is unlikely to ever again be the source of reliable middle-class jobs for 
relatively uneducated workers that it was for much of the second half of the 20th century. The best 
hope for a young-to-middle aged truck driver committed to this career for the long haul is likely 
going to be found in the “monitoring AV” jobs found either in the “drone operation after exit-to-
exit autonomous” or “human-drone platooning” scenarios described above. 
To the extent that employers design these jobs so that feedback from drivers/monitors is used to 
improve AV operation, then these workers may gain some bargaining power (and improvement 
will likely be faster.103 How AVs are regulated will also affect labor market impacts. For example, 
will there be caps on the number of vehicles each remote operator is required to monitor? Will 
minimum levels of training be specified? Will human drivers be mandated until certain conditions, 
forcing use of Level 3 rather than Level 4 automation? These final points reinforce our initial 
statement that the future of autonomous trucking technologies will be designed and chosen, not 
pre-ordained by the capabilities of the technology proper.  
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V. Mitigating the Negative Effects: Recommendations and Future 
Research Agenda 
 
A. A policy strategy to mitigate negative impacts 
In short, AV technology offers large widespread potential economic gains, concentrated costs to 
some individuals and many possible routes of adoption. Put simply, since the faster the speed of 
adoption of AVs, the more severe the labor market disruption will likely be, society has three 
possible AV adoption routes: 
1. Accept rapid adoption with substantial costs to workers, at the risk of social disruption 
and heightened public resistance for further technological change. 
2. Impose a slow enough adoption that the current workforce system can handle the 
transition without high costs. 
3. Pursue rapid adoption combined with policies to upgrade our ability to mitigate 
adjustment costs. 
Under the assumption that Option 1 is least preferred and Option 2 is suboptimal, this section 
discusses the ability of the current workforce development system to mitigate the costs of a rapid 
adoption of AV, what is known about the effectiveness of mitigation programs and how 
stakeholders could craft a mitigation strategy on a scale larger than has ever been done before. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to recommend specific policy options from the many 
available, we outline essential elements of an effective overall strategy.  
i. Goals of a policy strategy 
Overall, the goal of an AV adoption mitigation strategy is to minimize adjustment costs for workers 
and their families and communities, that is, to provide the help needed to allow each affected 
worker to adjust to or move as quickly as possible to his or her most productive, highest wage new 
job opportunity.  
To begin with, the strategy must take into account the issues raised above from previous 
technological transitions: 
• Technology alone does not determine outcomes; policy and employer choices matter. 
• Large, widespread impacts are anticipated. 
• There is no certainty about timing, the workers and communities affected, or what new 
jobs will arise. 
• Workers’ needs vary and certain workers (late career, low education, rural, in particular 
geographic areas, with criminal records, etc.) will face particularly severe risks from job 
loss.  
• Other transitions are ongoing, including additional applications of artificial intelligence 
(AI) and rising world trade.  
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These factors argue for an approach with certain key elements: 
First, it needs to be large. We estimate significant impacts from the adoption of AV. The approach 
taken must be able to cope with those impacts as well as others that may occur at the same time, 
such as adoption of other applications of AI or changes in trade patterns. In addition, dynamic, 
free enterprise economies continually create and destroy jobs, imposing significant continual 
churn. Furthermore, some of the transition may well take place in the context of a recession, which 
would broaden impacts. Thus, any approach must be large. 
Second, the approach must also have multiple treatments and be broad-based. Research shows 
that unemployed workers vary substantially in their needs and risks, so a single treatment 
(whether income support, job search assistance, retraining, etc.) is unlikely to be universally 
adequate. Separately, the approach must not narrowly target a specific population identified 
according to preset criteria, such as those that purport to determine the “real reason” for 
displacement. Narrow criteria will inevitably be imperfect; attempts to craft them will fall victim 
to false precision. Applying those imperfect guidelines will waste administrative resources and 
delay or deny coverage to people when they need it. For example, ongoing difficulties 
administering the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, which seeks to aid workers 
affected by trade, illustrate the inherent difficulties in a narrowly targeted approach. Furthermore, 
we see no rationale for granting more assistance to workers displaced by AV than for some other 
reason, whether another adoption of AI or an unrelated business relocation or failure. Indeed, 
worker insecurity about technological change is unlikely to be alleviated by a narrow program that 
delays or rejects many applicants.  
Third, to serve evolving employers and workers, the approach must be adaptable and encourage 
innovation. To achieve nimbleness, it must continually be informed by the best evidence to guide 
its decisions. The essential evidence comes in four key forms: (1) Both innovative and ongoing 
programs must be continually evaluated to help improve service delivery and ensure the best use 
of resources. (2) Open lines of communication with employers about their needs, perspectives, 
and plans are also essential. (3) Comprehensive labor market statistics are needed to identify 
emerging gaps and trends. And, (4) research studies are needed to investigate causes and 
consequences of labor market outcomes.  
To summarize, these factors argue for a policy approach with the following features: 
1. Enough capacity to handle multiple large scale disruptions, even during an economic 
downturn  
2. Multiple treatments that can be tailored to workers’ situations and risk as well as local 
conditions 
3. Broad-based, rather than applying some criteria that determine the “real reason” for 
displacement  
4. Engaged directly with employers  
5. Able to innovate  
6. Guided by evidence from program evaluations, robust labor market statistics, and research  
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ii. Current context 
The mitigation strategy need not start from scratch. But neither is the current system likely to be 
adequate to mitigate the impacts of AV adoption. The U.S. already has a public workforce 
development system, a partnership among federal, state, and local governments that is charged 
with providing employment‐related services to two customer groups: workers and employers. 
Through more than 2,000 local One-Stop Career Centers, the system operates a free labor 
exchange nationwide, offers job search and job matching services, and provides access to a range 
of services to improve the employability of Americans, including training. 
The goal of the system is to help anyone find a job, especially the unemployed and 
underemployed, dislocated workers, and veterans. Employment services and job training are also 
provided to workers with disabilities, older workers, youth and other new workers entering the 
job market, and people lacking skills that employers in their community demand. 
In addition, since its establishment by Congress in 1933, the workforce development system is 
regularly called upon to mobilize during economic recessions and in local areas where 
unemployment rates or economic dislocation is particularly high, to facilitate the processing of 
unemployment insurance claims, administer transitional or subsidized jobs when authorized, 
retrain workers whose regular occupations or industries have disappeared, and assist workers, 
communities, and regions affected by disasters. The most recent law, the 2014 Workplace 
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA),104 is administered by the U.S. Departments of Labor, 
Education and Health and Human Services and is intended: 
To amend the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 to strengthen the United States 
workforce development system through innovation in, and alignment and 
improvement of, employment, training, and education programs in the United 
States, and to promote individual and national economic growth, and for other 
purposes.  
Operating in conjunction with the system, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) program works with the states to provide unemployment benefits to eligible 
workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own, and meet certain other eligibility 
requirements.105 This program provides displaced workers with temporary partial income 
replacement (usually 26 weeks maximum106 with an intended average replacement rate of about 
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50 percent) during job search. It also connects them with One-Stop Career Centers when they file 
a claim.  
Another key input to the workforce development system is workforce information, such as 
statistics on wages, employment, and joblessness—levels and growth—by occupation, industry, 
and location. On a national level, three federal statistical agencies—the BLS, the National Center 
for Education Statistics, and the Census Bureau—as well as the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA) provide most of the information that state and 
local agencies use to guide their programs and plans. Some of this data is gathered (from 
administrative sources and surveys) by the states on behalf of the federal agencies.  
Even with all its moving parts and the recent passage of WIOA, the current workforce development 
system has some serious limitations that are arguably not improving. As part of federal 
discretionary spending, employment and training and statistical budgets have been shrinking in 
recent years.107 The cuts curtail coverage and needed modernization. Thus, fewer people can be 
served and the guidance they get is not as good as it could be. Furthermore, legal restrictions 
prevent BLS and DOL ongoing access to administrative wage and employment data from the 
Unemployment Insurance system. Such access could provide much more timely and detailed 
information to local workforce development agencies. Program evaluations would also be less 
expensive, more frequent, and more complete if they could count on access to administrative UI 
wage and education records.  
Also, for a number of possible reasons, unemployed workers’ receipt of Unemployment Insurance 
has been low in recent years. Eligibility rates have declined and, in addition, only about 63 percent 
of those eligible from 1989 to 2011 received UI benefits.108 Thus, more unemployed workers and 
their families go without this income source during challenging times.  
As evidence of these and other limitations of the system, measures of U.S. workers’ insecurity 
have risen dramatically over the past several decades, even though incidence of job loss has not 
risen.109 This suggests that workers increasingly fear the consequences of job loss. That is, they 
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sense that despite the U.S. workforce development system and safety net, job loss would be very 
damaging for them. Such fears engender workers’ understandable resistance to disruptive 
economic changes. 
All the reasons above suggest strongly that the current workforce system alone will be inadequate 
to mitigate the labor market costs of a rapid adoption of AV. The system is not adequate now to 
allay workers’ rising anxiety and this system is shrinking.  
iii. Information needed for effective evidence-based mitigation policies 
Regardless of the policy route taken, it is essential to have accurate and timely labor market 
information, research, and program evaluation in order to ensure policy effectiveness.  
For this reason, we recommend that the U.S. increase its capability in workforce research, 
evaluation, and official statistics. Fortunately, recommendations by the recent Ryan-Murray 
Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking (CEP) point the way for the federal government to 
better harness administrative data for many uses, including workforce development.110 The CEP 
included academic researchers, privacy experts, and program administrators. A concerted effort 
to support enactment of the CEP recommendations would be an essential step for a strong 
mitigation policy.  
For workforce information purposes, at least three other information enhancements are 
important. First, though the CEP recommends allowing statistical agencies and program evaluators 
to access UI wage records—which would be very helpful—it would be even more valuable if UI 
wage records were enhanced by the addition of just two fields: occupational title and hours 
worked. These days, most employers have this information already in their automated payroll 
systems so it is no longer a burden on employers as it once was. BLS can use AI techniques it has 
already developed to convert job titles to Standard Occupational Classifications efficiently. BLS is 
currently working with several states, some of which have hours and occupation information, to 
explore the feasibility of this enhancement. With those data, BLS could redesign a number of its 
programs to reduce dependence on burdensome surveys.  
Second, the U.S. lacks gold-standard data on employer-provided training. We do not know how 
much training, of what type, is provided by employers and to whom, and who (worker, employer, 
nonprofit or government) pays for what. The last such data (collected in 1995) showed that large, 
high-performance, or unionized employers provided more worker training than others.111 Nearly 
half of all establishments provided formal job skills training in 1993, while orientation, safety and 
health, and workplace-related training were provided by 1 in 3 establishments. The three types of 
job skills most commonly taught through formal training were sales and customer relations, 
management skills, and computer skills. While about 1 in 4 establishments provided training in 
these areas, 1 in 12 provided formal training in food, cleaning, protective, and personal services. 
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These findings point to potential gaps in the types of training available to displaced workers 
seeking a new career path. Any effective comprehensive workforce strategy requires information 
about the training activities of employers to round out the information collected from the 
educational system and workforce training providers.  
Third, to more closely track employer needs and activities, BLS is developing the capacity to 
conduct quick-response one-off surveys. These are key to improving the responsiveness of policy 
initiatives to fast-developing national, local or sectoral situations. In order to guide resource 
allocation efficiently, these data must meet a high standard for accuracy and detail. 
Fourth, labor market policies should always include a commitment to ongoing evaluation. All too 
often, policies and programs are implemented without a plan for ongoing evaluation to help 
determine their effectiveness and inform improvements. Evaluations can be seen by 
administrators and appropriators as too expensive, disruptive, and slow when needs are great and 
resources are scarce. Such an approach is certainly short-sighted and undermines efficient use of 
resources. Moreover, development of administrative data to support program evaluations from 
their inception can make evaluations cheaper, less disruptive, and faster. For example, the recent 
Commission on Evidence-based Policymaking recommends that administrative data from federally 
supported programs always be supplied to the federal government so that it can be used for 
program evaluations unless there are compelling privacy or legal restrictions that prevent it. 
iv. Major policy options 
So how can the existing workforce development system and safety net be improved and 
supplemented so it can handle the challenges of AV and other major transitions?  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to recommend funding mechanisms for the options 
discussed below, we note that the benefits of AV adoption to the U.S. economy are likely quite 
substantial, over $1 trillion annually by one estimate.112 With benefits of this magnitude, diverting 
some portion to mitigate transition costs appears to be feasible and appropriate, and may indeed 
be necessary to promote acceptance of further innovations.  
As a foundational element of a policy response, we strongly recommend the development of a 
forum where employers adopting AV and other stakeholders take responsibility to engage with 
and prepare the workforce development system for upcoming disruptions from AV. The most 
direct way to begin this engagement would be through the Workforce Information Advisory 
Council (WIAC). To help administer WIOA, the legislation established WIAC, whose membership 
consists of workforce and labor market information experts representing a broad range of 
national, state, and local data and information users and producers.113 The purpose of the WIAC 
is to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Labor, working jointly through the Assistant 
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 Robert Atkinson. “The Coming Transportation Revolution,” Milken Institute Review. 4th Quarter 2014. 
https://itif.org/publications/2014/10/17/coming-transportation-revolution 
113
 See “Workforce Information Advisory Council Charter,” 
https://www.doleta.gov/wioa/wiac/pdf/WIAC_Charter.pdf and the WIAC webpage 
https://www.doleta.gov/wioa/wiac/.  
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Secretary for Employment and Training and the Commissioner of Labor Statistics on information 
needs and coordination opportunities.  
Engaging with a high-level forum, such as WIAC, to help the workforce system to prepare for AV 
would include  
• Educating stakeholders early on trends,  
• Connecting affected employers with local workforce system agencies, and  
• Advising on information needs to best monitor labor market impacts of AV. 
Two related key entrees for more such discussions are the Department of Labor’s Employment 
and Training Administration (ETA), community colleges, and the National Association of State 
Workforce Agencies (NASWA).114  
But that is just the easy part. As noted above, WIOA alone is unlikely to achieve the degree of 
mitigation needed. In recognition of the upcoming challenges, a number of major proposals have 
been advanced, including: 
• Works councils 
• Worker training accounts 
• Wage insurance 
• Public sector employment for infrastructure 
• Universal basic income 
• Flexicurity (an extensive four-part program) 
• Place-based policy; enhanced local economic development 
Table V-1 describes these main contenders briefly, with links to further information. They vary 
substantially in key ways, including who or what they target, what is the nature of the treatment, 
and which stage of the transition they address. 
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 See Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) 
https://www.doleta.gov/eta_default.cfm and National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA) 
http://www.naswa.org/. 
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TABLE V-1: Sample of Major Policy Proposals to Mitigate Adjustment Costs 
 
 
Name of Policy Proposed By or Reference Concept 
Implementation 
Examples 
Works Councils https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Works_cou
ncil 
Encourage or require employers to set up Works 
Councils of elected employees in companies above a 
specified size, to enhance workers’ and community 
voices in employer decision-making. Such consultation 
can encourage and inform national and local employer 
actions to mitigate costs, such as retraining programs 
or alternative technology implementation strategies.  
European Works 
Councils in 
Germany, UK, 
France, etc.  
Worker Training 
Accounts 
“New Deal for the 21st Century,” by 
Edward Alden and Robert Litan, Council 
on Foreign Relations 
https://www.cfr.org/report/new-deal-
twenty-first-century 
 
Establish “Lifetime career loan accounts” for income-
contingent repayable loans accessible to any employee 
at any point in their careers. 
 
Wage Insurance “Wage insurance” by Robert Litan, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/wag
e-insurance-a-potentially-bipartisan-way-
to-help-the-middle-class/ 
Top up the earnings of those who lose their jobs and 
are forced to take new ones at significantly lower 
wages. 
Provision in Trade 
Adjustment 
Assistance Act 
Public Sector 
Employment for 
Infrastructure 
“Marshall Plan for America,” by Neera 
Tanden et al., Center for American 
Progress 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/economy/reports/2017/05/16/432499/t
oward-marshall-plan-america/ 
Create a large-scale, permanent program of public 
employment and infrastructure investment to increase 
jobs and wages for those without a college degree 
while providing needed services to lower-income 
households and cash-strapped state and local 
governments. Some workers would be paid as “public 
apprentices,” undergoing intensive, full-time training 
for in-demand occupations with guaranteed private-
sector jobs upon successful completion. 
Similar to the 
Works Progress 
Administration 
(WPA) during the 
Great Depression 
but modernized for 
the 21st century 
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Universal Basic 
Income  
Many variants: basic income guarantee, 
Citizen's Income, unconditional basic 
income, or universal “demogrant.” 
See overview in:  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_inco
me 
Add a form of social security in which all citizens or 
residents receive a regular, unconditional sum of 
money from the government independent of any other 
income. Instead of having numerous welfare programs, 
it would simply be one universal unconditional income.  
Permanent Fund of 
Alaska. Brazil’s 
Bolsa Família 
program. US 
Negative Income 
Tax Experiments in 
the 1970s.  
Flexicurity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexicurity 
 
Establish integrated strategy to simultaneously 
enhance flexibility and security in the labor market, 
implemented across four policy components:  
1) flexible and reliable contractual arrangements;  
2) comprehensive lifelong learning strategies;  
3) effective active labor market policies; and  
4) modern social security systems providing adequate 
income support during employment transitions. 
Denmark and 
various other parts 
of the European 
Union 
Placed-based 
policy; Enhanced 
local economic 
development 
Many variants. 
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/publications/economic-
letter/2015/march/enterprise-zone-
economic-incentive-tax-subsidy-place-
based-policies/; and 
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/%7Edneumark
/1-s2.0-B9780444595317000181-
main.pdf ; 
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-
articles/saving-the-heartland-place-
based-policies-in-21st-century-america/  
Programs to improve entrepreneurship, develop local 
industries, attract new employers, subsidize work and 
upgrade infrastructure or residents’ education that will 
bring more or higher wage jobs to areas with high 
unemployment.  
State and federal 
Empowerment 
Zones; European 
Union Structural 
Funds; Industrial 
cluster policies; 
regionally 
augmented Earned 
Income Tax Credits; 
Kalamazoo Promise 
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Most are in place elsewhere or have been tried before so, some evidence on their effectiveness 
and costs are available. Boxes V-1, V-2 and V-3 summarize findings on the impact of previous 
implementations of mitigation programs. Despite widespread popular impressions that no 
programs work as intended, many programs actually have a demonstrable positive impact. And, 
with more innovation and evaluations, there is opportunity to improve on these outcomes.  
Note that these policies need not be mutually exclusive. A combination is likely needed, given the 
breadth of impacts. Indeed, two of these approaches (flexicurity and place-based policy) consist 
themselves of combinations of programs. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to recommend which policies should be pursued, we 
recommend that proponents of AVs engage private and public stakeholders in dialog to find a 
satisfactory way to mitigate the negative effects of disruption and displacement. These 
stakeholders include employers, unions, workers with disabilities, state and local agency officials, 
community colleges, and legislators at many levels. 
 
Box V-1 
Impacts of Job Training Programs 
Heinrich, et al.115 found: 
We estimate impacts on earnings and employment of the two primary adult 
workforce support and training programs under the U.S. Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA) using administrative data on 160,000 participants from 12 states for up to 
four years following program entry. We find that participants in the WIA Adult 
program, who typically enter with poor work histories, realize improved 
employment levels and increased average quarterly earnings of several hundred 
dollars. Earnings gains for Dislocated Worker program participants are appreciably 
smaller, although these participants do experience employment gains. 
(Note from the authors: Many participants in the WIA Adult Program are displaced workers. If they 
are disadvantaged enough to qualify for the Adult Program, local administrators will often assign 
them there rather than to the Dislocated Worker program.) 
From Congressional testimony about evaluations of workforce development programs:116 
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 Carolyn J. Heinrich, Peter R. Mueser, Kenneth R. Troske, Kyung-Seong Jeon, and Daver C. Kahvecioglu. “Do Public 
Employment and Training Programs Work?” IZA Journal of Labor Economics 2, no. 6 (October 2013). 
https://izajole.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/2193-8997-2-6  
116
 Demetra Smith Nightingale. Institute Fellow, Urban Institute. Statement before the Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies, United 
States House of Representatives. Hearing on “Preparing the Workforce.” April 4, 2017. 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89426/nightingale_-_testimony.pdf 
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Training connected to work has the most positive evidence. Not all training is the 
same, and not all training, whether public or private, is effective, but considerable 
evidence from evaluations over many years shows that the most effective type of 
job training is that which is connected directly to work, rather than “stand alone” 
training not aligned with jobs in demand. Several formal evaluations have found 
positive impacts on earnings and employment from work‐based and work‐
integrated training models, including registered apprenticeships with particular 
employers, sectoral and industry‐specific training, career pathways, and on‐the‐job 
training where a subsidy is offered to employers for a portion of wages for a set 
period (e.g., six or nine months). Findings from recent evaluations of integrated 
education and occupational instruction also show promise. 
Counseling and customer‐focused career services are important. Several different 
evaluations suggest that the types of intensive services offered in One‐Stop Career 
Centers are important for job seekers and trainees. Veterans who receive 
assistance from specialized staff have better employment outcomes than veterans 
who receive general core services. Trainees who receive assistance in selecting 
their training do better than those who make their own choices without any career 
coaching. And interim results from the WIA Gold Standard evaluation find that 
individuals who have staff‐supported services, such as workshops and counseling, 
available to them do better than those who have access to only basic self‐service 
resources. Similar findings about the importance of student supports are coming 
from evaluations of community college programs. 
Comprehensive and integrated models work for youth. Youth, especially those out 
of school and not working, are much more challenging to serve than adults. Fewer 
formal evaluations of job training for youth have been done than for adults. 
However, growing evidence indicates that the programs showing the most positive 
outcomes for youth have a comprehensive set of integrated services, including 
education, occupational training, counseling and support services. Residential 
models such as Job Corps and National Guard Youth Challenge have been found to 
increase employment outcomes... 
Public investment in training fills a “gap.” Most job training in the United States is 
provided by employers. Public funding on training comes mainly from the federal 
government, although some states invest considerable resources in training, 
usually in tandem with the federal funding. One Urban Institute study conducted 
several years ago, but that probably still holds true, estimated that the private 
sector spends two to three times as much as the public sector (federal and state 
combined) each year on training. Training at work is clearly important, especially 
for company‐specific purposes. Surveys indicate, though, that employer-provided 
training is more likely to go to more‐educated and higher‐level workers. Higher 
educated and higher paid employees are twice as likely to receive employer‐
provided training as lower‐level and less‐educated workers. The 2016 Training 
Industry Report’s recent survey suggests more than 60 percent of those receiving 
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training by employers are executives, managers, and other “exempt” employees. 
The public workforce system’s very limited funding only allows serving a small 
fraction of the 150 million or so workers in the nation. The public system also tends 
to serve smaller businesses and newer businesses by identifying available workers 
and training them, because many of those businesses do not have the resource 
levels that larger, established companies have. Thus, the public system is training 
workers who might not otherwise receive it—namely, those with middle and lower 
skills and wages, and providing training for businesses that might not have the 
resources to do it on their own. However, the system is constrained by very limited 
funding in reaching all workers and businesses that could use the services. 
 
 
 
 
Box V-2 
Impacts of Place-Based Policies 
A recent Brookings paper117 by Austin, Gleaser and Summers reviews the motivation for place-
based policy and finds three plausible justifications for place-based policies: agglomeration 
economies, spatial equity, and larger marginal returns to targeting social distress in high distress 
areas. The second justification is stronger than the first and the third justification is stronger than 
the second. Strong tools, such as spatially targeted employment credits, may be needed in 
distressed locations. They find that increases in labor demand appear to have greater impacts on 
employment in areas where not working has been historically high.  
Neumark and Simpson report:118  
Our overall view of the evidence is that state enterprise zone programs have 
generally not been effective at creating jobs. The jury is still out on federal 
programs—Empowerment Zones in particular—and we need more research to 
understand what features of enterprise zones help spur job creation. Moreover, 
even if there is job creation, it is hard to make the case that enterprise zones have 
furthered distributional goals of reducing poverty in the zones, and it is likely that 
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 Benjamin Austin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence Summers. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st 
Century America.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2018 Edition. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-
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For more details see: David Neumark and Helen Simpson. “Place-Based Policies,” Chapter 18 in Gilles Duranton, J. 
Vernon Henderson, and William C. Strange, Eds. Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics 5. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 2015. PP. 1197-1287. http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~dneumark/1-s2.0-B9780444595317000181-main.pdf  
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they have generated benefits for real estate owners, who are not the intended 
beneficiaries. … 
... [S]tudies of discretionary subsidies targeted to businesses in underperforming 
areas in European countries and location-based subsidies in the United States… 
suggest positive effects on investment, employment, and productivity spillovers. 
The discretionary nature of these subsidies may help explain their success, because 
applications for subsidies pass through an initial scrutiny, and targeted outcomes 
can be monitored so that the payment of the subsidy is contingent on job or 
investment targets being met. 
Evidence also suggests that higher-education institutions generate productivity 
spillovers that may be highly localized. Not surprisingly, these benefits are specific 
to industries with technological links to university research and that employ many 
university graduates. Some evidence finds that university research facilities attract 
high-tech, innovative firms to an area, which can help form industry clusters that 
may deliver longer-term benefits from agglomeration. Much of the evidence is 
from long-established universities, although research from Sweden points more 
directly to new universities increasing local labor productivity with benefits that do 
not appear to create negative effects in other regions. 
Finally, analysis of the TVA program and EU Structural Funds indicates that 
infrastructure investment can deliver productivity growth in targeted regions, and 
can act as a redistributive tool across areas, although questions remain about how 
long these effects last. 
The extensive research on place-based policies indicates that some types of well-
designed policies can be effective, while other policies do not appear to be. Policies 
that subsidize businesses based solely on their location are hard to defend based 
on the research record. Place-based policies used in a more discretionary fashion 
seem to work better, perhaps because policymakers can target subsidies where 
they will do the most good and also hold recipients accountable. And place-based 
policies that generate public goods such as infrastructure and knowledge appear 
beneficial, perhaps because these goods are underprovided by the private sector. 
But even among the more effective policies, exactly what makes them work is 
unclear. Past research can provide some guidance, but the lack of consistent 
evidence means that any such policies need to be continually monitored and 
evaluated to see whether they actually deliver their intended benefits. 
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Box V-3 
Impacts of Works Councils 
Works councils in Germany are correlated with a number of positive effects. 
• They are associated with higher wages (above union levels).119  
• Productivity is higher in companies with works councils.120 
• They do not appear to reduce investment or innovation.121  
• Disadvantaged workers benefit disproportionately from working in firms with works 
councils.122  
• They are correlated with lower profitability (likely because of paying higher wages) and 
benefit larger companies more than small ones.123  
 
 
 
B. Agenda for future research 
One important goal of policy with respect to innovation is to achieve a balance between reflexively 
optimistic and reflexively pessimistic views generated purely from the predictions of what new 
technologies can do. The aim is for realism about the many factors that affect the use and diffusion 
of new technical capabilities.  
As Section III-B shows, technological transitions can be costly when the new jobs arise too long 
after the old jobs disappear, appear elsewhere geographically, or require very different skills. 
Previous major transformations, including the recent introduction of trade with China, have 
occurred without coordinated engagement of stakeholders to mitigate damage to those left 
behind. As described in Appendix A, the uncompensated losses from transformations have 
damaged many lives, families, and communities and, thus helped breed resistance to change. 
Through research, advance planning, and stakeholder engagement, AVs offer an important 
opportunity to improve on the past.  
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The full impact of the adoption of AVs on the labor market extends well beyond the scope of this 
paper. Further research will need to grapple with the complexity of the topic, the early stages of 
transition, time constraints, and data limitations. Going forward, the targeting and effectiveness 
of cost mitigation efforts will be greatly aided by an ongoing program to track the transition and 
delve more definitively into particular topics. In this section we describe how to organize such a 
research agenda. 
The research should have at least two important goals: informing mitigation efforts for AVs and 
providing a case study for the impact of other innovations. By supporting this research agenda, 
stakeholders can demonstrate their concern and build persuasive evidence to inform policy.  
Topics for further work include the following:  
1. Conduct industry-level input-output macro analysis to identify other jobs that may be 
affected by AVs: As a complement to the occupation-based analysis here, an industry-
based analysis can track ripple effects through supply chains to identify additional affected 
sectors and occupations. 
2. Estimate the impact of a driving requirement on wages: This estimate would improve 
precision of the wage impacts of AVs on displaced drivers.  
3. Study where unemployed drivers find new jobs by industry and occupation, the duration 
of unemployment, and the wage change: Analysis of the career paths of former drivers 
would improve precision of unemployment impacts and inform the design of retraining 
programs. Although past career paths may not be indicative of a future career path after 
AV disruption, they are still a good starting point to think about policies to mitigate 
disruption.  
4. Investigate productivity benefits from reducing driving time and increasing other work-
related uses of time on the road, size, and incidence by occupation and industry: Sizing 
these productivity benefits will help identify other beneficiaries of the adoption of AVs. 
5. Identify geographic areas and demographic groups at most risk: Refine estimates of the 
dependence of localities and demographic groups on jobs that are affected by AV to 
provide early warning to communities. 
6. Compare outcomes for workers under different implementations of AVs.  
7. Determine the labor market impact of alternative implementation options for AVs: 
Monitoring the choices and consequences as implementation proceeds will inform future 
decisions. 
This list is far from exhaustive. Experience and engagement with the workforce development 
system, employers, policymakers, and the technical community (as recommended below) will help 
identify further important topics. 
Ambitious research agendas need external support if they are to be timely, of high quality, and 
relevant to policy needs. Fortunately, there is already an impressive community of researchers 
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studying the impact of automation and artificial intelligence on the U.S. economy. The best way to 
tap into these networks is to work with existing research centers at universities or highly regarded 
organizations such as the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Brookings Institution, or the 
American Enterprise Institute. AV stakeholders could provide funding for research conferences 
focused on topics of interest.  
Another important step is to ensure that researchers have the data to allow the best possible 
analysis. To accomplish this we recommend convening research, practitioner, and statistical 
agency experts to discuss data needs and how to make that data available. It would be all the more 
useful if this were established in advance of changes. Then the transition could be well-monitored. 
Sources that can be tapped include government surveys (existing or performed on a reimbursable 
basis), private surveys (although these tend to have very low response rates), and private and 
public administrative data.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our simulations suggest that realizing the vast promise of AV technology will entail straining the 
U.S. labor market moderately as 1.3 to 2.3 million jobs are eliminated directly over a 30-year time 
span, depending on adoption scenarios. Although the short-term impacts may be modest, by the 
mid-2040s, AV adoption may cause the displacement of hundreds of thousands of U.S. workers. 
As the newly jobless search for work, unemployment rates will likely inch up for a time, starting in 
the 2030s, with a maximum impact in the mid-2040s of about 0.1 percentage points. Labor force 
participation will also tick down temporarily by similar numbers as AV-displaced workers spend 
more time out of the labor force altogether. Wage levels are also likely to change, though the 
direction is unclear and likely to be affected by policy choices. 
U.S. manufacturing has lost 6.7 million jobs since its peak in 1978, or about 1.7 million jobs per 
decade. Our estimate that AV adoption will disrupt 1.3 to 2.3 million jobs over 30 years amounts 
to as much as 800,000 jobs per decade—half the size of the manufacturing job loss. Although 
these effects may be smaller and less geographically concentrated than the manufacturing job 
losses caused by increased trade with China, they are nevertheless consequential, particularly if 
incurred during an economic downturn, in already distressed areas, or in the context of job losses 
from other shocks.  
The issue is not if new jobs will arise eventually in the wake of AV displacements (they most 
certainly will), but whether AV adoption will impose very high costs on displaced workers, and 
their families and communities. Our estimates suggest that each laid-off worker will lose on 
average about $80,000 in lifetime income due to the disruption. In addition, when driving is no 
longer a requirement, many other jobs will change substantially. In total, the jobs whose duties 
are very likely to change with AV employed 7.7 million people in 2016.  
Since the faster the speed of adoption of AVs, the more severe the labor market disruption, 
Americans will choose whether to slow down adoption enough to avoid high costs to workers, to 
accept high costs with rapid adoption, or to pursue rapid adoption combined with policies to 
upgrade our ability to mitigate costs.  
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If we, as a country, choose to implement the latter, we must plan now so that the promise of AVs 
(cheaper and more efficient transportation, dramatic reduction in deaths and injuries from 
accidents, greater mobility for those who can’t drive, freedom from tedium for those who can) 
either does not impose huge costs on those directly affected or compensates them for their loss. 
With the prospect of these substantial benefits and advance planning, the task is manageable. 
Indeed, if we are complacent and do not manage the transition well, we risk inviting more 
resistance to further innovation.  
There is no dearth of broad and tailored policy proposals to meet these challenges. To manage 
policy choices, we offer guidelines for an effective overall strategy to mitigate costs to workers. 
The issue is whether policymakers and AV stakeholders have the will and foresight to take the 
needed steps. Going forward, we believe that adoption of a sound mitigation strategy must be 
recognized as an essential component of promoting adoption of any disruptive innovation in the 
U.S. There is still time for the transition to autonomous vehicles to help establish this new 
paradigm. 
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Appendix A. Case Studies of Economic Transitions 
 
I. The Industrial Revolution 
The Industrial Revolution began in England in the late 18th century. The mechanization of 
industries such as agriculture and weaving led to dramatic increases in output. However, wages 
stagnated for half a century, from about 1790-1840, and workers’ living standards declined. The 
Enclosure Movement removed small farmers’ and grazers’ access to land, enabling agriculture to 
be mechanized on the resulting large holdings; the mechanization also reduced the skills needed 
for farming. Similarly, skilled hand-loom weavers were replaced by less skilled factory workers 
(including children), and the weavers’ wages fell dramatically.  
FIGURE A-1: Engle’s Pause 
 
Source: James Manyika, Susan Lund, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan Woetzel, Parul Batra, Ryan Ko, and 
Saurabh Sanghvi. “Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transition in a Time of Automation.” McKinsey Global Institute. 
December 2017, p. 47. https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/future-of-organizations-and-work/what-the-
future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages  
Eventually, wages did grow at a rate commensurate with (and sometimes exceeding) productiveity 
growth, thus enabling workers to share in prosperity. But these changes did not occur 
automatically. As a recent McKinsey report notes, “The turnaround in the relationship between 
wages and output came at a time of substantial reform of existing structures including the right to 
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unionize, limitations on child labor, the introduction of public high schools, urban planning to 
improve public health, elimination of debtors’ prison, and the extension of the right to vote to 
landless workers.”124 
There is extensive research that shows that the average stature (height) of a population is directly 
related to its socio-economic level.  
Stature is a function of proximate determinants such as diet, disease, and work 
intensity during the growing years, and as such it is a measure of the consumption 
of basic necessities that incorporates demands placed on one’s biological system. 
Because family income heavily influences purchases of basic necessities such as 
food and medical care, stature is ultimately a function of access to resources.125 
Family income appears to have a strong direct influence on stature because higher income affords 
better nutrition, housing, and personal hygiene. Stature is also influenced by neighborhood and 
community effects related to income such as public health and sanitation measures and disease 
exposure, as well as by work intensity, which in turn, is determined by culture, technology, and 
methods of labor organization. 
Reliable height data has been difficult to obtain for many reasons: sporadic and limited efforts to 
collect data, especially historically, focused selectivity in who was measured (mostly military 
recruits, convicts, and slaves), other selection biases of various kinds, minimum height cutoffs, age 
and height heaping, and ethnic differences in growth potential. Researchers have found ways to 
overcome these limitations by looking at a wide variety of populations, comparing datasets, and 
using various clever statistical techniques.126 
Using stature measurements of English convicts shipped to Australia, who were broadly 
representative of the working class, Nicholas and Steckel found evidence that English workers 
experienced falling living standards during the early years of the British Industrial Revolution 
(roughly 1785-1820).127 Comparing British workers in urban areas with rural British workers and 
with Irish workers who were not yet industrialized, the smaller average height of urban workers 
probably reflect worse health caused by living in substandard housing in an overcrowded disease 
environment.  
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Steckel found that the height of northern European men decreased slightly during the 12th through 
16th centuries and even more in the 17th and 18th centuries.128 By the 1700s, northern European 
men had lost an average of two-and-a-half inches of height. Not until the early 1900s did they 
again stand as tall. There are several circumstances that may have caused this: the cooling climate 
trend from the 1300s to the 1800s (the Little Ice Age) probably made life harder for everyone; 
urbanization and the growth in trade encouraged the spread of disease; war and other political 
strife disrupted production and spread disease; and the growth of inequality likely increased stress 
and decreased nutrition for the lower classes. 
Floud et al. found that “the early part of the industrial revolution led to an absolute as well as 
relative increase in the welfare and nutritional status of the working class, but … the impact of 
urban growth eroded that increase and even led to decreases in average height as large 
proportions of the working class were subjected to town life.”129 
Komlos found that average stature dropped in the United States for those born from 1830 to 
1860—a time when per capita income rose by roughly 50 percent. 130 And in Europe, “The first 
decrease in physical stature occurred earlier in Europe, coinciding with the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution (c.1760 to 1800).” He argues that even though industrialization increased overall 
production, income tended to be more unevenly distributed with the small upper stratum 
remaining the same height while the much larger lower classes decreased in height. Also, 
technological change depressed the market value of skilled craftsmen and farmers leading to 
reductions for both of these groups. Economic growth also led to food losing value compared to 
industrial commodities which resulted in stagnant food production and lower class people 
substituting inexpensive starchy carbohydrates for protein rich meat.  
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FIGURE A-2: Change in Average Height of Various Groups during the Industrial Revolution 
 
Source: John Komlos. “Shrinking in a Growing Economy? The Mystery of Physical Stature during the Industrial 
Revolution.” The Journal of Economic History 58, no. 3 (September 1998). 
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Industrialization also meant that more people were detached from the land and more directly tied 
to the business cycle, so they suffered nutritionally during economic recessions such as the 
American contractions of 1837-43 and 1848-55. Additionally, poor people in urban areas were too 
far away from farms to get fresh milk and meat. “Furthermore, industrialization and its 
concomitant, the increased division of labor, in turn unleashed other processes, including the 
integration of hitherto isolated regions into a larger world market, that magnified their impact on 
nutritional status. … Yet, once able to sell their products easily, subsistence farmers, lacking full 
knowledge of the technology of health production, traded away proteins, minerals, and vitamins 
essential to the health and nutrition of their children. Although such producers gained from the 
transaction in monetary terms, their children became stunted (and less healthy) as a 
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consequence.”131 Children working long hours in factories may also have needed more nutrition 
than their pre-industrial counterparts. 
However, Bodenhorn, Guinnane, and Mroz argue that most of the studies relying on measurement 
of living people have selection bias that negates their value in explaining the “industrial puzzle.”132 
They show that in countries where all or a random selection of men are conscripted and measured 
(such as the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Sweden), mean height grows monotonically 
throughout the 19th century. They argue those joining a volunteer army must have some incentive 
(such as inferior labor market opportunities) that is related to health/height. This self-selection 
bias (SSB) is responsible for the “industrialization puzzle” in studies relying on army 
measurements. They also argue there are similar selection problems for the slaves who were 
chosen to be measured. 
Boix and Rosenbluth summarize what is now generally agreed about average human height over 
time:  
Both men and women were taller in pre-agrarian societies than in agrarian 
societies. In Paleolithic and Mesolithic sites, femur lengths seem to indicate a height 
around 175 cm for men and 165 cm for women. These values are in the range of 
average heights today. Pre-agrarian individuals were tall as a result of their 
abundant and diverse diet based on scores of plants and animal species, naturally 
related to the use of birth control strategies and low human population densities … 
By contrast, agriculturalists tended to rely on a single cereal stable—rice in Asia, 
wheat in temperate Asia and Europe, and maize in the Americas—supplemented 
with vegetables and, particularly among wealthy strata, some fish and meat … 
The economic transformation spurred by the industrial revolution had two 
consequences. In the short run, it led to a decline in average heights as rural 
dwellers moved to densely crowded, unhealthy urban centers. Transitionally, the 
opening of markets permitting sales of food for other goods might also have raised 
the price of food, reducing consumption. In the long run, however, growing per 
capita incomes and the improvement of public sanitation resulted in better 
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nutrition and health conditions and, eventually, increased heights to the genetic 
potential—until increased income had no additional effect.133 
 
II. Autopilot in aviation 
The autopilot function in aviation has a long history, going back to 1914 when gyroscope 
technology was shown capable of keeping a plane’s flight path stable even in the absence of an 
active pilot at the controls. After refinement, this autopilot technology was licensed for use in 
1931; another advance came with the invention of an automatic landing system in 1935.134 Hence 
an automatic control capability has been available in commercial aviation for many decades. Yet 
pilots still routinely staff all commercial airline flights. The minimum required staffing level for a 
flight crew has shifted down; it was once three (two pilots and a flight engineer) and now only the 
two pilots are required by FAA regulations. This status quo is, by most accounts, securely 
maintained under the current regulatory regime.135  
Still, the public imagination continues to be seized by the idea of “planes without pilots.” Pilotless 
military drones, guided from remote control centers, provide dramatic examples of the potential 
of automatic controls (although over 150 humans are involved in the average combat mission 
flown by a drone). In a recent survey, airline pilots reported spending only 4 to 7 minutes per flight 
in manual control mode. And NASA is investing heavily in a “safe autonomous system operations” 
project that could potentially remove the on-board co-pilot and substitute a remote ground 
controller who could serve as co-pilot for multiple flights. 136  
While not contradicting what autopilot technology is capable of doing, accounts from pilots reveal 
how misleading the “seven minutes of hands-on flying” statement is.137 Pilots always have hands-
on control during taxiing for takeoff and after landing, and they also make the choices among a 
set of operating parameters that go into a given autopilot configuration. In addition, pilots respond 
to queries and directives from air traffic controllers and, of course, take over in the case of extreme 
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weather conditions, equipment failures, and other emergencies. Indeed, in one view, pilots should 
increase their minutes of active flying to avoid the risk of seeing their skills diminished by too much 
reliance on autopilot.138 
But perhaps the most important point about the continued presence of pilots in the cockpit is that 
they are there to reassure both passengers and the society at large that a responsible, competent 
professional is in charge and monitoring the technology for their safety. Legal philosophers and 
ethicists, observing this phenomenon, speak of the importance of having a “moral crumple zone” 
for certain activities that are dangerous and occur in public space.139 Just as the crumple zone in 
an automobile provides protection for the occupant in the event of a crash, the presence of a pilot 
who is responsible for safety provides a kind of moral protection against anxieties that could 
otherwise render the aviation system less effective as a transportation service open to all. We 
might find that similar sentiments will preserve a driver role for autonomous trucks, perhaps 
particularly the big tractor-trailers that can pose such a danger in case of accidents, even when 
the technology is hypothetically able to function without any human intervention.  
 
III. Computer numerical control of machine tools 
Machine tools cut away metal to make a highly precise, durable component. Traditionally, 
machine tools were operated by highly skilled machinists, who determined how to make a 
component. The machinist decided what sequence of cuts a machine should make, decided which 
tools the machine should use (lathe, mill, drill, etc.), made fixtures to hold the part steady while it 
was being cut, and manipulated cranks and levers to determine the speed at which the machine 
operated and the speed at which a part was fed in.  
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force subsidized development of automated machine 
tools. Initially, instructions were coded into tape guided machines (“numerical control”). In the 
1970s and 1980s, firms introduced computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools that 
were programmed using a computer. In both cases, the goal was to enable complex products to 
be produced without companies needing to depend on skilled labor. The Air Force and defense 
contractors ended up with a highly abstract programming method which initially was quite 
complex, expensive, and fault-prone. They rejected a simpler technology, “record playback,” 
which would have simply recorded the actions of skilled machinists to make a repeatable process. 
The result was a technology that after much tribulation could make more complex parts than even 
the most skilled machinist could make—but which continued to require the input of skilled 
technicians. The most effective operation of the technology involves both specialized 
programmers and skilled technicians on the shop floor who can modify programs to take into 
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account ever-changing variables such as tool wear.140 The goal of a “lights out factory” (one with 
no workers) remains elusive. 
Introduction of the same type of automation equipment led to upskilling in some cases and 
deskilling in other places, depending upon characteristics of both product and labor markets. Once 
CNC had been adopted, rather than record playback, machinists in some plants gained computer 
programming skills while computers took over the direct determination of “feeds and speeds.” 
More often, however, machinists became less skilled, mostly watching for errors by the automated 
equipment while firms gave programming and problem-solving duties to engineers. The main 
result was that the jobs were separated; according to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET), two occupations are now involved with CNC machine tools.141 The 
median wages of the 146,000 “Computer-Controlled Machine Tool Operators, Metal and Plastic” 
in 2016 were $18.21 per hour; these workers operate machines – the job description does not 
mention programming. Conversely, the job description for “Computer Numerically Controlled 
Machine Tool Programmers, Metal and Plastic” does not mention actually operating a machine; 
these workers (25,000 in 2016) earned a median wage of $24.32 annually. Finally, there is a 
“machinist” occupation, employing 396,000 workers, who earned an average of $20 per hour. 
Thus, the introduction of computers in most cases led to a separation of operational and 
programming tasks and a reduction in wages and skills for the former. This separation was not 
inevitable in that a) machine tools could have been designed to be easier for machinists to 
program (the “record playback” option), albeit at a cost in the complexity of operations that the 
machine tool could perform, and b) machinists could have been asked to program as well as 
operate, a situation that does occur in a significant minority of cases according to Kelley. In both 
the cases studied by Kelley and by Noble, integration was associated with higher productivity. 
Noble argues that a desire to minimize worker bargaining power led management to choose the 
less-productive path.  
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IV. Automotive assembly plant automation 
Assumptions that automation will eliminate jobs in their entirety often guide first perceptions—
and headlines—about the employment impact of new technologies. But partial automation is far 
more common. Bessen142 examines all of the 270 detailed occupations listed in the 1950 U.S. 
Census and found that only one—elevator operator—was completely eliminated by automation. 
The automation trend in one of the most capital-intensive settings in heavy industry—the 
automotive assembly line—offers insights into the reasons partial automation is so prevalent.143  
An automotive assembly plant is typically comprised of three primary departments – body, paint, 
and assembly. (Certain plants also have stamping departments; and each of the primary 
departments can have multiple sub-segments, e.g. trim and chassis lines in assembly.)  
The automation trends in each department have been distinct. For many years now, body shops 
have carried out the majority of needed welds using large multi-welders, with hundreds of welds 
(up to 80 percent) applied by many robots while the body pieces are held firmly in place by a jig 
that guarantees structural integrity. Feeder lines that weld small metal stampings into 
subassemblies typically consist of a mix of automated and manual welds. The development of 
more sophisticated robots—capable of moving on up to six axes of motion, plus new techniques 
such as arc welding—has raised the total number of welds applied by automation to upwards of 
95 percent in newer assembly plants. With more precise welding, the total number of welds can 
be reduced. (When many welds were manual, product designs typically required up to 5,000 
welds, anticipating that some would be missed or imprecisely placed; a modern design has 2,500-
4,000 welds depending on the vehicle type.) OEMs have increasingly been willing to invest in this 
very high level of weld automation, even when building new plants to produce vehicles in 
developing countries with low wage rates, because the consistency of body welding and the 
resulting integrity of the structural design has advantages in selling a vehicle that can meet the 
regulatory requirements of many different export markets. 
Paint automation was similarly divided into highly automated stages in environment-controlled 
paint booths (by dipping the vehicle body for rustproofing and applying the undercoat, then by 
paint robots applying the prime and 1-2 color coats) and mostly manual processes to apply sealer 
for leak prevention and noise control. These sealer jobs were difficult to automate because of the 
complex motions to apply a precise bead along a curving line, but they were also ergonomically 
demanding and likely to cause repetitive motion injuries. Eventually the same advances in robotics 
that allowed further automation of welding—and the reduced price for these capabilities—also 
allowed automation of many sealing tasks. Hence, the two already-capital intensive departments 
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have moved from 70-80 percent steps performed by automation to between 90 and 100 percent 
between the mid-1980s and the present.  
The assembly department, however, is a completely different story. This is the setting that most 
people think of when they hear the phrase “assembly plant,” whether their reference point is 
Henry Ford or Charlie Chaplin. Painted vehicle bodies are stationed on a moving line that passes 
many workstations where workers carry out a set of standardized tasks on each vehicle with a 
short cycle time—typically about 1 minute. Assembly is one of the most labor-intensive production 
processes in any manufacturing setting despite the otherwise high level of capital investment and 
hence has been a frequent target of efforts to increase automation. In particular, a wave of intense 
focus on automating assembly took place in the 1980s led by automotive OEMs and equipment 
suppliers all over the world. Advances in flexible automation, in robots, in logistics (the movement 
of vehicles and supplier parts within the factory), and in larger automation installations were the 
proximate cause of this focus. The leading firms in this effort were General Motors in the U.S., Fiat 
and Volkswagen in Europe, and Mazda and Nissan in Japan, but no firms stayed on the sidelines.  
With the benefit of longitudinal data from the International Assembly Plant Study from MIT’s 
International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP), the consequences of this wave of investment in 
assembly automation soon became clear. Certain assembly tasks were well-suited to automation, 
e.g. the installation of windshields where a heavy object needed to have a same-width bead of 
glue applied around its edge before precise placement onto the opening in the vehicle body. One 
robot arm applied the glue bead while another robot arm lifted and placed the windshield, at first 
with guiding hands from workers insuring precise placement but eventually operating without 
human intervention. Accordingly, most assembly plants in the IMVP sample implemented 
automated windshield installation in the period between 1985 and 2000.  
However, windshield installation was the exception. Most assembly automation proved not to 
work well for three reasons: 1) the capital equipment was expensive; 2) the equipment broke 
down a lot and required frequent maintenance; and 3) the equipment, while hypothetically 
programmable and able to handle a high degree of model mix and product complexity, was mostly 
unable to accommodate that level of variety in actual operating conditions. Other problems were 
specific to the type of automation. Large automation installations, where the vehicle would be 
fixed in position for a period of time during which multiple tasks were performed, required 
removing vehicles from the moving assembly line; these often became bottlenecks due to 
operational problems. Automated Guidance Vehicles (AGVs), detachable platforms that moved 
vehicles from one section of the plant to another, were guided by fixed metal strips placed in the 
concrete flooring and hence were hard to move once installed. 
Several adaptations to the situation followed, with striking similarities across companies and 
regions (possibly due to direct knowledge exchange or spillover via suppliers). Large automation 
installations were often removed and replaced with a more traditional setup of automation 
stations that could function within the standard cycle time of the rest of the assembly line. 
Sophisticated multiple-axes programmable robots intended for automating human assembly tasks 
often could not duplicate the precise maneuvering of the part to the right position/angle for 
installation nor the precise tightening for the correct torque. Hence those tasks were returned to 
line workers. But when heavy parts needed to be lifted into place before fastening, simple single-
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axis “pick and place” robots were used to relieve the ergonomic strain on workers. This philosophy 
of “automation assist,” using inexpensive commodity-like robots in combination with human 
labor, became the dominant approach. Eventually this philosophy found its most creative outlet 
in the design of work carts to hold bolts and fasteners plus tools, customized by each work team 
to meet their preferences (with height of the cart and layout of the bins for parts and the holders 
for tools being the primary design variables). These carts would hook into the moving assembly 
line so they moved at the same pace as the vehicle and then would disengage at the end of the 1-
minute work cycle and roll back to the starting position for the next vehicle. These carts often had 
decorations on them and were given affectionate, anthropomorphized names.  
Technological advances did not cease, of course, but largely adapted to this new philosophy as the 
appeal of “lean” or “frugal” capital investment caught on. To deal with the problems of inflexible 
(though programmable) AGVs, new designs emerged with sensors that could read a magnetic strip 
that could simply be taped on the floor, making a change in routing much simpler. In order to have 
closer proximity of simple “pick and place” robots and workers while maintaining safety, those 
robots were increasingly designed with low-voltage power supplies, eliminating the risk of shock. 
At Toyota, where the principle of continuous improvement (kaizen) is well-established, 
researchers learned that close proximity of humans and robots was prized as an opportunity for 
monitoring and learning about machine operations in order to “give wisdom to the machine.” 
Toyota engineers contrasted this learning-oriented approach with the “monuments of 
automation” approach embodied in the massive and physically-separated installations favored by 
Fiat and VW.  
Thus even in a setting that favors capital investments for complete automation of tasks, the 
assembly automation case shows the limits of automation for certain tasks and the ability of firms 
to adapt to a partial automation strategy that uses less sophisticated equipment designed to 
complement human activities and capabilities. This partial automation approach has proven to be 
durable at most OEMs. Tesla’s Elon Musk talks frequently about his intention for robots to carry 
out the production of a future Tesla model so that the final products have been untouched by 
human hands. While this vision is appealing to any observers who find the auto assembly line to 
be the very symbol of alienating work, there is reason to be skeptical of whether Musk can achieve 
this goal any time soon. Indeed, while ramping up production of the mass-market Model 3, Tesla 
has faced difficulties with its welding automation, requiring manual welds that have slowed 
production to a handful of vehicles per day. There’s every reason to expect that Tesla, like all other 
automotive OEMs, will solve the welding automation problem—but much less reason to expect 
full automation of assembly tasks. Recent reports from Tesla’s factory for the Model 3 suggest 
that Musk’s pursuit of full automation in the assembly department is a major cause of both 
production delay and additional cost. Indeed, Musk is already beginning to concur with the 
external diagnosis of overautomation in assembly. Overall, this remarkably common experience 
at most if not all automakers worldwide suggests that “automation assist” in assembly will 
continue to be more effective for cost, quality, safety, and throughput efficiency that initiatives 
attempting full automation. This, in turn, greatly reduces the automation threat to employment 
levels in assembly departments at both new and established OEMs worldwide. 
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V. Automatic teller machines (ATMs) 
The now-ubiquitous Automated Teller Machine (ATM) has become a ready reference point for 
technology observers on both sides of the question whether automation decreases or increases 
employment, each side often telling only part of the story. For our purposes, the ATM example is 
particularly valuable for these reasons:  
1) The technology itself diffused relatively slowly at first before a period of explosive 
growth. This is due less to technical challenges than to regulatory issues and the slowness of 
customers to change their financial habits;  
2) The employment impacts were slow at first. When the period of intense adoption 
arrived, there was a large first-order negative effect on bank teller employment. Subsequently 
there was an even larger second-order indirect effect as banks shifted strategy to open many more 
local branches, reducing tellers per branch but expanding overall teller employment;  
3) Banking technology has advanced beyond ATMs, particularly via fintech apps related to 
mobile or cashless payments. But the ATM is not disappearing; rather, it is being repurposed in 
ways that promise both direct negative employment effects and indirect employment gains. With 
respect to the latter, job enhancement will also be enhanced by returning human interaction to 
non-routine situations arising during routine banking transactions.  
According to historians of the ATM, there was no “eureka” moment for the ATM, a complex 
combination of technologies, but rather an evolution of antecedent technologies (magnetic stripe 
technology most notably) and several inventors working in parallel.144 Three different ATMs were 
launched in 1967, each developed independently: Bankomat in Sweden; Barclaycash in the UK; 
and Chubb MD2 in the U.S. New technologies were developed specific to the ATM, both hardware 
(the cash output mechanism) and software (the algorithm creating an encrypted PIN and linking it 
to a specific account). Exposure of ATMs to weather conditions (intense rain, snow/sleet, extremes 
of heat and cold) was an early source of operational difficulties that hurt customer trust in their 
reliability and slowed adoption. According to McRobbie, skepticism was widespread with varied 
reasons:145 
One Detroit artist told The New York Times in 1977 that she preferred face-to-face banking and 
that a number of her friends had machines eat their cards: “I’m suspicious,” she said. “At least the 
girl behind the window doesn’t die in the middle of a transaction.”146 A dubious banking exec in 
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New York City told the paper that it was great that a customer could bank at 3 a.m., but “Where 
are you going to spend it at 3 a.m.?”  
Employment consequences of ATMs tracked diffusion levels quite directly for a time. Statistics 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that employment in commercial banking declined by 
70,000 from 1986 to 1996, dropping to 1.5 million even as the economy expanded. Of the service-
producing sector, only savings institutions and railroad transportation lost more jobs than 
commercial banking from 1986-96.147 But this pattern reversed beginning in the mid-1990s. 
According to James Bessen, “The number of full-time equivalent bank tellers has grown since ATMs 
were widely deployed during the late 1990s and early 2000s.”148 (See Figure A-3). “Why didn’t 
employment fall? Because the ATM allowed banks to operate branch offices at lower cost; this 
prompted them to open many more branches (their demand was elastic), offsetting the erstwhile 
loss in teller jobs.”  
FIGURE A-3: Fulltime-Equivalent Bank Tellers and Installed ATMs in the U.S. 
 
 
Regulatory changes also played a role in the diffusion of ATMs and a shift in bank strategies vis-à-
vis branches. In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that an ATM did not count as a bank branch, 
allowing more density of ATMs without violating regulations on geographic concentration of 
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banks. The freedom to do routine banking transactions at any hour increased use of banking 
services and encouraged banks to reach out to potential customers who hadn’t had a bank account 
previously. Branches were reconceptualized as places to connect directly with customers in order 
to sell high-margin products and services such as credit cards, mortgages, home equity lines of 
credit, and insurance. Deregulation of banking that allowed more different entities to enter these 
new lines of business increased this new cross-selling approach and also spurred competition, with 
the physical presence of branches seen as valuable for building overall consumer awareness of a 
bank’s brand. Fishman provides these comparative statistics: “… in 1985, the U.S. had 60,000 ATMs 
and 485,000 bank tellers. In 2002, the U.S. had 352,000 ATMs—and 527,000 bank tellers. ATMs 
notwithstanding, banks do a lot more than they used to and have a lot more branches than they 
used to.”149 
 
VI. International trade 
Though not directly connected to automation, the rapid change in trade patterns in the 1990s and 
2000s offers some important lessons about how change can severely hurt some communities and 
spark widespread fear and anger.  
Studies such as those by MIT economist David Autor150 and Yale economist Peter Schott151 have 
found that China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) led to large losses in income 
and employment for U.S. workers. Autor’s findings suggest that one quarter of U.S. manufacturing 
job loss can be attributed to this cause, and the impact was not limited to the manufacturing 
sector. According to this research, the median working age adult lost $1,200 in annual income 
from 2000 to 2007 as a result of China’s entry into the WTO.  
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson analyzed the effect of rising Chinese import competition between 1990 
and 2007 on U.S. local labor markets (“commuting zones”, or CZs). Some CZs had high exposure 
to Chinese imports because in 1990 they specialized in industries (e.g. furniture) in which Chinese 
imports by other rich countries grew a lot, while other CZs had less exposure. The median CZ saw 
an increase of Chinese imports per worker of $890 from 1990-2000, and $2,110 between 2000 
and-2007. They found that the impact of increased Chinese import exposure was large and was 
not limited to the manufacturing sector. A $1,000 /worker increase in a CZ’s import exposure led 
to a $549 loss in wage/salary income per working age adult per year in that CZ, due to reduced 
employment (mostly in manufacturing), reduced labor force participation, and reduced non-
manufacturing wages.  
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Most of these losses were not compensated. For every dollar of income that workers lost due to 
China’s entry into the WTO, they received on average only 10 cents in compensation.152 A 
$1,000/worker increase in a CZ’s import exposure led to only a $58/year increase in government 
transfers. Most of these transfers of income occurred through the disability system or food 
stamps; the impact of Trade Adjustment Assistance was very small. The deadweight loss due to 
inefficiency of transfer payments and to involuntary unemployment was about $142 per capita for 
1990-2007. One estimate of gains from this increased import exposure was $32–$61.153 Others 
argue this estimate is too small, and ignores potential long-term gains. Also, deadweight loss will 
fall over time as adjustment occurs. 
 
VII. Australian mining 
Much of Australia’s mining industry is located hundreds of miles away from population centers.154 
In some quarries and mines, workers are flown into tent camps from which they work for two 
weeks and are then flown back home. These working conditions are hard on workers and 
expensive for the mining companies.155 So the Australian mining industry has been rapidly 
developing and deploying automation and remote-controlled equipment including autonomous 
(self-driving) trucks made by Komatsu and Caterpillar for hauling raw rock from the quarry face to 
crushers.  
Currently mining giant Rio Tinto operates 73 driverless trucks at four mining sites (West Angelas, 
Yandicoogina, Nammuldi, and Hope Downs 4) in Western Australia from an operations center in 
Perth.156 The trucks can run 24 hours a day throughout the year without a driver who would need 
lunch and bathroom breaks. They are also more precise and consistent in where they pull up for 
loading. Company officials estimate that each of the trucks can replace about 500 work hours each 
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year.157 Rio Tinto’s productivity leader, Rob Atkinson, says driverless trucks are roughly 15 percent 
cheaper to run than human-operated trucks.158  
Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) is currently operating 54 driverless trucks and drills at the Firetail 
and Kings Valley iron ore mines in North West Australia, which have increased productivity 20 
percent and saved $100 million on the capital cost of 20 trucks.159 Pit to port costs have been cut 
43 percent. To support the trucks, Caterpillar’s dealer, Westrac, has hired 100 people with skills in 
robotics, data analytics, radio networks, and GPS technologies. 
Rio Tinto also operates robotic rock drilling rigs and will have driverless trains for hauling the ore 
to port by 2018.160 BHP Billiton has also deployed driverless trucks in Western Australia that it 
operates from Perth. In addition, the mining industry is exploring automated rock breakers, semi-
autonomous crushers, and remotely-operated ship loaders.161 Auto-tunable robotic loading 
(ATRL) technology, which can sense how much rock has been scooped up by a loader as it moves 
its scoop forward, is being developed for underground mines.162 Where jobs are too complicated 
for autonomous machines to work, remotely controlled machines may be possible. 
Beyond the mining industry, Australia is developing automated milking machines that enable a 
cow to be milked whenever she wants and an autonomous weed-removing robot powered by on-
board photovoltaic solar collectors.163  
While providing substantial productivity benefits, automation and remote control means fewer 
jobs for miners and local suppliers, many of them Aboriginal/indigenous people. It also means less 
tax-revenue for government tax agencies.164 These local low-skill workers are often replaced by 
high-skill workers who manage and service the autonomous machines from remote operation 
centers located in far-away cities.  
“If you’re moving from mines that employ 5,000 to 10,000 people down to 500 or 1,000, then 
you’re obviously not going to get the same amount of local jobs,” says Howard Mann, senior 
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adviser on international law at International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and co-
author of a recent study165 on the impact of automation in the mining sector.166 
The situation could be even worse in resource-rich developing countries as multinational mining 
corporations deploy automation to extract resources that are primarily used in the developed 
world. Local employment in mining, support, and supplier industries may dry up, and the GNP of 
some of these countries might be reduced by as much as 4 percent. Large mine operators in low-
income countries make 21 percent of their purchases locally whereas in OECD countries, they 
spend closer to 91 percent. 
“The ‘shared value’ paradigm was intended to reduce that gap and give developing countries the 
opportunity to close those ratios. What automation is going to do is just step in the way and block 
that from happening in a significant way,” says Mann. 
Peter Knights, head of the mining engineering department at Australia’s Queensland University, 
argues that host governments in developing countries should require that skills be transferred to 
local workers just as U.S. defense companies that have sales contracts with Australia must 
currently do. 
James Cook University professor Ian Atkinson said it was likely some jobs would be lost but 
expected it to happen over a long period of time. “It may happen that as people retire or leave the 
industry they won't be replaced by a person,” Professor Atkinson said. “It's not just taking workers 
out and putting a machine in, it's going to happen really quite gradually for a long time yet.”167 
And automation might also make mining easier so that new mines are developed that would 
employ additional people, as Professor Atkinson said: 
 If you apply machines and actually have a mine where you normally wouldn't 
maybe you’ll be developing new mines. 
A recent study found that computers will reshape the labor market in Australia in two ways: 
1. Directly substitute for labour, with a high probability that as much as 40 per cent 
of the jobs in Australia could be replaced by computers within a decade or two; and 
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2. Disrupt the way work is conducted, expanding competition and reducing the 
costs to consumers but also reducing the income of workers.168  
The study estimated that up to 5 million jobs are likely to be automated by 2030 and nearly 40 
percent of Australian jobs that exist today are at risk, with more than 60 percent at risk in parts of 
rural and regional Australia.169 
University of Sydney mechatronic engineering Professor Hugh Durrant-Whyte designed and 
implemented the stevedore automation system in Port Brisbane and Port Botany so that these 
terminals are now completely operated from Sydney. He was also responsible for automating Rio 
Tinto’s mines in Western Australia—14 mines in the Pilbara, six in the Hunter Valley, three in 
Mongolia, and four in the U.S., all from “a single room in Brisbane.” He argues that the worst 
consequence of automation will be further polarization of the workforce—the number of high-
skill jobs for managers and professionals would grow as would low-skilled, interactive jobs in the 
service industry, but those in between will shrink drastically. 
“That’s what technology is doing that’s different from previous industrial 
revolutions,” Durrant-Whyte said. “And I do think that this is very, very concerning 
because it really does show the type of inequalities on a global scale that are going 
on.” He said this polarization hadn’t quite hit Australia yet but warned “it is heading 
that way without any doubt at all.” 
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Appendix B. Simulating Labor Market Status and Earnings Impacts  
 
This appendix details how we convert the job loss patterns shown in Table II-2 into displacements 
and changes in unemployment, labor force participation, and earnings through our simulation 
exercises.  
To summarize our approach for labor market status, first we derive displacements from job losses 
to displacements by adjusting for projected turnover. Once we have determined the number of 
workers we expect to be laid off, we then project their subsequent labor market status in the years 
after layoff. To do so, we use the recent experience of displaced workers to estimate a path for 
the group going forward. That is, these paths allow us to convert a surge in expected layoffs from 
occupations affected by AV into implied elevations of unemployment and declines in labor force 
participation. To construct these paths, we rely heavily on data from the 2012, 2014, and 2016 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS) conducted by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, augmented as needed by assumptions that we explain below.170 We use this 
same process to construct post-displacement paths for several demographic and geographic 
subgroups.  
 
I. Displacement simulations: from jobs lost to displacement 
To estimate displacement from the number of jobs we expect to be eliminated, it is important to 
consider the number of potentially laid-off workers who might never receive a pink slip because 
they retired or left the labor force for other reasons, or they transferred to a different occupation 
first.  
Occupational turnover occurs when workers leave an occupation. For example, a worker may 
retire, become disabled, take a job in another occupation, go back to school, be promoted, take 
on family responsibilities, be fired for cause, or pass away. An occupation’s annual turnover 
reflects the rate at which jobs in the occupation would decline if no exiting workers were replaced. 
Factors that influence occupational turnover include the average age of the workforce, injury 
rates, whether it is an entry-level job, and if experience in that job applies to other occupations. 
These estimates do not count workers who change jobs but remain in the same occupation.  
Table III-1 presents occupational turnover projections for AV affected occupations derived from 
BLS Occupational Openings and Separations projected for 2016-2026.171 The table also presents 
ranges for the total number of jobs that are eliminated in each occupation across the four scenario 
combinations. BLS projects occupational turnover using two different models, one for labor force 
exits and another for occupational transfers. Both models use a regression analysis of historical 
data to identify the characteristics of a worker, such as age and educational attainment that make 
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them likely to separate from their occupation. These patterns from historical data are then applied 
to the current distribution of employment for each occupation to project future separations.  
Our simulations are turnover-adjusted in the sense that to calculate the expected number of 
displaced workers in each scenario we reduce the expected job losses by the turnover percentages 
shown in Table III-1. 
  
II. Unemployment simulations: from displacement to being re-employed or unemployed 
Once we know the expected pattern of displacements, we use the DWS to simulate laid-off 
workers’ labor market experience in subsequent years, beginning with unemployment and re-
employment.  
The DWS includes workers with three or more years of tenure on the job before they were laid 
off. We used the DWS from 2012, 2014, and 2016 because these are the most recent surveys and 
they occur during an economic expansion, but when unemployment was still relatively high. So, 
these years are neither boom not bust years. Because the sample is representative of all 
displacement in the U.S. during those years, its composition reflects the particular cyclical and 
structural trends at play at the time. The paths followed after displacement reflect the composition 
of the workers as well as the impact of current mitigation efforts. 172  
The finished path for the most general cohort of workers appears in Table B-1. It covers the period 
from the year before displacement until six years afterward. Table B-2 describes the source or 
formula for each element in Table B-1, while the text below presents the rationale for the 
assumptions taken. Discussion of Tables B-1 and B-2 focuses on re-employment and 
unemployment impacts. Labor force participation impacts are considered further below.  
First, how to read Table B-1: In this table, we follow a group of workers displaced from their jobs 
for five years to register their labor market status in each subsequent year. The left-hand column 
gives us the year relative to the year when they lose their jobs. The first row (year -1) gives their 
status before the layoff year. In that year, all are employed (so employment =1); none are out of 
the labor force or unemployed (so out of labor force and unemployment=0). In subsequent years, 
the table shows the share of the original laid off cohort that fall into the three possible labor 
market statuses in columns 2, 3 and 4. Also shown is the unemployment rate for this group of 
workers in column 5 and the difference between their unemployment rate and a baseline rate 
calculated as explained below. 
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TABLE B-1: Path of Labor Market Status after Displacement 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) for 2012, 2014, and 2016 for columns 2-5 for 
years 1, 2, and 3. Estimates provided by Henry S. Farber. See  
 B-2 and Appendix B text for detailed description of the authors’ assumptions and calculations that complete the 
table.  
*In years -1 and 0, this figure compares laid off workers to employed workers. To simulate normal employment 
turnover, for years 1-6, it compares them to linearly increasing unemployment, until reaching the year 6, which 
compares them to the overall average unemployment during the DWS months. 
 
Years 
after 
displace-
ment 
Share of 
displaced 
workers 
employed 
Share of 
displaced 
workers out of 
labor force 
Share of 
displaced 
workers 
unemployed 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
of displaced 
workers 
Baseline* 
unemploy-
ment rate 
Unemploy-
ment rate gap 
between 
displaced 
workers and 
baseline* 
Share of 
displaced 
workers 
adding to 
unemploy-
ment 
-1 1 0 0 0% 0% 0.0% 0 
0 0.597 0.065 0.338 36.1% 0.00% 36.1% 0.338 
1 0.483 0.130 0.387 44.5% 1.08% 43.4% 0.378 
2 0.681 0.126 0.192 22.0% 2.17% 19.9% 0.174 
3 0.723 0.133 0.144 16.6% 3.25% 13.4% 0.116 
4 0.763 0.120 0.117 13.3% 4.33% 8.9% 0.079 
5 0.802 0.110 0.088 9.9% 5.42% 4.5% 0.040 
6 0.842 0.100 0.059 6.5% 6.50% 0.0% 0.000 
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TABLE B-2: Sources and Assumptions for Table B-1 
 
 
Years 
after 
displace-
ment 
Share of 
displaced workers 
employed 
Share of 
displaced 
workers out of 
labor force 
Share of 
displaced 
workers 
unemployed 
Unemploy-
ment rate of 
displaced 
workers 
Baseline 
unemployment 
rate for the year 
Unemployment 
rate gap 
between 
displaced 
workers and 
baseline* 
Share of 
displaced 
workers adding 
to unemploy-
ment 
-1 
1, by construction 0, by 
construction 
0, by 
construction 
0, by 
construction 
0, by 
construction 
0, by 
construction 
0, by 
construction 
0 
Implied by 
unemployment 
rate and out of 
labor force 
estimates 
(1/2)*DWS 
average exit 
rate for years 
1-3 
Implied by 
unemployment 
rate and out of 
labor force 
estimates 
(1/4)*(1+year 1 
unemployment 
rate) 
By construction Unemp. rate for 
year 0 
(Unemp. 
rate)/(baseline 
unemp. rate)* 
unemployment, 
all for year 0 
1, 2 & 3 
DWS average 
employment 
share for same 
year 
DWS average 
exit share for 
same year 
DWS average 
unemployment 
share for same 
year 
DWS average 
unemployment 
rate for same 
year  
(1/6), (2/6) or 
(3/6)*baseline 
unemployment 
rate for year 6 
(Unemp. rate for 
same year)-
(baseline unemp. 
for same year) 
(Unemp. 
rate)/(baseline 
unemp. rate)* 
unemployment, 
all for same year 
4 & 5 
Implied by 
unemployment 
rate and labor 
force exits 
(12/13 or 
11/13) *(DWS 
average exit 
share for years 
1-3) 
Implied by 
unemployment 
rate and labor 
force exits 
(Unemp. rate in 
year 3) + ((1/3) 
or (2/3)) * 
(unemp. rate in 
year 6 –unemp. 
rate in 3) 
(4/6) or (5/6) 
*baseline 
unemployment 
rate for year 6 
(Unemp. rate for 
same year)-
(baseline unemp. 
for same year) 
(Unemp. 
rate)/(baseline 
unemp. rate)* 
unemployment, 
all for same year  
6 
Implied by 
unemployment 
rate and labor 
force exits 
(10/13)*(DWS 
average exit 
share for years 
1-3) 
Implied by 
unemployment 
rate and labor 
force exits 
Baseline 
unemployment 
rate for year 6 
DWS weighted 
average unemp. 
rate (Jan. 2012, 
2014 and 2016). 
0, by assumption 0, by assumption 
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Sometime during the next year (year 0), all in the group lose their jobs. At the moment of the 
layoff, all displaced workers become unemployed, but then over time they look for new jobs, start 
work at new jobs, or exit the labor force, so they leave the ranks of the unemployed. Thus, workers 
begin year 0 (the year of the layoff), with a job and end it after their layoff. Layoffs can happen at 
any time throughout the year. So, for the year 0, we assume that the average layoff takes place 
halfway through the year. 
We take into account that some workers will exit the labor force after displacement, that is, about 
13 percent of displaced workers are not working or looking for work. This is reflected in the third 
column of Tables B-1 and B-2. Perhaps surprisingly, the DWS data suggests that virtually all of 
displacement-induced labor force exits take place during the first year. That is, about 13 percent 
of displaced workers are not working or looking for work. For three years after the layoff event, 
that share neither rises nor falls. (Specifically, the average rates are 13.0, 12.6 and 13.3 in years 1, 
2 and 3 respectively.) If all the exits occur quickly after the layoff, then to reflect the partial year, 
the share of the laid-off workers that were out of the labor force would be about half of the 13 
percent or 6.5 percent. To the extent that workers may delay their exits during the first few 
months, this number will be biased upward, but for year 0 only.  
Columns 2 and 4 of the tables show employment and unemployment shares respectively. The 
DWS provides these shares for years 1-3, from which we calculate the unemployment rates in 
column 5, using the following formula: 
Unemployment rate = (Unemployed share)/(Unemployed share + Employed share) 
To construct an unemployment rate for year 0, we start by assuming, on average, the layoffs occur 
halfway through the year and that all workers are unemployed at least briefly once during the 
year. If they stayed unemployed for the whole time after layoffs until the end of the year, their 
unemployment rate would be 50 percent for the year. However, according to the DWS, the 
unemployment rate for displaced workers is not 100 percent, but 44.5 percent by a year out. 
Assuming the path from 100 percent to 44.5 percent is not too far from linear, we take a quarter 
of the sum of 100 percent and 44.5 percent as average unemployment for this cohort of workers 
to get 36.1 percent for the average unemployment rate for displaced workers during year 0. That 
is, we multiply by one half to reflect the partial year and another one half to reflect their average 
unemployment rate during that time. If we knew that the layoffs would be early or late in the year, 
this rate would be higher or lower accordingly, for year 0 only.  
Thus, we see that the unemployment rate rises rapidly in year 0. But because all of the cohort was 
employed at the beginning of year 0, annual average unemployment peaks the year after, in year 
1. After that it declines steeply in year 2 and further in year 3.  
Since the DWS does not ask workers to recall back more than three years earlier than their layoff, 
we must make reasonable assumptions about outcomes of layoffs for years 4 and 5. In the DWS, 
unemployment at year 3 is still elevated (higher than 6.5 percent, the average rate at the time of 
the DWS surveys), and it is not declining fast enough to close the gap by year 4, so we assume that 
it takes at least another two years, until year 6, to close the gap. That is, we impose year 6 as the 
end date when the unemployment rate of the displaced workers converges to the national rate. 
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We make the path linear rather than curved (perhaps hyperbolic) to balance out some very long 
spells that we may be truncating. We also note that the share of workers who linger in 
unemployment beyond year 6 is surely quite small.173  
At this point, it is important to emphasize that we don’t expect unemployment to decline to zero 
for laid-off workers, but rather to converge to the U.S. average. Before displacement, they were 
all employed, but over time, their unemployment status would be expected to approach the labor 
market average, not zero unemployment. This means that our baseline for comparison needs to 
change by year. It increases over time from zero to the average when the DWS surveys were 
conducted. Normal turnover (assuming it occurs at a constant rate) would have caused a linear 
rise in unemployment for this set of workers, converging to the national average for the years the 
DWS covers by year 6. 174  
This moving baseline allows us to track two measures of displacement’s impact on joblessness: 
the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed. The impact on the unemployment rate is 
the gap between the DWS unemployment rate for each year above the baseline unemployment. 
Then we multiply the ratio of the unemployment gap to the DWS unemployment rate by the share 
unemployed to estimate the share of displaced workers unemployed as a result of displacement.  
For demographic and geographic sub-groups, we use the DWS shares in the same way as discussed 
above. We also use their specific unemployment rates for the baselines.  
 
III. Participation simulations: from displacement to leaving the labor force 
As noted above, the DWS also shows that some displaced workers exit the labor force altogether. 
So, another impact to track is how much the adoption of AVs could reduce the size of the labor 
force. That is, what share of the workforce laid off from AVs is likely to be neither working nor 
looking for a job? Our strategy is to take the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) estimates of decline 
                                                          
173
 We know that the share unemployed due to displacement will decline over time until it reaches the new steady 
state, but not how fast it declines. It is also likely (because we see this in Years 1-3) that the pace slows every year, 
reflecting accumulating scarring from long-term joblessness, skills gaps, or other barriers. So, the path should be 
concave. By adopting a linear path ending in Year 6, we almost certainly overestimate unemployment effects in 
Years 4 and 5, and underestimate those effects for Years 6 and beyond. Whether these effects balance out 
depends on how many people continue actively looking for work and are unable to find it seven or more years 
after displacement. For the full sample, the overall remaining divergence in unemployment rates in Year 3 is 10.1 
percent (16.6 percent minus 6.5 percent, see Table B-1), far lower than in Years 0 through 2. Future work on 
simulations such as these should tap into longitudinal studies to refine such calibrations and the concept of the 
year-by-year baseline.  
174
 That way, at year 6 we compare unemployment for this set of workers to that for the whole country, but for 
earlier years, we take account of their lower unemployment than the average worker because they all had jobs at 
the beginning of year 0. We call this the baseline unemployment for each year. It begins at zero and converges to 
the national average by year 6. Note that in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, average monthly 
turnover (also called the separation rate) across the U.S. from December 2000 to September 2017 was 3.5% per 
month. At that rate, if displaced workers have an equal and typical chance of separating each month without 
displacement, then over 78 months (six years plus half of year 0), over 94 percent of workers would have left their 
jobs “normally” (without being displaced by AV). 
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in participation in years 1 to 3 after displacement and project them forward beyond the six years 
covered in the unemployment simulations.  
To begin with, it is important to note that the pool of people out of the labor force is not composed 
of the same people every year. A steady average can mask a considerable amount of cycling in and 
out the labor force. For example, some workers (especially young ones—and displaced workers 
are typically younger than average) will opt to get more education or training and re-enter the 
labor force after they finish. Others may take time off to attend to family responsibilities for a 
while, caring for children or parents, and return after that. On the other hand, some displaced 
workers may exit if they fail to find suitable work after a long search. They may stop searching for 
an extended time or permanently. So, the decrease in labor force participation should be seen as 
an increased tendency for many to spend some time not working as well as premature retirement 
by a smaller number.  
Simulating participation decline for displaced workers poses some challenging questions. How 
long does the decline in participation persist beyond the three years we observe in the DWS and 
the six years we model for unemployment impacts?  
The starting point is the unemployment simulation described in Table B-1, which shows how we 
expand the participation effects to years 0 and to years 4-6. As noted, we find a flat effect of 
displacement on labor force participation for years 1-3 for the sample as a whole and for all 
subgroups other than the oldest workers (age 55-64). That is, we model the participation effect as 
a discrete jump in workers’ tendency to be out of the labor force compared to full participation 
before. Then, for years 1-3 we take DWS shares.  
Going beyond the three years raises the question of how long the average displaced worker could 
have been expected to work without displacement. It is far too extreme to assume that the whole 
labor force shrinks a bit, permanently, with each displacement event. Laid off workers do not work 
or live forever; they all leave the labor force eventually. Thus, the impact on the labor market must 
surely taper off over a longer span as the group ages. This does not contradict the lack of a decline 
in the DWS samples over a short time.  
To project the period of impact forward, we estimate the average remaining worklife of the DWS 
sample (using forensic worklife expectancy estimates from Krueger and Slesnick175—a standard 
resource for forensic economists), adjusted for the sex and age of the DWS sample to be 16 years. 
Midway between assuming that the impact of displacement on workers is permanent and 
assuming it disappears after three years is taking a linear decay after three years for the remainder 
of expected worklives. This implies that we expect the labor force participation of displaced 
workers to converge to that of non-displaced workers after 16 years. This pattern is shown in Table 
B-3 and in Figure III-1. 
  
                                                          
175
 Kurt Krueger and Frank Slesnick. “Total Worklife Expectancies.” Journal of Forensic Economics 25, no. 1 (2014), 
pages 51‐70 
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TABLE B-3: Impact of Displacement on Labor Force Participation 
 
Years after 
displacement 
Increase in share of workers not in the labor force after displacement  
All Men Women 
-1 0 0 0 
0 0.067 0.051 0.085 
1 0.130 0.103 0.166 
2 0.126 0.089 0.180 
3 0.133 0.111 0.165 
4 0.123 0.103 0.152 
5 0.113 0.095 0.139 
6 0.102 0.087 0.127 
7 0.092 0.079 0.114 
8 0.082 0.071 0.101 
9 0.072 0.063 0.089 
10 0.061 0.055 0.076 
11 0.051 0.048 0.063 
12 0.041 0.040 0.051 
13 0.031 0.032 0.038 
14 0.020 0.024 0.025 
15 0.010 0.016 0.013 
16 0.000 0.008 0.000 
17  0.000  
Source: See Table B-2 for source of years -1 and 0. Years 1, 2 and 3 are taken from the BLS Displaced Worker Survey. 
For all and women workers, Years 4-16 are a linear decline from the year 1 to year 3 average to zero. Year 16 is the 
average expected worklife of all and women workers in the labor force with the same age and sex distribution as the 
combined 2012, 2014, and 2016 Displaced Worker Survey samples, using expectancies from Kurt V. Krueger and 
Frank Slesnick, “Total Worklife Expectancy,” Journal of Forensic Economics 25, no. 1 (April 2014): 51-70. 
http://www.journalofforensiceconomics.com/doi/abs/10.5085/jfe.25.1.51 For men, the average expected worklife 
is 17 years, so the impact stretches over an additional year. 
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Weighting those worklife estimates by the DWS yields an average expected remaining worklife of 
16 years for the DWS sample. We take a linear path of declining impact that ends in the sixteenth 
year after displacement. For men the worklife length is 17 years, while for women it is 16. 
The DWS makes clear that participation effects are longer-lived than unemployment effects. Davis 
and von Wachter176 also state that: 
Previous research also finds that job displacement leads to other adverse 
consequences. Lasting post-displacement earnings shortfalls occur alongside lower 
job stability, greater earnings instability, recurring spells of joblessness, and 
multiple switches of industry or occupation…Lower job stability and higher earnings 
volatility persist up to 10 years after displacement. Thus, there is no indication that 
laid-off workers trade a lower earnings level for a more stable path of employment 
and earnings. 
This is consistent with the fact that many workers find lower wage jobs after displacement. That 
is, as the wages offered to many workers will be lower or more volatile than their previous job, 
some of them choose not to work. The alternatives of early retirement or taking on family 
responsibilities are more rewarding. Long-lived impacts on participation are also consistent with 
these workers not finding stable employment, so they cycle in and out of the labor market more 
often.  
 
IV. State occupation location quotients 
To complement the analysis of regional impact in our simulations, Table III-2 summarizes 
information from BLS state Occupation Location Quotients. That table is built on the state location 
quotients provided in Table B-4.  
                                                          
176
 Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2011 no. 2. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/recessions-and-the-costs-of-job-loss/ 
138 
 
TABLE B-4: Occupation Location Quotients (LQs) for Primary Driving Occupations* 
State 
Heavy 
and 
Tractor-
Trailer 
Truck 
Drivers 
Light 
Truck or 
Delivery 
Services 
Drivers 
Bus Drivers, 
School or 
Special Client 
Driver/ 
Sales 
Workers 
Taxi 
Drivers and 
Chauffeurs 
Bus 
Drivers, 
Transit 
and 
Intercity 
Ambulance 
Drivers and 
Attendants, 
Except 
Emergency 
Medical 
Technicians 
AL 1.37 0.99 1.34 0.99 0.47 1.00 2.04 
AK 0.70 0.89 0.87 0.67 0.86 0.81  
AZ 0.72 0.90 0.74 1.07 1.38 1.14 0.85 
AR 2.30 0.87 1.42 0.82 1.04 0.25 0.34 
CA 0.67 1.02 0.5 0.83 0.83 1.21 0.76 
CO 0.77 1.11 0.65 0.86 0.74 1.10 0.53 
CT 0.69 1.03 1.68 0.65 1.71 0.82 0.48 
DE 0.73 0.85 1.34 1.19 0.89 0.90 1.04 
DC 0.06 0.39 0.48 0.21 0.45 0.30  
FL 0.78 1.01 0.67 1.04 0.98 1.04 0.15 
GA 1.10 1.01 1.16 1.13 0.51 0.69 1.71 
HI 0.46 1.21 0.61 0.89 1.57 3.00  
ID 1.48 0.79 1.10 1.27 0.70 0.88 1.11 
IL 0.93 1.27 1.04 0.73 1.02 1.16 1.01 
IN 1.45 0.94 1.29 1.27 0.61 0.50 0.40 
IA 2.02 0.99 0.95 0.87 0.81 0.85 1.46 
KS 1.19 0.99 1.32 1.08 0.71 0.24  
KY 1.19 1.09 1.48 0.97 0.71 1.04 0.24 
LA 0.97 1.23 1.17 0.57 0.86 0.51 0.89 
ME 1.16 1.22 1.00 1.33 1.02 0.56 3.73 
MD 0.73 1.35 1.18 0.92 1.34 1.88 0.54 
MA 0.59 1.05 1.08 0.91 2.13 1.08 1.50 
MI 1.04 1.07 0.87 1.03 0.75 0.71 0.76 
MN 1.01 0.86 1.52 1.03 1.04 1.08  
MS 1.66 1.04 1.28 1.10 0.59 0.54 1.08 
MO 1.27 0.91 1.16 1.27 0.79 0.68 0.15 
MT 1.18 1.20 1.20 1.25 0.73 0.98 1.13 
NE 2.29 0.81 1.01 1.23 0.82 0.77 0.85 
NV 0.69 0.94 0.49 1.08 6.88 1.67  
NH 0.82 1.15 1.10 1.16 1.37 0.31  
NJ 0.9 1.11 1.21 0.61 1.55 1.30 1.59 
NM 1.01 0.94 0.92 1.05 0.96 0.78 1.75 
NY 0.52 0.79 1.51 0.08 1.24 1.90 1.72 
NC 1.06 0.97 1.07 1.23 0.67 0.63 0.47 
ND 2.36 1.05 0.91 1.43 1.10 0.32 7.37 
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OH 1.09 1.07 0.57 1.37 1.05 0.91 1.43 
OK 1.21 0.92 0.79 0.98 0.73 0.53 0.75 
OR 1.00 0.83 0.97 1.18 0.70 1.01 0.30 
PA 1.12 0.98 1.50 0.99 0.99 0.78 3.23 
RI 0.55 1.29 1.11 0.99 0.85 0.27 1.12 
SC 1.10 1.11 0.78 1.25 0.61 0.34 3.57 
SD 1.53 1.01 1.02 0.88 1.12 0.43  
TN 1.65 1.06 1.05 1.03 0.71 0.73 0.43 
TX 1.23 0.92 0.80 1.36 0.68 0.91 0.55 
UT 1.34 1.00 0.48 0.73 0.74 0.51 0.64 
VT 0.96 1.14 1.3o 0.72 1.67 1.17  
VA 0.89 0.92  0.94 0.91 1.07 0.62 
WA 0.83 0.97 1.07 0.84 0.88 1.62 0.77 
WV 1.28 1.13 2.11 1.1 0.73 0.59 2.83 
WI 1.44 0.95 1.10 0.92 1.44 0.57 0.59 
WY 1.85 0.90 1.40 1.89 1.45 0.57  
Minimum LQ 0.06 0.39 0.48 0.21 0.45 0.24 0.15 
Maximum LQ 2.36 1.35 2.11 1.89 6.88 3.00 7.37 
Standard 
deviation of LQs 
0.475 0.158 0.336 0.268 0.901 0.500 1.313 
Total US 
employment, in 
thousands** 
1,532 781 212 383 300 75 10 
Jobs eliminated 
in AV scenarios, 
range in 
thousands** 
919-996 351-430 106 77 60-210 53-56 1 
*Occupation location quotients (LQs) measure whether a state specializes in providing a certain type of labor. They 
are defined as the ratio of an occupation’s share of jobs in a state to the occupation’s share of jobs in the U.S. as a 
whole. LQs greater than one signify that the state has a higher concentration of jobs in that occupation than the U.S. 
as whole. LQs less than one indicate that the state has a lower share than in the nation. An LQ of two indicates that 
the state has double the share of jobs in that occupation as the country as a whole. The standard deviation of LQs 
for an occupation is lower if that occupation has a consistent share of jobs in most states. LQs of 1.5 or greater are 
shown in boldface.  
**See Table II-2 for sources.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Survey 2016. 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm. Missing values indicate a very small number of jobs and/or data suppressed to 
preserve confidentiality of survey respondents. Note that self-employed workers are not included in these statistics.   
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V. Earnings losses simulations: from displacement to lost wealth 
As noted in the framework, AV’s transition costs will be borne largely by workers displaced from 
their jobs by AV. This is a small group compared to those who benefit from AV, which includes all 
transportation consumers, along with the firms who become early AV adopters and their suppliers. 
Suppose that some of those benefits could be used to defray the losses likely to be suffered by the 
displaced workers, what would the bill come to? This exercise aims to answer that question.  
A layoff can affect workers’ annual earnings in various ways, including causing a period of 
unemployment, changing the number of hours worked and affecting their wage rate. To simulate 
earnings losses, we apply an estimate of losses to the layoffs we identified in the unemployment 
estimates. While there have been many estimates of earnings losses from displacement before, a 
recent one stands out as particularly valuable for our purposes.  
Our earnings simulations are based on a recent careful study of the impact of displacement by 
Davis and von Wachter.177 Using longitudinal Social Security records from 1974 to 2008, they 
calculate, in present value terms, the lifetime wealth costs to workers of being displaced from their 
jobs. This study has the merits of being based on administrative data (which is very reliable), 
looking at a large sample, and estimating cumulative lifetime impacts. Overall they find large 
effects. They state:  
In present-value terms, men lose an average of 1.4 years of pre-displacement 
earnings if displaced in mass-layoff events that occur when the national 
unemployment rate is below 6 percent. They lose a staggering 2.8 years of pre-
displacement earnings if displaced when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 
percent. These results reflect discounting at a 5 percent annual rate over 20 years 
after displacement. We also document large cyclical movements in the incidence 
of job loss and job displacement and present evidence on how worker anxieties 
about job loss, wage cuts, and job opportunities respond to contemporaneous 
economic conditions.  
The results we use are taken from Table 2 of Davis and von Wachter, which we reproduce here in 
Table B-5. We use the estimates for women and for men with three years of tenure or more (by 
age group for men), to maximize consistency with the Displaced Worker Survey. This is also the 
more conservative approach, since losses for men with six years of tenure are much higher. The 
relevant column is the present discounted value of average loss at displacement “as a multiple of 
predisplacement annual earnings.” 
To estimate predisplacement earnings for the occupations affected by AVs, we use occupational 
average annual earnings for full-time, full-year workers in the American Community Survey (ACS). 
We apply the multiples in Table B-5 to the ACS annual earnings to estimate the wealth loss to 
individuals and sum them up for the number of workers we estimate will be displaced by AV 
adoption.  
                                                          
177
 Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2011 no. 2. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/recessions-and-the-costs-of-job-loss/ 
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TABLE B-5: Reproduction of Table 2 from Davis and von Wachter (2011): Present-Discounted 
Value (PDV) of Earnings Losses after Mass-Layoff Events, 1980–2005178 
 
Group179 
Present discounted value (PDV) of average loss at displacement 
Dollars 
As a multiple of 
predisplacement 
annual earnings 
As percent of PDV of 
counterfactual 
earnings180 
Women 21–50, 3 or more years tenure 
All years  38,033  1.5  10.9  
Expansion years only  33,164  1.3  9.5  
Recession years only  68,782  3.3  20.6  
Men 21–50, 6 or more years tenure  
All years  106,900  2.0  12.9  
Expansion years only  100,543  1.8  11.9  
Recession years only  148,400  3.0  20.0  
Men 21–30, 3 or more years tenure  
All years  50,240  2.1  9.8  
Expansion years only  39,639  1.7  7.8  
Recession years only  117,322  4.0  22.0  
Men 31–40, 3 or more years tenure   
All years  49,599  1.2  7.7  
Expansion years only  42,555  1.0 6.5  
Recession years only  93,833  2.2  16.0  
Men 41–50, 3 or more years tenure181  
All years  98,519  1.8  15.9  
Expansion years only  95,716 1.7 15.1 
Recession years only  116,515 2.2 21.9 
Men 51–60, 3 or more years tenure182  
All years  99,288 1.8 24.0 
Expansion years only  97,934 1.7 23.1 
Recession years only  108,248 2.1 31.1 
 
Source: Reproduced from Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, 2011 no. 2. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/recessions-and-the-costs-of-job-loss/ 
 
                                                          
178
 Present discounted values (PDVs) are calculated over the 20 years following displacement as described in table 1 
of Davis and von Wachter (2011), except as noted below. Dollar figures are in dollars of 2000. 
179
 Ages and years of tenure are as of time of displacement. Values for years containing both expansion and 
recession months or monthly unemployment rates that fall in different ranges are calculated as described in  
table 1 of Davis and von Wachter (2011).  
180
 Counterfactual earnings are what the displaced worker would have earned over the same 20 years had he or she 
not been displaced. 
181
 PDVs are calculated over 15 years. 
182
 PDVs are calculated over 10 years. 
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We consider these estimates rough for a number of reasons. First, not all the AV displaced workers 
will be working full-time, year-round, as the ACS wage estimates assume. Second, Davis and von 
Wachter’s estimates cover only workers with three years of experience, whereas some AV workers 
will have less than that. This analysis does not take into account that employers may lay off workers 
with lower or higher wages on average or with more or less experience, or if there will be any shift 
to part-time or less-than-full-year working arrangements. Any of those decisions will affect the 
eventual magnitude of losses to AV workers. Third, we do not know the stage of the business cycle 
during which layoffs will occur. As Table B- 5 shows, layoffs during recessions are far costlier (about 
twice) to workers than those during expansion years. Thus, actual losses could be much higher or 
lower.  
 
VI. Summary of sources used for impact simulations 
For easy reference, Table B-6 provides a comprehensive list of the sources we use in all parts of 
the simulations in this paper. 
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TABLE B-6: Sources and Uses of Inputs for Impact Simulations 
Simulation Input Source Notes 
Unemployment 
and labor force 
participation 
Labor market status of 
displaced workers with 
3+ years of tenure 
before displacement, 
by sex, age, region, 
education, and race 
Displaced Worker Surveys for 2012, 
2014, 2016, Current Populations Survey, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics  
Tabulations 
provided by 
Henry Farber, 
Princeton 
University and 
downloads from 
BLS website.  
Unemployment rate, 
seasonally adjusted, by 
sex, age, region, 
education, and race 
Current Population Survey, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, for January 2012, 2014, 
and 2016 
Downloads from 
BLS website 
Expected worklife by 
sex and age 
Kurt Krueger and Frank Slesnick. “Total 
Worklife Expectancies.” Journal of 
Forensic Economics 25, no. 1 (2014), 
pages 51‐70 
Table 3 
Participation rate by 
sex, age, region, 
education, and race 
Current Population Survey, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
Downloads from 
BLS website 
Occupational turnover 
projections 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment 
Projections 2016-2026 
Downloads from 
BLS website 
Earnings Net present value of 
earnings losses for 
displaced workers by 
sex and age 
Steven Davis and Till von Wachter. 
“Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
2011 no. 2.  
Table 2 
Driving-related 
Injuries and 
fatalities 
On-the-job injuries 
from traffic accidents 
by occupation 
Survey of Occupational Illnesses and 
Injuries, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016 
Downloads from 
BLS website 
On-the-job fatalities 
from traffic accidents 
by occupation 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016 
Downloads from 
BLS website 
All Employment, wages, 
and demographics by 
occupation 
American Community Survey, Census 
Bureau, 2015 
Downloads from 
Census website 
Proportion of jobs that 
require driving 
Occupational Requirements Survey, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016 and 2017  
Downloads from 
BLS website 
Occupations affected 
by AV 
David Beede, Regina Powers, and 
Cassandra Ingram, “The Employment 
Impact of Autonomous Vehicles” ESA 
Issue Brief #05-17, Office of the Chief 
Economist, Economics and Statistics 
Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. August 11, 2017.  
Consultation with SAFE transportation 
experts 
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